UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-250/88-38 and 50-251/88-38

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33102

Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4

Inspection Conducted: December 5-9, 1988

Inspector: M D Hunt for 12/28/88
N. Merriweather Date Signed

Team Members C. Kido, Consultant Engineer, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
M. Miller, Reactor Inspector, RII
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Approved by: T E Conlon 12/28/88
T. E. Conlon, Chief Date Signed
Plant Systems Section
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This special, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment which included: a review of Florida Power and Light Company's implementation of a program to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 at Turkey Point Plant; walkdown inspections of equipment inside containment; preventive and corrective EQ maintenance; and followup on licensee commitments (SER/TER).

Results: In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

The results of this inspection support NRC's initial assessment, of the July 21, 1987 audit, that FPL had implemented an adequate EQ program and that the program continues to be adequate. The walkdowns of EQ equipment revealed some minor discrepancies both EQ and non-EQ for which the licensee has proposed acceptable corrective actions.

Reviews of EQ documentation files identified some areas where additional information was requested to clarify the analysis provided in the file. In these cases, FPL has committed to revise the DOC PACs to incorporate the appropriate information. In the area of EQ maintenance, both prevention and corrective, it was observed that the maintenance program procedural compliance was good. Maintenance activities were scheduled, planned and executed in accordance with program procedures. The maintenance procedures and schedules were considered adequate. The maintenance requirements given in the EQ DOC PACs were confirmed to have been incorporated into the maintenance program for those sample items reviewed.

Management appears to be supporting the EQ Program at Turkey Point. Management wants to develop a proactive program in which they can identify problems in the program instead of reacting to NRC initiatives. The licensee has brought in outside contract support to walkdown EQ equipment, review the EQ files and to evaluate deficiencies. In addition, the QA audit department has also contracted for technical support in the EQ area to support their audit team. These and other self monitored initiatives will enhance the EQ program. The EQ DOC PACs were considered, in most cases, to be well organized and complete. Inclusion of EQ checklists provides a quick reference to locate appropriate material (such as, test procedures, test reports, SCEW sheets, vendor correspondence, and qualification summary).

The licensee has adopted a system of marking EQ components with special tags identifying it as EQ. This provides a warning to the technicians that special maintenance may be required to maintain the qualified status. All of these independent initiatives were considered strengths in the licensee's EQ program. Only one weakness was observed involving poorly identified electrical penetrations. However, it is our understanding that improved identification tags will be installed as part of the licensee's current enhancement program for identifying equipment.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*T. Abbatiello, Supervisor - Performance Monitoring, Quality Assurance
*W. A. Busch, Electrical Engineer
*J. E. Cross, Plant Manager
*R. J. Earl, QC Supervisor
*S. M. Franzone, Lead Nuclear
*R. Gouldy, Principal Engineer
*S. T. Hale, Engineering Project Manager
*J. W. Kapper, Maintenance Superintendent
*E. Lyons, Compliance Engineer
*C. E. Norris, QA Engineer
*L. W. Pearce, Operations Superintendent
*G. Pinsonneault, Licensing Secretary
*G. E. Regal, EQ Coordinator
*G. Salamon, Compliance Engineer
*D. L. Smith, Manager Electrical/I&C Engineering - Juno
*F. H. Southworth, Technical Sup.
*R. J. Stevens, Manager, - Plant Licensing

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

*R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector (RI)
*T. McElhinney, RI
*G. Schnebli, RI

*Attended exit interview

2. Evaluation of Licensee's Program for Qualification of Electrical Equipment Located in Harsh Environments (TS 2515/75, TI 2515/76 and 2500/17)

During the week of December 5, 1988, members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II and Idaho National Engineering laboratory (INEL) conducted a Phase II EQ inspection of Florida Power and Light's (FPL's) Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4 Equipment Qualification (EQ) program. The Phase I EQ inspection performed in March 1987 verified that the documentation in the EQ files was adequate to support qualification of the electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The purpose of the Phase II EQ inspection was to evaluate the implementation of the EQ program and to verify that selected components inside containment were installed as tested.

