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Docket Nos. 50-250  
and 50-251

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President  
Advanced Systems and Technology  
Florida Power and Light Company  
Post Office Box 529100  
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

SUBJECT: NUREG-0737 ITEM II.B.3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM

The staff will be conducting a post implementation review of NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3 Post Accident Sampling System of the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos. 3 and 4. Enclosed you will find the criteria contained in NUREG-0737 along with the guidelines to be utilized by the staff to conduct our review. You are requested to make a submittal which documents how you have satisfied each criteria of NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3. If you have made past submittals on this subject which you feel adequately or partially answers a particular criteria, please include them by reference. You are requested to provide a schedule for responding to the enclosed information request within 30 days of receipt of this letter.

This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and Budget under clearance number 3150-0065 which expires May 31, 1983.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:  
S. A. Varga

Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/enclosure:  
See next page

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ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO  
POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM  
NUREG-0737, II.B.3 EVALUATION  
CRITERIA GUIDELINES

The post accident sampling system will be evaluated for compliance with the criteria from NUREG-0737, II.B.3. These eleven items have been copied verbatim from NUREG-0737. The licensee's submittal should include information equivalent to that which is normally provided in an FSAR. System schematics with sufficient information to verify flow paths should be included, consistent with documentation requirements in NUREG-0737, with appropriate discussion so that the reviewer can determine whether the criteria have been met. Further information pertaining to the specific clarifications of NUREG-0737, which will be considered in the reviewer's evaluation are listed below. Technically justified alternatives to these criteria will be considered.

**Criterion:** (1) The licensee shall have the capability to promptly obtain reactor coolant samples and containment atmosphere samples. The combined time allotted for sampling and analysis should be 3 hours or less from the time a decision is made to take a sample.

**Clarification:** Provide information on sampling(s) and analytical laboratories locations including a discussion of relative elevations, distances and methods for sample transport. Responses to this item should also include a discussion of sample recirculation, sample handling and analytical times to demonstrate that the three-hour time limit will be met (see (6) below relative to radiation exposure). Also describe provisions for sampling during loss of off-site power (i.e. designate an alternative backup power source, not necessarily the vital (Class IE) bus, that can be energized in sufficient time to meet the three-hour sampling and analysis time limit).

**Criterion:** (2) The licensee shall establish an onsite radiological and chemical analysis capability to provide, within three-hour time frame established above, quantification of the following:

- (a) certain radionuclides in the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere that may be indicators of the degree of core damage (e.g., noble gases; iodines and cesiums, and non-volatile isotopes);
- (b) hydrogen levels in the containment atmosphere;
- (c) dissolved gases (e.g., H<sub>2</sub>), chloride (time allotted for analysis subject to discussion below), and boron concentration of liquids.
- (d) Alternatively, have inline monitoring capabilities to perform all or part of the above analyses.



Clarification: 2 (a) A discussion of the counting equipment capabilities is needed, including provisions to handle samples and reduce background radiation (ALARA). Also a procedure is required for relating radionuclide concentrations to core damage. The procedure should include:

1. Monitoring for short and long lived volatile and non volatile radionuclides such as  $^{133}\text{Xe}$ ,  $^{131}\text{I}$ ,  $^{137}\text{Cs}$ ,  $^{134}\text{Cs}$ ,  $^{85}\text{Kr}$ ,  $^{140}\text{Ba}$ , and  $^{188}\text{Kr}$  (See Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 524-527 of Rogovin Report for further information).
2. Provisions to estimate the extent of core damage based on radionuclide concentrations and taking into consideration other physical parameters such as core temperature, data and sample location.

- 2 (b) Show a capability to obtain a grab sample, transport and analyze for hydrogen.
- 2 (c) Discuss the capabilities to sample and analyze for the accident sample species listed here and in Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2.
- 2 (d) Provide a discussion of the reliability and maintenance information to demonstrate that the selected on-line instrument is appropriate for this application. (See (8) and (10) below relative to back-up grab sample capability and instrument range and accuracy).

Criterion: (3) Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling during post accident conditions shall not require an isolated auxiliary system [e.g., the letdown system, reactor water cleanup system (RWCUS)] to be placed in operation in order to use the sampling system.

Clarification: System schematics and discussions should clearly demonstrate that post accident sampling, including recirculation, from each sample source is possible without use of an isolated auxiliary system. It should be verified that valves which are not accessible after an accident are environmentally qualified for the conditions in which they must operate.

Criterion: (4) Pressurized reactor coolant samples are not required if the licensee can quantify the amount of dissolved gases with unpressurized reactor coolant samples. The measurement of either total dissolved gases or  $\text{H}_2$  gas in reactor coolant samples is considered adequate. Measuring the  $\text{O}_2$  concentration is recommended, but is not mandatory.

Clarification: Discuss the method whereby total dissolved gas or hydrogen and oxygen can be measured and related to reactor coolant system concentrations. Additionally, if chlorides exceed 0.15 ppm, verification that dissolved oxygen is less than 0.1 ppm is necessary. Verification that dissolved oxygen is <0.1 ppm by measurement of a dissolved hydrogen residual of





$\geq 10$  cc/kg is acceptable for up to 30 days after the accident. Within 30 days, consistent with ALARA, direct monitoring for dissolved oxygen is recommended.


