



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-250/81-13 and 50-251/81-13

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
 9250 West Flagler Street
 Miami, FL 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point

Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

Inspection at Turkey Point site near Homestead, Florida

Inspectors: *H C Dance / for*
 A. J. Ignatonis

6/9/81
 Date Signed

H C Dance / for
 W. C. Marsh

6/9/81
 Date Signed

Approved by: *H C Dance*
 H. C. Dance, Section Chief, Resident and
 Reactor Project Inspection Division

6/9/81
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 26 - May 25, 1981

Areas Inspected

This routine inspection involved 134 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of (1) followup on previous inspection findings; (2) followup on IE Bulletins; (3) followup on IE Circulars; (4) followup on licensee event reports (5) plant operations; (6) 10 CFR Part 21 report on Rockbestos cable problem; and (7) plant tours.

Results

Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in six areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Violation - failure to implement administrative procedure on housekeeping - paragraph 10).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. K. Hays, Acting Site Manager
*D. W. Haase, Acting Plant Manager-Nuclear
*J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent - Nuclear
L. L. Thomas, Assistant Superintendent - Nuclear Maintenance
V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor
J. A. Laborrague, Acting Technical Department Supervisor
J. C. Balaguere, Licensing Engineer
E. A. Suarez, Plant Mechanical Engineer
*D. W. Jones, QC Supervisor
*J. P. Mendieta, Maintenance Superintendent

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview


2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 29, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The acting plant manager acknowledged the stated violation. In addition, the inspectors expressed some concern in not always being informed of reportable occurrences as early as possible, other than at the required reporting date. Discontinuation of early notification to the resident inspectors occurred only recently during the reassignment of key plant management personnel. The acting plant manager acknowledged the inspectors concern and agreed to provide earlier informal notification of reported events.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) 251/81-02-02 - Failure to meet Licensee Commitment: of Testing Westinghouse Type W-2 Switches per time Intervals specified in Response to IE Bulletin 80-20. The inspector reviewed licensee's corrective action to perform the necessary testing of the Type W-2 switches in a timely manner. The test interval has been changed to a sixty day frequency for each unit. This was found to be acceptable by the IE management and the inspector. In addition, the licensee issued and implemented a new maintenance procedure for these switches. The inspector had no further questions.

(Closed) 250/81-05-2 - Failure to Report Reactor Coolant System Chloride Concentration Exceeding the Technical Specification Limit. The inspector reviewed licensee's corrective actions. A 30 day report has been prepared by the licensee and the interpretation of Regulatory Guide 1.16 will be used in the future. The inspector had no further questions.



(Closed) (50-250/81-07-01 and 50-251/81-07-01) - Failure to Follow Waste Disposal System - Laundry and Hot Shower Drain System Operating Procedure 5120. The inspector reviewed licensee's corrective actions. Operating Procedure 5120 was revised and implemented on March 24, 1981 which included provisions for allowing transfer of fluid to the CVCS Monitor Tank A. Also, the Nuclear Operators were reminded to follow operating Procedures. The inspector had no further questions.

5. IE Bulletins

The following IE Bulletins were reviewed to determine whether they had been received and reviewed by appropriate management, responses, where necessary, were accurate and complete, and that required action taken was complete.

- a. (Closed) IEB 79-25, Failures of Westinhouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems. This bulletin is closed based on the review of FPL response letters L-79-356 and L-80-161 dated December 20, 1979 and May 30, 1980, respectively. The relays are periodically tested by licensed operators using Operating Procedure 1004.2, Reactor Protection System - Periodic Test, Operating Procedure 4004.2, Safeguard Relay Rack Train A, B and Emergency Load Sequences Timer - Periodic Test; and Operating Procedure 4104.2, Engineered Safeguards and Emergency Power Systems - Integrated Test. For inspection, testing, and replacement of the relays the licensee uses Maintenance Procedure 0732, QC check and Replacement of BFD/NBFD Relays in Reactor Protection and Safeguards Systems.
- b. (Closed) IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II, 2 inch, Tray Adsorber Cells. The inspector reviewed the FPL response letter L-80-104 dated March 26, 1980 and licensee procedures used for the Emergency Containment Filter Systems and Control Room Ventilation System adsorber cell performance tests. Based on the review, the inspector determined that the licensee provided a satisfactory response to paragraph 1 of the bulletin. The adsorber cells used in Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are different in design with respect to the problem ones described in the bulletin.
- c. (Closed) IEB 80-15, Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS) with Loss of Offsite Power. This bulletin is closed based on the review of FPL response letter L-80-290 dated September 4, 1980. With regard to item 3 of the bulletin, the licensee took exception in conducting a test of the ENS station package within 60 days of the issuance of the bulletin. However, in their response they have stated that the system configuration was demonstrated in the past by energizing the fossile unit station Service MCC via the 2500 Kw "block start" diesel generators (these are not the Emergency diesel generators). This test met the intent of actions to be taken therefore, it is acceptable. Furthermore, the inspector verified incorporated changes to Emergency Procedure 2004, Loss of off-site Power and Administrative Procedure 0103.12, Notification of Significant

Events to NRC, as stated by the licensee in response to item 5 of the bulletin.