NRC Temporary Instructions 2515/75, 2515/76 and 2500/17 were used as the guidelines during the EQ inspection. Similar to the first inspection, the team examined files as the basis for qualification; performed walkdown inspections of equipment (inside containment only); continued the review of the EQ maintenance program; and examined what actions had been taken by the licensee on previous inspection concerns and commitments. The results and conclusions reached are discussed below:

a. Maintenance

A review of the Maintenance Tracking System (MTS) indicated that EQ maintenance was being performed as required within the allowable time frame. Also indicated by this review were poor maintenance practices. Examples of these were missing screws on junction boxes and condulet covers, transmitters that were bent out of position due to being used as a step, and inconsistent reading of bearing oil sightglasses. These examples did not affect the qualification of EQ equipment, but indicate a need to improve the overall maintenance program.

b. In Plant Physical Inspection and EQ file Review

The inspection team physically inspected approximately 60 qualified components and associated field cables inside containment for as-built installation characteristics such as mounting configuration, orientation, interfaces, name plate data, moisture intrusion seals, splices/terminations, internal wiring and preservation and protection. Several of the EQ files had been previously examined during the first round EQ inspection, however, in these four cases where the files were not previously reviewed, they were examined during this inspection and are discussed in this report. In all other cases only cursory reviews of the EQ files were made to confirm special installation or maintenance requirements, model number and equipment qualified life. The walkdowns resulted in some minor deficiencies being identified in which the licensee has proposed or taken adequate corrective actions as discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA), EQDP 6.1 and 8.0. The following EPAs were inspected inside the containment for mounting configuration, identification, stressing of conductors, termination of conductors and general area cleanliness around penetration assemblies. All EPAs inspected were considered to be satisfactory.

Site ID No.	Manufactor/Description
T4I01	Conax/Low Voltage Instrumentation
T4P43	Crouse Hinds/600V Power Cable Assembly
T4P22	Crouse Hinds/600V Power Cable Assembly

Site ID No. (cont'd)	Manufactor/Description
T4C12	Crouse Hinds/600V Control Cable Assembly
T4I24	Crouse Hinds/600V Instrumentation Assembly

The penetration conductors to field cable terminations were accomplished by using Raychem heat shrink tubing. These terminations appeared to be satisfactory. During the walkdown inspection, a weakness was observed with regard to the sites identification labelling for the EPAs. Most of the EPAs were identified by the use of drawings.

Labelling for other EQ equipment (transmitters, etc.) appeared to be good. The licensee stated that they have an enhancement program that is up-grading the labelling identification for these EPA.

(2) General Atomics Radiation Detectors, EQDP 11.0. Radiation Detectors RD-4-6311A and 6311B inside the containment were examined during the walkdown. The mounting configuration and name plate data agreed with the information in EQDP 11.0.

During the review of the EQDP it was noted that anomalies pertaining to the cable and connector failures were experienced during several of the LOCA tests with a G. A. Radiation Detector. This was resolved when an acceptable design was achieved. The detector was qualified with this design which included Raychem heat shrink tubing for the cable/connector interfaces. Turkey Point uses this same cable/connector sealing system. A visual examination of the cable/connector interface appeared to meet the requirement shown and referenced in the EQDP. The area around the detector and cable/connector interfaces was clean.

IFI 50-250, 251/87-08-16, Brand Rex Conax Jacket Integrity, is applicable to the accuracy requirements of the General Atomics Radiation Detectors. This item was reviewed and discussed in NRC Report 50-250, 251/88-27. Licensee action to close this item is still in process and expected to be complete in early 1989. This item remain open and will be reviewed on a future inspection.

(3) Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors, Model 7M18-10001-01 and 7M18-10002-01, Tag Nos. TE-410 A&B, TE-413 A&B, TE-420 A&B, and TE-423 A&B

The RTDs inspected are located inside containment. They are used to measure the RCS Loops A&B cold leg and hot leg temperatures. Several of the RTDs were examined for location,

tagging, model numbers, qualified electrical connections and qualified housing. The RTDs are installed using a Conax T-8 head assembly which contains a terminal block for the initial terminations. The T-8 head assembly is qualified for EQ. A Conax ECSA connects from the T-8 head assembly to a splice box where the pigtails are connected to a field cable using Raychem shrink material.

