

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 . FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
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 VARGA, S.A. Operating Reactors Branch 1


SUBJECT: Notifies of deficiencies in emergency ventilation system
 NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4. Util will install redundant
 control room normal intake radiation monitor to correct
 deficiencies. Completion of mods scheduled by June 1986.

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Varga:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 & 50-251
NUREG 0737, Item III.D.3.4
Control Room Habitability

By letters dated July 9, 1981 (L-81-285) June 9, 1982 (L-82-240) July 22, 1982 (L-82-298), August 9, 1983 (L-83-441) and November 3, 1983 (L-83-552) Florida Power & Light Company provided responses to NUREG 0737, Item III.D.3.4, Control Room Habitability concerns, and provided details of proposed modifications to assure that the control room operators will be adequately protected, and that Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, can be safely operated or shut down during design basis accident conditions. In your Safety Evaluation dated November 25, 1983 you concluded that the proposed modifications were acceptable and in accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG-0737.

In part, the Safety Evaluation stated "The emergency ventilation system has redundant means of automatic actuation for all postulated accidents having the potential of yielding doses greater than GDC 19 limits, and is further protected against Unit 3 spent fuel releases which have not that potential, but which could contaminate the control room". That finding was based on the Turkey Point Unit 3 and 4 control room ventilation system being automatically isolated and pressurized upon a high radiation signal as monitored at the plant stack (the ventilation systems for both containments, the auxiliary building, and the Unit 4 fuel handling building exhaust through the plant stack), and that the fuel handling accident was the most severe design basis release (doses to control room occupants within GDC 19 guidelines) for the Unit 3 fuel handling building.

During review of plant change modifications to implement auxiliary power upgrade (C-Bus) and control room habitability modifications, FPL identified the following deficiencies. The normal sampling point for the containment and plant stack radiation monitors, R-11 and R-12, which provide input for control room ventilation isolation, is the containment building and not the plant stack as stated in previous correspondence, since they are required for reactor coolant system

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Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief

leakage detection per Technical Specification 3.1-3. Also, the cask drop accident, which is a more severe licensing basis accident, should have been used for determining operator doses, since it could result in releases larger than the fuel handling accident.

To correct both these deficiencies, FPL will install a redundant control room normal intake radiation monitor that will automatically initiate control room isolation/pressurization upon detection of high radiation. The input from R-11 and R-12 will remain as is, since the maximum hypothetical accident (i.e. LOCA) is the most severe accident with regard to control room doses. The addition of this redundant monitor is in accordance with the Safety Evaluation in that "the emergency ventilation system has redundant means of automatic actuation for all postulated accidents having the potential of yielding doses greater than GDC-19 limits...".

In FPL letter L-84-100 dated April 13, 1984 FPL committed to the installation of a redundant normal air intake isolation damper and a redundant emergency supply fan and motor by December 31, 1985. A plant review of the initial design for the supply fan indicated that access for maintenance and testing of the HEPA/charcoal filters would be limited. The redesign resulted in a change in scope, delaying the engineering completion date to June 1985. Control room habitability modifications are now scheduled to be completed by June 1986.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,


J. W. Williams, Jr.
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

JWW/TCG/cab