Criterion: (5) The time for a chloride analysis to be performed is dependent upon two factors: (a) if the plant's coolant water is seawater or brackish water and (b) if there is only a single barrier between primary containment systems and the cooling water. Under both of the above conditions the licensee shall provide for a chloride analysis within 24 hours of the sample being taken. For all other cases, the licensee shall provide for the analysis to be completed within 4 days. The chloride analysis does not have to be done onsite.

Clarification: BWR's on sea or brackish water sites, and plants which use sea or brackish water in essential heat exchangers (e.g. shutdown cooling) that have only single barrier protection between the reactor coolant are required to analyze chloride within 24 hours. All other plants have 96 hours to perform a chloride analysis. Samples diluted by up to a factor of one thousand are acceptable as initial scoping analysis for chloride, provided (1) the results are reported as \_\_\_ ppm Cl (the licensee should establish this value; the number in the blank should be no greater than 10.0 ppm Cl) in the reactor coolant system and (2) that dissolved oxygen can be verified at  $<0.1$  ppm, consistent with the guidelines above in clarification no. 4. Additionally, if chloride analysis is performed on a diluted sample, an undiluted sample need also be taken and retained for analysis within 30 days, consistent with ALARA.

Criterion: (6) The design basis for plant equipment for reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling and analysis must assume that it is possible to obtain and analyze a sample without radiation exposures to any individual exceeding the criteria of GDC 19 (Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50) (i.e., 5 rem whole body, 75 rem extremities). (Note that the design and operational review criterion was changed from the operational limits of 10 CFR Part 20 (NUREG-0578) to the GDC 19 criterion (October 30, 1979 letter from H. R. Denton to all licensees).

Clarification: Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.3 or 1.4 source terms, provide information on the predicted man rem exposures based on person-motion for sampling, transport and analysis of all required parameters.

Criterion: (7) The analysis of primary coolant samples for boron is required for PWRs. (Note that Rev. 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97 specifies the need for primary coolant boron analysis capability at BWR plants).



Clarification: PWR's need to perform boron analysis. The guidelines for BWR's are to have the capability to perform boron analysis but they do not have to do so unless boron was injected.


Criterion: (8) If inline monitoring is used for any sampling and analytical capability specified herein, the licensee shall provide backup sampling through grab samples, and shall demonstrate the capability of analyzing the samples. Established planning for analysis at offsite facilities is acceptable. Equipment provided for backup sampling shall be capable of providing at least one sample per day for 7 days following onset of the accident, and at least one sample per week until the accident condition no longer exists.

Clarification: A capability to obtain both diluted and undiluted backup samples is required. Provisions to flush inline monitors to facilitate access for repair is desirable. If an off-site laboratory is to be relied on for the backup analysis, an explanation of the capability to ship and obtain analysis for one sample per week thereafter until accident condition no longer exists should be provided.

Criterion: (9) The licensee's radiological and chemical sample analysis capability shall include provisions to:

- (a) Identify and quantify the isotopes of the nuclide categories discussed above to levels corresponding to the source terms given in Regulatory Guide 1.3 or 1.4 and 1.7. Where necessary and practicable, the ability to dilute samples to provide capability for measurement and reduction of personnel exposure should be provided. Sensitivity of onsite liquid sample analysis capability should be such as to permit measurement of nuclide concentration in the range from approximately  $1\mu$  Ci/g to 10 Ci/g.
- (b) Restrict background levels of radiation in the radiological and chemical analysis facility from sources such that the sample analysis will provide results with an acceptably small error (approximately a factor of 2). This can be accomplished through the use of sufficient shielding around samples and outside sources, and by the use of a ventilation system design which will control the presence of airborne radioactivity.

Clarification: (9) (a) Provide a discussion of the predicted activity in the samples to be taken and the methods of handling/dilution that will be employed to reduce the activity sufficiently to perform the required analysis. Discuss the range of radionuclide concentration which can be analyzed for, including an assessment of, the amount of overlap between post accident and normal sampling capabilities.



- (9) (b) State the predicted background radiation levels in the counting room, including the contribution from samples which are present. Also provide data demonstrating what the background radiation levels and radiation effect will be on a sample being counted to assure an accuracy within a factor of 2.

Criterion: (10) Accuracy, range, and sensitivity shall be adequate to provide pertinent data to the operator in order to describe radiological and chemical status of the reactor coolant systems.

Clarification: The recommended ranges for the required accident sample analyses are given in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2. The necessary accuracy within the recommended ranges are as follows:

- Gross activity, gamma spectrum: measured to estimate core damage, these analyses should be accurate within a factor of two across the entire range.

- Boron: measure to verify shutdown margin.

In general this analysis should be accurate within  $\pm 5\%$  of the measured value (i.e. at 6,000 ppm B the tolerance is  $\pm 300$  ppm while at 1,000 ppm B the tolerance is  $\pm 50$  ppm). For concentrations below 1,000 ppm the tolerance band should remain at  $\pm 50$  ppm.