EQ File 6.2 for the Conax RTDs, ECSAs and the T-8 head was reviewed to determine and verify these instruments are qualified for their intended use. The maintenance requirements were specified and found acceptable. In addition, IPS-325 and IPS-1138 were reviewed for the Viton O-ring and T-8 Head Assembly respectively.

(4) Rosemont Series 1153 Pressure and Differential Pressure Transmitters; PT-455, PT-456, PT-457, LT-459, LT-460, LT-461, LT-474, LT-475, LT-476, LT-484, LT-485, LT-486, LT-494, LT-495, LT-496, PT-403, PT-404, PT-405, PT-406

The instruments inspected are located inside containment. They are used to measure the RCS Pressurizer pressure and level, the level for Steam Generators A, B, & C, and the RCS Loops pressure. Each transmitters installed condition was examined for location, tagging, model numbers, orientation, qualified electrical connections, and a qualified housing and cover seal.

The housing covers were removed from four transmitters, LT-474, LT-484, LT-485, and LT-486, to verify the proper type of seal O-rings were installed. Each transmitter electrical connection assembly was inspected to ensure that a Conax ECSA PN N-11001-31 was installed and the pigtails from the ECSA to the field cable was made in a splice box using Raychem shrink material.

EQ File 24.1 and Test Report TR 45592-3 were reviewed for the Rosemont transmitters with the Conax ECSA. The Component Maintenance History was reviewed to assure work requests were written for calibration required during the refueling outage.

The documentation packages and the installed transmitters were found to be acceptable.

(5) Fluid Components, Inc., Flow Switch Model FR 72-4R, Tag Nos. FS-1422 and FS-1427

These flow switches are located inside containment. Their function is to activate the charcoal filter dousing valves when low air flow condition exist to prevent ignition of the charcoal beds. The switches were not accessible for walkdown.

The EQ File No. 4 and Test Report TR 708053 were reviewed and found adequate. EQ File No. 6 for the Conax ECSA was also found satisfactory.

(6) Gems/Delaval Liquid Level Transmitters (EQDP 10.0)

The Gems/Delaval Liquid Transmitters are used to monitor reactor building (RB) water level. During a plant walkdown, two level transmitters, LT-6309 A&B, were inspected. These two transmitters monitor water level above the 14 foot elevation. The junction box (JB) where the electrical connection are made were properly protected to prevent water entry into it. This was accomplished by having it filled with silicone oil in accordance with manufacturers requirementss. This oil is heavier than water and will preclude any water from entering the JB that could adversely affect the electronics of the system. Cable connection downstream of the JB were made using Raychem sleeving that appeared to be satisfactory. The transmitters were properly labelled and the area around them was clean.

(7) DOC PAC 26.0 - Target Rock Corporation, 1-inch Solenoid Valves, Models 808-001, 81AA-001, and 8300-001

The qualification of the above equipment meets the requirements and guidelines of Reg. Guide 1.89 (IEEE 323-1974), Reg. Guide 1.100 (IEEE 344-1975), and Reg. Guide 1.73 (IEEE 382-1972). The equipment is qualified to Category I of NUREG-0588. The test conditions (385°F, 66 psig, 100% humidity, 2.07EB R, and 10.0pH chemical spray) envelope the plant conditions (276°F, 50 psig, 100% humidity, 4.0E7 R, and spray). The SCEW sheets and appropriate portions of the maintenance program were reviewed and found to be consistent with the test results and analyses. The O-rings and gaskets will be replaced every 20 years as recommended by the vendor technical manual. The qualified life of the solenoid valve is 40 years, which was determined by the Arrhenius methodology. The EQ file inspection raised several questions, all of which were resolved by the licensee before the conclusion of the inspection. Following is a brief discussion of the areas reviewed.

