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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 REYES, L. A. Region 2, Office of Director
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.

SUBJECT: Summarizes 870505 meeting w/util at plant site re Augmented
 Insp Team findings & issues that may affect plant. List of
 attendees encl.

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 TITLE: Summary of Significant Meeting with Licensee

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Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251
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✓ Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy Department
P. O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT - DOCKET NOS. 50-250
AND 50-251

This letter refers to the meeting conducted at your Turkey Point Nuclear Plant May 5, 1987. The meeting involved a discussion on the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) findings and other issues that may affect restart of the units. Enclosed is a summary of the meeting topics.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial, and provided a better understanding of the restart issues and the status of your corrective actions.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, "Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations," a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them.

Sincerely,

Luis A. Reyes

Luis A. Reyes, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

- 1. Meeting Summary
- 2. Attendance List

cc w/encls:

- ✓ C. M. Wethy, Vice President
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
- ✓ C. J. Baker, Plant Manager
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
- ✓ A. Arias, Jr., Regulatory and Compliance
Supervisor

bcc w/encl:

- ✓ NRC Resident Inspector
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ENCLOSURE 1

MEETING SUMMARY

At the conclusion of the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Exit briefing on May 5, 1987, representatives from Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) and the NRC met to discuss the various issues that could impact the restart of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. FPL's present schedule is for Unit 4 to restart on May 25 and Unit 3 to restart on June 15. A list of attendees is contained in Enclosure 2.

The restart issues were divided into five areas: 1) follow-up on AIT findings (conoseal report); 2) diesel generator wiring errors; 3) proposed integrated sequencer tests; 4) Raychem splices; and 5) effectiveness of engineering evaluations. Much of the discussion concerning items 1) and 5) took place during the AIT Exit briefing.

Issue 1) AIT Findings

Commitments were made by FPL to improve inspections, leak detection processes and engineering evaluations in order to prevent an incident such as this from re-occurring. Many of these commitments are contained in FPL letter L-87-186, Report on Instrumentation Port Column Assembly Leakage. The AIT Report, No. 50-251/87-16, will also summarize the team's findings and will concur in the restart of Unit 4 pending satisfactory completion of the applicable commitments.

Issue 2) Diesel Generator Wiring Errors

FPL recently identified wiring errors in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) protection circuitry and the 3B load sequencer. Licensee representatives described their analysis of the cause of these errors and the proposed corrective actions. These actions included functional tests of the "A" EDG protective relaying, 100% inspection of the wiring in all four load sequencers, engineering analysis of sequencer circuitry for other "hidden" circuits and functional testing of these previously untested circuits. The delayed start of the Containment Spray Pumps due to a small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) is an example of one of these untested circuits. They have subsequently identified four other capabilities of the sequencer not previously tested (see Issue 3). Additional information on this issue is contained in Inspection Report 50-250, 251/87-14.

Issue 3) Integrated Sequencer Test

As a result of wiring errors discussed previously, FPL concluded that the "cross-talk" capability of the sequencers during a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) of both units had never been adequately tested. They committed to develop and perform such a test prior to restart of either unit. A test of this type can only be properly performed with both units in cold shutdown. The proposed test would be to interrupt offsite power to both

units, allow the EDGs to energize the required shutdown loads, then to manually initiate a safety injection on one unit. This test would then be repeated for the other unit. NRC personnel cautioned that the test be carefully planned so as to not subject personnel and equipment to unnecessary hazards. Also, that Regional personnel be kept aware of schedules, be provided test procedures and work closely with FPL personnel in order to monitor the test. In subsequent telephone conversations on May 13, 1987, FPL committed to functionally test five circuits on each unit prior to restart of the applicable unit. These tests will be monitored by NRC inspectors and documented in Inspection Report 250, 251/87-26.

