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

FAC
~~D. Eisenhut~~
T Colburn

FEB 11 1982

Docket No. 50-250
and 50-251

Dr. Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology
Florida Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 529100
Miami, Florida 33152

Dear Dr. Uhrig:

We have completed our preliminary review of your submittal dated March 2, 1981 in regard to NUREG-0737 Action Item II.K.3.2 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nosa 3 and 4. We find we need the additional information as indicated in the enclosure to this letter. Please respond to this request in 30 days from the receipt of this letter.

Sincerely,

Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
Request for Additional
Information

cc: See next page

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PDR ADOCK 05000250
P PDR

OFFICE	ORB 1	ORB 1	ORB-3				
SURNAME	MGrotenhuis/rs	SVarga	Rec				
DATE	2/ 4/82	2/9/82	2/11/82				

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

Robert E. Uhrig
Florida Power and Light Company

cc: Mr. Robert Lowenstein, Esquire
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis and Axelrad
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1214
Washington, D. C. 20036

Environmental and Urban Affairs Library
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Mr. Norman A. Coll, Esquire
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1400 Southeast First National
Bank Building
Miami, Florida 33131

Mr. Henry Yaeger, Plant Manager
Turkey Point Plant
Florida Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Mr. Jack Shreve
Office of the Public Counsel
Room 4, Holland Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Administrator
Department of Environmental Regulation
Power Plant Siting Section
State of Florida
2600 Blair Stone Road
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Resident Inspector
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 1207
Homestead, Florida 33030

ENCLOSURE

1. A calculation of safety valve failure rates based on past histories of the operating plants designed by the NSSS vendors.

2. An analysis of the probability of a small-break LOCA caused by a stuck-open safety valve using the safety valve failure rate calculated in question 1. Since operating data indicate that some plants operate with the block valves shut and others block all PORVs some of the time, the analysis provided should account for the additional challenges to the safety valves when PORV(s) are blocked intentionally.

3. Further clarification of the sources and the method used to determine the initiator event frequencies. Specifically, describe why only 16 transient initiators are considered in the Westinghouse generic report. Describe the method used to group the transient initiators and to arrive at the resultant frequencies.

4. A justified estimate of how many multiple PORV openings per transient could be expected with each initiator event.

5. An explanation of the analysis yielding the PORV failure rate of 1×10^{-3} per demand.

6. Show that the assumptions made and credits taken for plant reconfigurations and non-design improvements in the Westinghouse generic report are appropriate for TP-3 and TP-4.