- d. (Closed) IEB 80-16, Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with either "A" or "D" output codes. This bulletin is closed based on the review of FPL response letter L-80-240 dated July 28, 1980. The Rosemount 1151 and 1152 pressure transmitters with "A" or "D" codes are not installed in any Safety-related applications of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
- e. (Closed) IEB 80-18, Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side high Energy Line Rupture. This bulletin is closed based on the review of FPL response letter L-80-315 dated September 23, 1980. The Turkey Point units do not have centrifugal charging pumps, and the recirculation lines on the safety injection pumps are not isolated on receipt of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
- f. (Closed) IEB 80-19, Failures of Mercury - Wetted Matrix Relays in Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering. This bulletin is closed based on the review of FPL response letter L-80-286 dated September 2, 1980. In the letter the licensee has stated that no C. P. Clare Model HG2X-1011 mercury - wetted relays are used in the logic matrix of the RPS.
- g. (Closed) IEB 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indown Point 2 Event). This Bulletin is closed based on the review of FPL response letters L-81-7 and L-81-29 dated January 7, 1981 and January 29, 1981, respectively. And, an inspection performed per assigned Temporary Instructions to the subject bulletin. Turkey Points Unit 3 and 4 have only closed systems inside containment. The inspector verified the plants history of leakage inside containment. The licensee maintains a Generation Equipment Maintenance System (GEMS) data based used in support of investigating instances of system leakage. The inspector had no further questions.

6. IE Circulars

The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determine whether they had been received by station management for applicability and appropriate action had been taken or planned.

(Closed) IEC 81-01, Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporate. Per discussion with the licensee engineer the inspector was informed that Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 do not use Series 2 indicating pushbutton switches manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated.

(Closed) IEC 81-02, Performance of NRC-Licensed Individuals While on Duty. The licensee revised their administrative controls and implemented most of the guidance contained in this Circular prior to its issuance. Administrative



Procedure 103.2, Duties and Responsibilities of Operators and Shift and Maintenance of Operating Logs and Records, has been revised, including increased restriction of personnel access to the Control Room. In addition, the site manager forwarded a letter to plant supervisors instructing them to notify all personnel of the required on the job professional practices with emphasis on the prohibition of distracting activities in the Control Room and all other areas on site. Also, the licensed personnel received this circular.

(Closed) IE 81-03, Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. The site has one seismograph. The strong-motion accelograph (kinematics SMA-1) unit as identified in subject circular is located outside containment of Unit 3. Calibration check of the SMA-1 unit and battery replacement in performed on a quarterly basis per Operating Procedure 1400.4.5. The film is replaced annually. Inspection interval of the seismic monitoring system appears to be shorter than for the example provided in the circular. This circular is closed based on discussion with the licensee on this matter and review of Operating Procedure 14004.5.

(Closed) IE 81-06, Potential Deficiency Affecting Certain Foxboro 10 to 50 Milliampere Transmitters. The licensee received and reviewed this circular and determined that they do not use Foxboro 10 to 50 mA transmitters with model numbers identified in the circular.

7. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup

The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the review, corrective action and been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.

- *250-81-04 "A" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failure to meet Acceptance Test Criteria, Update Report No. 1
- 251-81-05 "A" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Temporarily Out-of-service due to Governor Adjustment
- *250-81-06 Failure to provide 30-day Reportable Occurrence on RCS Chloride Concentration per T. S. 6.9.2.b(2)
- *251-81-03 RCS Leakage near the 4A RCP Seal Supply Line
- *250-81-07 3A Main Feedwater Check valve missing nut and missing pivot pins of 3A Bypass Feedwater Check Valve.



8. Plant Operations

The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed daily during the report period.

The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings, and recording, annunciator alarms, housekeeping, radiation area controls, and vital area controls. Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities in progress and status of safety-related equipment or systems.

On May 6 and 7, 1981 the inspector observed portions of maintenance work performed on Unit 4 "A" Charging Pump. Through observations reviews the inspector verified that: (1) the Plant Work Order was properly prepared and maintenance instructions were used; (2) proper Radiation Work Permit and Health Physics coverage during the venting of the pump was provided for; (3) radiological controls to prevent spread of contamination were proper; and (4) torque wrench used had current calibration. No violations were identified within the areas inspected.

On May 19, 1981 the inspector performed a spot-check survey of a Chem-Nuclear shipping cask containing radioactive waste destined for off-site shipment. Radiation survey was accomplished with a hand held Xetex digital exposure ratemeter. The results were in agreement with the licensee's radiation survey. The inspector also examined the licensee's surface contamination survey of the shipping cask. No violations were identified within the areas inspected.

9. 10 CFR Part 21 Report on Rockbestos Cable Problem

On May 28, 1981 the inspector informed the licensee of an apparent defect in instrument cables manufactured by Rockbestos, catalog number RSS-6-104. This is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21. The licensee informed the inspector that they have received the affected coaxial cable and it is in stock. Quality Control will put a hold on it. Replacement cables for nuclear instrumentation systems are manufactured by Essex. The inspector had no further questions.

10. Plant Tours

During a tour of the facility Auxiliary Building on April 30, 1981, the Inspector noted debris resulting from replacements of the "B" Waste Gas Compressor (accomplished in December of 1980 and April 22, 1981) on the floor outside the "B" Waste Gas Compressor cubicle. Additionally, the inspector noted that a defective manual valve 4-895L and an attached, contaminated length of tygon tubing (which had been removed from the CVCS



pipng adjacent to the Unit 4 Boron Injection Tank) was left on the floor under the tank. This maintenance activity apparently had been completed in May 1980.

Administrative Procedure 0103.11, Housekeeping, requires a post-maintenance verification of work-site cleanliness by maintenance supervision. The responsible foreman or supervisor is required to check that all tools and equipment have been put away and that all trash and debris have been properly disposed of. The failure to implement the requirements of AP0103.11 in these instances constitute a single failure to follow procedure which is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. (251/18-13-01). Similar failures to implement the requirements of AP 0103.11 were cited in inspection reports 80-21 and 80-36/34. The licensee's corrective actions for these previous violations do not appear to be effective; however, due to the short time the latest corrective action has been implemented, the effectiveness of that corrective action will be observed for some additional time prior to making a finding. This is an unresolved item (251/81-13-02).