The EQ file qualified the above models by similarity to Model 77CC-001, which was tested by Target Rock. However, the similarity analysis only stated that the models were "similar in design and made from the same materials." It was not clear that the licensee had performed a thorough evaluation of the basis for qualification by similarity. In response to these questions, the licensee contacted Target Rock, who indicated that the tested valves in TR 2375 contain exactly the same type of limit switches, coils, and O-rings as models 808-001, 81AA-001, and 8300-001. Additional information is available in

the Target Rock test reports to support the similarity analysis. The licensee indicated that Target Rock reports, containing the similarity analyses, were reviewed and found acceptable. The DOC PAC files will be updated to clarify the similarity analysis. This explanation was acceptable.

The inspector asked the licensee if any Target Rock valves were energized during normal plant operation, and if so, did the test report consider the self-heating effects. Also, did the test report consider the heat input from the process fluid? The licensee explained that the effects of the process fluid temperature are insignificant for all Target Rock valves at the plant; the valves are either subjected to ambient water temperature for charcoal filter dousing or the solenoid coils are normally de-energized during the plant normal operating conditions. The reactor head vent valves are closed during normal plant operation and the duration of the valve open position is short. There is 42 feet of uninsulated piping between the reactor head and the valves. Consequently, heat from the stagnant fluid in the piping will be shed before it reaches the valves. This explanation was acceptable.

The inspector noticed that the site-controlled copy of the Target Rock maintenance manual and plant maintenance procedures did not appear to reference the service bulletins from the manufacturer. When questioned the licensee explained that service bulletins are routinely evaluated upon receipt for operability and safety concerns. The necessary changes are incorporated via document change requests. To determine the effectiveness of this process, the inspector asked the licensee if an engineering evaluation had been performed on Target Rock Service Bulletin 88-01, regarding the inspection of the reed switch position indication lead wires for susceptibility to cracks from normal handling. The licensee demonstrated that an engineering evaluation of 88-01 was performed to consider the potential for nuclear safety hazards. Based on the results of their study, a Part 21 Notice was not issued. The inspector reviewed the latest revision O-PMI-102.5, Target Rock solenoid valve maintenance and verified that the recommended inspections were included in Step 6.2.12. Also, work packages completed on October 16, 1988 by plant personnel were reviewed and verified that the condition of the reed switch wiring was acceptable.

The walkdown inspection of SV-4-6318B and SV-4-6319B discovered that the lugs on the jumper wire (4 places) appeared to be too large for the installation. It appeared that the lugs were cut down in size and bent over to fit the terminal board connections. There was a potential for the connections to contact the housing. The licensee committed to replace the jumper wires with jumper wires and lugs of the correct size.

The inspection of SV-4-2909 identified three screws missing from the terminal board. The licensee committed to restore the screws via work order. Also, the positive lead wire to the coil was found to have a cracked tongue at the terminal block. Since the terminal board is located at the top end of the solenoid assembly, it appeared that the wire may have been bent over when the housing was installed. The wire still appeared to make adequate electrical contact. The licensee determined that there was no safety significance and committed to replace the damaged wire. This was acceptable.

There were no open items remaining as a result of the EQ file review and walkdown inspection.

(8) DOC PAC 30.0 - Valcor Engineering Corporation, 1-inch Solenoid Valves, Model V526-5295-69

The qualification of the above equipment meets the requirements and guidelines of Reg. Guide 1.89 (IEEE 323-1974), Reg. Guide 1.100 (IEEE 344-1975), and Reg. Guide 1.73 (IEEE 382-1972). The equipment is qualified to Category I of NUREG-0588. The test specimen was a model V526-5295-69. The test conditions (414°F, 66 psig, 100% humidity, 2.05E8 R, and 10.0pH chemical spray) envelope the plant conditions. A similarity analysis was performed to demonstrate qualification of the valve subassembly and solenoid subassembly to the test specimen. The test valves were operated throughtout the LOCA tests for 31 days at various voltage levels. The qualified life is 40 years, which is consistent with the SCEW sheets and maintenance program.

