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NOV 05 1982

Docket Nos. 50-250
and 50-251

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology
Florida Power and Light Company
Post Office Box 529100
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

RE: Single Failure - ECCS Valves

The staff has completed its review of your submittals dated June 22, 1978, July 11, 1978 and August 9, 1978, relating to the above referenced safety concern. Your submitttals propose changes to the Technical Specifications for Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4.

The enclosed safety evaluation concludes that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications constitute a safetand reliable method of eliminating a single failure. However, the acceptability of the changes are contingent on providing the following:

1. The procedures for reinstating power during a LOCA shall include the following elements: (a) a nuclear or nuclear-turbine operator must be assigned to each of the two Motor Control Centers such that successful action on the part of either operator is sufficient to allow switchover to recirculation, (b) these operators should be dispatched to their respective MCC's as soon as a LOCA has been identified, (c) they should have no other responsibilities until switchover to recirculation is complete, (d) power should not be reinstated until the low level (115,000 gal) on the RWST is reached and (e) this procedure should be emphasized in the training and requalification of nuclear operators and nuclear-turbine operators.

2. Single continuous positive indication for valves 862 A&B, 863 A&B and 864 A&B. In addition, the procedures used for removal of power from the above valves shall include the requirements for visual verification of the proper valve position prior to power removal.

3. The responses to our request for confirmation of the items identified in our letter dated October 13, 1982.

We will finalize our review and issue a supplement to the safety evaluation upon resolution of the above items.

OFFICE							
SURNAME							
DATE							

This response is requested within 60 days from the date of this letter. This letter affects fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P. L. 96-511.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:
S. A. Varga

Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

OFFICE	ORB#1:DL	RSB	ORB#1:DL				
SURNAME	DMcDonald:dm	RBarrett	SVarga				
DATE	11/5/82	11/5/82	11/10/82				

Robert E. Uhrig
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5. TWO residual heat removal pumps shall be operable.

6. TWO residual heat exchangers shall be operable.

7. All valves, interlocks and piping associated with the above components and required for post accident operation, shall be operable, except valves that are positioned and locked. Valves 862-A&B; 863-A&B; 864-A&B; 865-A,B&C; 866-A&B shall have power removed from their motor operators by locking open the circuit breakers at the Motor Control Centers. The air supply to valve 758 shall be shut off to the valve operator.

b. During power operation, the requirements of 3.4.1a may be modified to allow one of the following components to be inoperable (including associated valves and piping) at any one time except for the cases stated in 3.4.1.b.2. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of 3.4.1a within the time period specified, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of 3.4.1a are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

1. ONE accumulator may be out of service for a period of up to 4 hours.

2. ONE of FOUR safety injection pumps may be out of service for 30 days. A second safety injection pump may be out of service, provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours. TWO of the FOUR safety injection pumps shall be tested to demonstrate operability before initiating maintenance of the inoperable pumps.

3. ONE channel of heat tracing on the flow path may be out of service for 24 hours.

5. ONE residual heat exchanger may be out of service for a period of 24 hours.

6. Any valve in the system may be inoperable provided repairs are completed within 24 hours. Prior to initiating maintenance, all valves that provide the duplicate function shall be tested to demonstrate operability.

7. To permit temporary operation of the valve, e.g., for surveillance of valve operability, for the purpose of valve maintenance, etc., the valves specified in 3.4.1.a.7 may be unlocked and may have supplied air or electric power restored for a period not to exceed 24 hours.

2. EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS

a. The reactor shall not be made critical, except for low power physics tests, unless the following conditions are met:

1. THREE emergency containment cooling units are operable.

2. TWO containment spray pumps are operable.

3. ALL valves and piping associated with the above components, and required for post accident operation, are operable.

b. During power operation, the requirements of 3.4.2a may be modified to allow one of the following components to be inoperable (including associated valves and piping) at any one time. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of 3.4.2a within the time period specified, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of 3.4.2a are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.