Issue 4) Raychem Splices

FPL identified a large number of electrical cable splices with problems (installed incorrectly or lack of proper documentation). The licensee has or will replace 1475 splices in Unit 3 containment and 879 splices in Unit 4. The licensee plans to replace the remaining Unit 4 splices (in containment) during the next scheduled refueling outage. They have developed a Safety Evaluation (SE) to justify restart of Unit 4 prior to replacing all of the identified defective splices. Their original schedule called for replacement of Unit 4 splices during the 1988 refueling outage; however, they decided to take advantage of the outage caused by the conoseal leakage and replace the more sensitive instrument splices. The Safety Evaluation has been forwarded to NRR for review.

Issue 5) Effectiveness of Engineering Evaluations

FPL was asked to address this subject during the meeting due to NRC concerns in this area. These concerns were raised due to perceived inadequacies as evidenced by the examples given in the SALP report (250, 251/86-27) and the Enforcement Action '86-20. More recent issues include the conoseal leakage evaluation, seismic operability of EDG air receivers, and ICW check valve operability. Licensee representatives discussed several areas of potential improvement including procedures, staffing and supervisory review of evaluations. A QIP team has been formed to prepare an Engineering Guideline Document while instruction QI 3.2, Guidelines for the Preparation of Safety Evaluations, is being reviewed for adequacy. FPL was informed during the meeting that an NRC inspection would be conducted to evaluate the licensee's performance in this area. FPL felt confident about the results of this inspection since INPO has identified FPL's Standard Engineering Package as an Industry Good Practice.

Summary

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Action Necessary for Restart</u>
1	AIT Findings	NRC - Issue AIT Report FPL - Meet commitments in L-87-186



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|---|-------------------------|---|
| 2 | EDG Wiring Errors | NRC - None
FPL - Complete evaluation of wiring errors |
| 3 | Sequencer Test | NRC - Review Test Procedure, monitor test
FPL - Complete functional testing of all identified circuits |
| 4 | Raychem Splices | NRC - Evaluate FPL SE concerning Raychem splices
FPL - Complete splice repair work in Units 3 and 4 as presently scheduled |
| 5 | Engineering Evaluations | NRC - Conduct team inspection
FPL - Initiate stated improvements in procedures, staffing and supervisory review |

ENCLOSURE 2

LIST OF ATTENDEES

NRC - FPL MEETING MAY 5, 1987

Florida Power and Light Company

J. Arias, Jr.	Regulation & Compliance Supervisor
F. Southworth	Maintenance Superintendent
D. Grandage	Operations Superintendent
C. Baker	Plant Manager
C. O. Woody	Group Vice President
J. W. Dickey	Vice President Nuclear Operations
C. M. Wethy	Site Vice President
R. J. Acosta	Director, Quality Assurance
J. K. Hays	Director of Nuclear Licensing
D. A. Chaney	Plant Site Engineer Manager
H. T. Young	Project Site Manager
E. Preast	APMG
M. J. Crisler	QC Supervisor
F. G. Flugger	Manager Technical Licensing
L. F. Pabst	Manager Mechanical Engineering
W. J. Pike	Safety Engineer Group
P. L. Pace	Licensing Supervisor
P. W. Hughes	HP Supervisor
E. L. Anderson	ISI Engineer
J. P. Mendieta	Services Manager - N
J. W. Kappes	PEP Manager
H. E. Yaeger	Manager Nuclear Maintenance
R. L. Wade	Site Engineering
M. J. Bowskill	STA Lead Engineer
P. A. Roach	STA
J. L. Montgomery	Lead Elec./I&C Engr.

NRC

J. N. Grace	Regional Administrator, RII
J. H. Sniezek	Deputy Director, NRR
G. C. Lainas	Assistant Director, RII, NRR
D. G. McDonald	Project Manager, NRR
D. R. Brewer	Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point
B. A. Wilson	Section Chief, RII
A. R. Herdt	Branch Chief, DRS RII
M. L. Ernst	Deputy Regional Administrator, RII
J. B. MacDonald	Resident Inspector, Turkey Point
K. W. VanDyne	Resident Inspector, Turkey Point
R. V. Crlenjak	Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie

