

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706300961 DOC. DATE: 87/06/25 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light Co 05000250  
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 HART, R. D. Florida Power & Light Co.  
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-016-00: on 870526, while in Mode 6, partial actuation of Train A safeguards equipment occurred. Caused by sticking safety injection block switch. Safety injection block switch inspected, cleaned & lubricated. W/B ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4  
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT		COPIES			RECIPIENT		COPIES	
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	McDONALD, D		1	1					
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON		1	1	ACRS MOELLER		2	2	
	AEOD/DOA		1	1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB		2	2	
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB		1	1	DEDRO		1	1	
	NRR/DEST/ADE		1	0	NRR/DEST/ADS		1	0	
	NRR/DEST/CEB		1	1	NRR/DEST/ELB		1	1	
	NRR/DEST/ICSB		1	1	NRR/DEST/MEB		1	1	
	NRR/DEST/MTB		1	1	NRR/DEST/PSB		1	1	
	NRR/DEST/RSB		1	1	NRR/DEST/SGB		1	1	
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB		1	1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB		1	1	
	NRR/DOEA/EAB		1	1	NRR/DREP/RAB		1	1	
	NRR/DREP/RPB		2	2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB		1	1	
	NRR/PMAS/PTSB		1	1	REG FILE	02	1	1	
	RES DEPY GI		1	1	RGN2 FILE	01	1	1	
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M		5	5	H ST LOBBY WARD		1	1	
	LPDR		1	1	NRC PDR		1	1	
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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTR 42 ENCL 40

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>Turkey Point Unit 3</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 0 3</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**Partial Actuation of Train A Safeguards Equipment Due to Sticking Block Switch**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
									N/A		
<b>0 5</b>	<b>2 6</b>	<b>8 7</b>	<b>8 7</b>	<b>0 1 6</b>	<b>0 0</b>	<b>0 6</b>	<b>2 5</b>	<b>8 7</b>	N/A		
OPERATING MODE (9) <b>6</b>			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)								

POWER LEVEL (10) <b>0 0 0</b>	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME <b>Randall D. Hart, Licensing Engineer</b>		AREA CODE <b>3 0 5</b>	<b>2 4 6 - 1 3 0 0</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	J E	3 3	W 1 2 3	N							
X	J E	R L Y	W 1 2 3	Y							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		
			MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 26, 1987, while Unit 3 was in mode 6 (refueling), a partial actuation of the train A safeguards equipment occurred. Preparations were underway on Unit 3 to perform temporary procedure (TP) 336, Dual Unit LOOP with Single Unit SI. The TP was being used to verify proper sequencer logic actuation. As a part of this preparation, safeguards rack 45 was being re-energized per plant procedures and when the safety injection block switch was supposed to automatically return to neutral position, it would not return by itself. The operator manually returned the switch to the neutral position and at this time an actuation of the train A safeguards equipment occurred. The operators entered applicable emergency operating procedures. While verifying proper equipment actuation, it was discovered that only a partial actuation of train A occurred. The affected equipment was returned to its normal status for mode 6. An investigation revealed that the cause of the safeguards actuation signal was due to a sticking safety injection block switch. The reason for only a partial train A actuation was due to a piece of insulation found in relay SI 15X which would not allow it to actuate. The block switch was inspected, cleaned and placed back in service. The safeguards racks on both units were cleaned and inspected.

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PDR ADDCK 05000250  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Turkey Point Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   5   0	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8   7   -	0   1   6   -	0   0	0   2	OF	0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

**EVENT:**

On May 26, 1987, while Unit 3 was in mode 6 (refueling), a partial actuation of the train A safeguards equipment occurred. Preparations were underway on Unit 3 to perform temporary procedure (TP) 336, Dual Unit LOOP with Single Unit SI. The TP was being used to verify proper sequencer logic actuation. As a part of this preparation, safeguards rack 45 was being re-energized per off normal operating procedure (ONOP) 3-ONOP-049, Re-energizing Safeguard Racks After Loss of Single Power Supply. When step 5.4.5 was performed that should have automatically returned the safety injection block switch to the neutral position, it would not return by itself. The operator manually returned the switch to the neutral position and at this time an actuation of the train A safeguards equipment occurred. The operators entered emergency operating procedure (EOP) 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then entered 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination. While verifying proper equipment actuation, it was discovered that only a partial actuation of train A occurred. The equipment that actuated was; the A emergency diesel generator (EDG), 3A intake cooling water (ICW) pump, containment purge valves 2601 and 2603 closed, containment and control room ventilation isolation, and a partial phase A containment isolation occurred. The affected equipment was returned to its normal status for mode 6 and an investigation was begun into the cause of the event and the reason for the partial actuation of train A.

**CAUSE OF EVENT:**

The investigation revealed that the cause of the safeguards actuation signal was due to a sticking safety injection block switch. The reason for only a partial train A actuation was due to a piece of insulation found in relay SI 15X which would not allow it to actuate.

**ANALYSIS OF EVENT:**

At the time of the event, unit 3 was in mode 6 with a reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature of 88 degrees Fahrenheit. The requirements for equipment response to a safety injection signal during refueling shutdown depend on the status of the equipment. Certain valves were already closed and other equipment had been taken out of service on equipment clearance orders such that they could not actuate. Upon receiving the partial safety injection signal, the equipment that was affected, operated as required. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:**

- 1) The safety injection block switch was inspected, cleaned, and lubricated prior to reassembly and reinstallation on Unit 3.
- 2) The insulation was removed from SI 15X and the safeguards racks on Units 3 and 4 were cleaned and inspected.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Turkey Point Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   5   0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 8   7	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0   1   6	REVISION NUMBER 0   0	0   3	OF 0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

- 3) TP 336 was successfully performed on May 28 and 29, 1987, which included a simulated SI signal and proper equipment operation was verified.
- 4) The Instrumentation and Control Department has a maintenance instruction to clean the safeguards racks at the end of each refueling shutdown.

ADDITIONAL DETAILS:

The safety injection block switch is supplied by Westinghouse.  
similar occurrences: none



JUNE 25 1987

L-87-267  
10 CFR 50.73


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-250  
Reportable Event: 87-16  
Date of Event: May 26, 1987  
Partial Actuation of Train A Safeguards  
Equipment Due to Sticking Block Switch

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

  
C. O. Woody  
Group Vice President  
Nuclear Energy

COW/SDF/gp

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC  
Senior Resident Inspection, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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