During the review of the test report, there were several test anomalies that did not appear to have been thoroughly addressed. The results of the radiation and thermal aging tests (QR 526-5683-6) determined that the insulation resistance (IR) and dielectric strength tests were below the acceptance limits. In their discussion of the test anomalies, Valcor determined that the dielectric loss and IR breakdown from the wiring to the solenoid shell was due to bared internal leadwire contacting the solenoid shell. The leadwire was bare of insulation over random sections of the wire because the insulation (Tefzel) had become embrittled by overaging. Subsequent handling and shipping during the test program caused parts of the embrittled insulation to break away. The leadwires were overaged to an amount equivalent to 140 years in order to achieve the necessary aging for other critical components. Valcor indicated that if the Tefzel wire insulation had been aged to only 40 years, the insulation would not have degraded and the IR tests and dielectric tests would have been acceptable. The inspector was concerned that the EQ file did not referenced the qualified life

of Tefzel insulation and did not discuss the basis for predicting the acceptability of the IR and dielectric tests. In response to these questions, the licensee indicated that the disposition of the test anomalies were reviewed and accepted by the plant engineering staff. The licensee also cited DOC PAC 36.0 for qualification of the Tefzel wire insulation. The inspector briefly reviewed this file (see Paragraph 2.b.9 of this report). The file demonstrated the qualified life of the Tefzel insulation is 32 years, which exceeds the balance of operating life at the plant. In summary, the inspector found that the DOC PAC 30.0 does demonstrate qualification of the Valcor solenoid valves, but the basis for acceptance of the test anomalies should be strengthened. The licensee committed to revise DOC PAC 30.0 to clarify the basis for acceptance of the test anomalies.

The walkdown inspection was performed for SV-4-6427A and SV-4-6427B. The valves were inspected for installation configuration, wiring, identification, manufacturer's nameplate date, and seals and found acceptable. No open items were identified.

(9) DOC PAC 36.0 - Teledyne Thermatics Internal Jumper Wire (Tefzel-280)

The qualification of the Tefzel wire meets the requirements and guidelines of Category I of NUREG-0588. The test conditions (340°F, 105 psig, 100% humidity, 2.0E8 R, and 10.0pH chemical spray) envelope the plant conditions. The qualified life is 32 years at 50°C, which is greater than the balance of life of the plant. The Tefzel jumper wires were installed in 1985 for various equipment (Limitorques, Valcor, etc.). During the walkdown inspection of selected components the inspector verified that the internal wires were in good condition. No open items were identified.

(10) Limitorque Actuators (Various locations inside containment), Equipment Tag Nos. MOV-4-744A, MOV-4-744B, MOV-4-866B, MOV-4-6386, and MOV-4-751

Five Limitorque actuators were inspected during the Phase II EQ inspection. MOV-4-744A and B are dual voltage motor types with Dings brakes, while the others are 460 volt models. All were inspected for T-drains, grease reliefs, internal wiring, mounting configuration, and nameplate data.

The licensee indicated that the motor lead connections to the field cables are made using qualified Raychem splices or qualified terminal boards. In addition, the dual voltage motor connections have all been replaced with qualified Raychem splices. The licensee provided a copy of the MOV inspection guidelines, which described the acceptable condition of internal wiring, Raychem splices, shipping plugs, and greases. The guidelines were reviewed and found acceptable and were consistent with the condition of the equipment as found during the walkdown inspections of the five MOVs. In addition, the licensee resolved the following observations satisfactorily.

MOV-4-744A and MOV-4-744B

Q: "T" drains were missing and the grease reliefs appeared to be plugged.

A: The "T" drains are not required to be installed per DOC PAC 17.1. The grease reliefs will be cleaned prior to plant mode change. The inspection report dated November 7, 1988 did not identify the presence of any foreign material. The source of the material may be due to the reinsulation of pipes in that area.

MOV-4-744A

Q: Raychem splices were found installed over braided wire in two places. Verify qualification of the splice.

A: The licensee provided drawing 5610-E-1593/87-093 Rev. 4 which shows splice detail 2. The diagram shows that the primary insulation must be a qualified substrate material. The extension of the splice over the braided material prevents the braid from unravelling and does not affect qualification of the splice connection.

MOV-4-866B

Q: The grease drain on the motor bearing was deformed and inoperable.

A: Work Action WA881208112731 was issued to replace the grease drain.

