APR 26 1982

Docket Nos. 50-250
50-251

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Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology
Florida Power and Light Company
Post Office Box 529100
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

We have completed our preliminary review of your letters dated May 8, 1980 and May 19, 1981 regarding the Main Steam Line Break with continued Feedwater Addition consideration for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos. 3 and 4. In order to complete our review we need the information identified in the enclosure to this letter. Please provide your response within 45 days from the date of this letter.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Steven A. Varga

Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
Request for Additional
Information

cc w/encl:
See next page

OFFICE	DL:ORB#1	DL:ORB#1					
SURNAME	MGrotenhuis:ms	SAVarga					
DATE	4/22/82	4/26/82					

NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981—335-960

Robert E. Uhrig
Florida Power and Light Company

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PWR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK WITH CONTINUED FEEDWATER ADDITION

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4

NRC DOCKET NO. 50-250, 50-251
NRC TAC NO. 46866, 46867
NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130

FRC PROJECT C5506
FRC ASSIGNMENT 5
FRC TASK 143

Prepared by

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Prepared for

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Washington, D.C. 20555

Lead NRC Engineer: P. Hearn

April 5, 1982

NOT ON DCS 5/6

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BACKGROUND

Evaluation of the information contained in the May 8, 1980 [1] and May 19, 1981 [2] letters from the Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relating to IE Bulletin 80-04, "Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition," revealed an item of concern. Additional information relating to this concern is needed before a final evaluation can be made regarding the potential for exceeding containment design pressure.

This concern and the additional information needed to resolve this concern are identified in this Request for Additional Information.

ITEM

CONCERN

IE Bulletin 80-04 directs the Licensee to review containment pressure response to a main steam line break (MSLB) accident to determine the impact of runout flow from the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and other energy sources. FPL's response concerning the MSLB analysis for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 indicated that manual isolation of the AFW flow to the faulted steam generator was assumed to occur by operator action 10 minutes after the initiation of the accident.

FPL's response is not sufficient to enable FRC to complete the evaluation of the potential for exceeding containment design pressure. The analysis [2] takes credit for operator action to identify the affected steam generator and isolate AFW flow to that generator within 10 minutes after the start of the accident. In the light of studies performed on operator response to stressful situations, this time may be unrealistic. Either additional operator response time or incorrect operator actions may cause the containment to exceed its design pressure.

REQUEST

In order to complete review on the potential for containment overpressurization, the following information concerning the containment pressure response to a MSLB is required:

1. Provide the actions required to be performed by the operator to prevent exceeding containment design pressure. Provide justification for the time at which credit is taken for operator action.

2. Provide the time after the start of a MSLB when containment design pressure will be exceeded if no operator action is taken to terminate the accident. Provide the magnitude of the peak pressure and the time at which the peak occurs.

REFERENCES

1. R. E. Uhrig (FPL)
   Letter to J. P. O'Reilly (NRC)
   Subject: IE Bulletin 80-04
   May 8, 1980

2. R. E. Uhrig (FPL)
   Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
   Subject: IE Bulletin 80-04
   May 19, 1981