- Chloride: measured to determine coolant corrosion potential.

For concentrations between 0.5 and 20.0 ppm chloride the analysis should be accurate within  $\pm 10\%$  of the measured value. At concentrations below 0.5 ppm the tolerance band remains at  $\pm 0.05$  ppm.

- Hydrogen or Total Gas: monitored to estimate core degradation and corrosion potential of the coolant.

An accuracy of  $\pm 10\%$  is desirable between 50 and 2000 cc/kg but  $\pm 20\%$  can be acceptable. For concentration below 50 cc/kg the tolerance remains at  $\pm 5.0$  cc/kg.

- Oxygen: monitored to assess coolant corrosion potential.

For concentrations between 0.5 and 20.0 ppm oxygen the analysis should be accurate within  $\pm 10\%$  of the measured value. At concentrations below 0.5 ppm the tolerance band remains at  $\pm 0.05$  ppm.



- pH: measured to assess coolant corrosion potential.

Between a pH of 5 to 9, the reading should be accurate within  $\pm 0.3$  pH units. For all other ranges  $\pm 0.5$  pH units is acceptable.

To demonstrate that the selected procedures and instrumentation will achieve the above listed accuracies, it is necessary to provide information demonstrating their applicability in the post accident water chemistry and radiation environment. This can be accomplished by performing tests utilizing the standard test matrix provided below or by providing evidence that the selected procedure or instrument has been used successfully in a similar environment.

STANDARD TEST MATRIX  
FOR  
UNDILUTED REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLES IN A POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT

<u>Constituent</u>	<u>Nominal Concentration (ppm)</u>	<u>Added as (chemical salt)</u>
I <sup>-</sup>	40	Potassium Iodide
Cs <sup>+</sup>	250	Cesium Nitrate
Ba <sup>+2</sup>	10	Barium Nitrate
La <sup>+3</sup>	5	Lanthanum Chloride
Ce <sup>+4</sup>	5	Ammonium Cerium Nitrate
Cl <sup>-</sup>	10	
B	2000	Boric Acid
Li <sup>+</sup>	2	Lithium Hydroxide
NO <sub>3</sub> <sup>-</sup>	150	
NH <sub>4</sub> <sup>+</sup>	5	
K <sup>+</sup>	20	
Gamma Radiation (Induced Field)	10 <sup>4</sup> Rad/gm of Reactor Coolant	Adsorbed Dose

NOTES:

- 1) Instrumentation and procedures which are applicable to diluted samples only, should be tested with an equally diluted chemical test matrix. The induced radiation environment should be adjusted commensurate with the weight of actual reactor coolant in the sample being tested.
- 2) For PWRs, procedures which may be affected by spray additive chemicals must be tested in both the standard test matrix plus appropriate spray additives. Both procedures (with and without spray additives) are required to be available.
- 3) For BWRs, if procedures are verified with boron in the test matrix, they do not have to be tested without boron.





- 4) In lieu of conducting tests utilizing the standard test matrix for instruments and procedures, provide evidence that the selected instrument or procedure has been used successfully in a similar environment.

All equipment and procedures which are used for post accident sampling and analyses should be calibrated or tested at a frequency which will ensure, to a high degree of reliability, that it will be available if required. Operators should receive initial and refresher training in post accident sampling, analysis and transport. A minimum frequency for the above efforts is considered to be every six months if indicated by testing. These provisions should be submitted in revised Technical Specifications in accordance with Enclosure 1 of NUREG-0737. The staff will provide model Technical Specifications at a later date.

Criterion: (11) In the design of the post accident sampling and analysis capability, consideration should be given to the following items:

- (a) Provisions for purging sample lines, for reducing plateout in sample lines, for minimizing sample loss or distortion, for preventing blockage of sample lines by loose material in the RCS or containment, for appropriate disposal of the samples, and for flow restrictions to limit reactor coolant loss from a rupture of the sample line. The post accident reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples should be representative of the reactor coolant in the core area and the containment atmosphere following a transient or accident. The sample lines should be as short as possible to minimize the volume of fluid to be taken from containment. The residues of sample collection should be returned to containment or to a closed system.
- (b) The ventilation exhaust from the sampling station should be filtered with charcoal absorbers and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.

Clarification: (11)(a) A description of the provisions which address each of the items in clarification 11.a should be provided. Such items, as heat tracing and purge velocities, should be addressed. To demonstrate that samples are representative of core conditions a discussion of mixing, both short and long term, is needed. If a given sample location can be rendered inaccurate due to the accident (i.e. sampling from a hot or cold leg loop which may have a steam or gas pocket) describe the backup sampling capabilities or address the maximum time that this condition can exist.

BWR's should specifically address samples which are taken from the core shroud area and demonstrate how they are representative of core conditions.



Passive flow restrictors in the sample lines may be replaced by redundant, environmentally qualified, remotely operated isolation valves to limit potential leakage from sampling lines. The automatic containment isolation valves should close on containment isolation or safety injection signals.

- (11)(b) A dedicated sample station filtration system is not required, provided a positive exhaust exists which is subsequently routed through charcoal absorbers and HEPA filters.