(11) Namco Limit Switch, Models 18021302 and 18011302

The walkdown inspection was performed on valve SV-4-2604 (Namco 18021302), and valves SV-4-200A, SV-4-200B, and SV-4-200C (Namco 18011302). The switch covers were removed for inspection

of the internal wiring. The condition of the gasket for the switches was good and void of any tears or degradation. The inspection of POV-4-2604 discovered a small tear in the jacket material of one wire and possible damage to the Kapton wire underneath. The licensee committed to replace the damaged wire. No open items were identified.

(12) ASCO Solenoid Valves, Equipment Tag Nos. SV-4-2601, SV-4-2604, SV-4-200A, SV-4-200B, and SV-4-200C

The above valves were inspected for installation, nameplate data, wiring, and submergence potential. Several questions were raised which the licensee answered satisfactorily. The inspection of SV-4-2601 discovered the junction box cover partially open and a splice cut loose on wire 4V2601/2804 to TB4144. The licensee explained that work was in progress per NCR-C-0584-88 to replace the solenoid valve for SV-4-2804. The splice will be restored upon completion of the work.

The inspection of SV-4-200A and SV-4-200B discovered the exhaust ports to be pointed in the up position rather than straight down. This configuration could result in moisture in the solenoid compartment rendering the solenoid valve inoperable. The licensee examined the installation and committed to restore the solenoid assembly to its proper configuration. No open items were identified.

(13) Joy Motor, Equipment Tag No. ECC-A and ECC-B

These motors were removed and disassembled for maintenance by the licensee prior to the inspection. The motors were inspected for nameplate data and wiring. The motor leads and power leads were found with cracks in the jacket material. The licensee indicated that these leads will be repaired by an approved procedures and an NCR will be written to resolve this issues. The parts are on order to replace the outer protective sleeves.

In addition, the motors have two vents that were painted over. It was unclear if the vents could still perform their function. The licensee committed to clean off the excess paint or install new vents. Changes to PWOs 64-4014, 64-4015, 64-4016, 64-4017, 64-4018, 64-4019 have been made to clean the vents. The inspectors considered the above corrective actions to be acceptable.

(14) Raychem

No Raychem installation deficiencies were noted on any of the items inspected.

(15) Cables Traceable to EQDP

Prior to the walkdown inspection, some cables were selected and identified to specific components and EPAs. Some of these cables were verified during the walkdown. The licensee was requested to show that these selected cables were addressed in their EQDP. Cables are traceable to the EQDP by the licensee's cable code designation.

Some of the licensee's instrument cables were sent to the EPA manufacturer for installation as part of the EPA. This cable when shipped to the EPA manufacturer was identified by cable manufacture, reel numbers, and the licensees cable code designation. This cable was internally Raychem spliced in the EPA by the EPA manufacturer. After the EPA was installed in the plant, this EPA cable was routed to the component. Rounting was accomplished by cable pull cards that identified the licensees cable code designation. All other cable pull cards included the cable manufacturer, reel number and the licensee's cable code designation. The following cables including those that were observed during the walkdown were examined for traceability to the EQDP. No problems were identified during this review.

Cable ID No.	Cable Code	Mfgr	EQDP
A4CWLA1/B	LT1	Anaconda	1.0
B4CWLB1/B	LT1	Anaconda	1.0
4ILSGS/T4I21-LT484/1	60	GE	13.0
4ILSGS/TB4369-LT494/1	LIP	Brand-Rex	5.1
4ILSGS/T4I24-LT495/1	60	GE	13.0
4ILSGS/T4I23-TB4379/8	60	GE	13.0
B4SCM2BD	LPI	Anaconda	1.0
A4SCMIF	LT1	Anaconda	1.0

3. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 9, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

4. Acronyms and Initialisms

EPA	Electrical Penetration Assembly
MOV	Motor Operated Valve
SV	Solenoid Valve
ECSA	Electric Conductor Seal Assembly (Conax)
EQ	Environmental Qualification

EQ DOC PAC	EQ Documentation Package
EQDP	EQ DOC PAC
ID	Identification
JP	Junction Box
FPL	Florida Power and Light Company
LT	Level Transmitter
PT	Pressure Transmitter
RI	Resident Inspector
RTD	Resistance Temperature Detector
QR	Qualification Report
IR	Insulation Resistance
TE	Temperature Element