



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 70 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-31
AND AMENDMENT NO. 63 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-41
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NOS. 3 AND 4
DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251

I. INTRODUCTION

By letters dated December 23, 1980; and supplemented on March 10, 1981, Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos. 3 and 4. The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in direct response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2, 1980.

II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

By our letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident. Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1, 1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter dated April 7, 1980.

In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requested that licensees amend their TS to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2, 1980. Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable. The licensee's application is in direct response to our request. Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.

III. EVALUATION

2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements

The pressurizer water level indicators, pressurizer relief and block valves, and pressurizer heaters are important in a post-accident situation. Adequate emergency power supplies add assurance of post-accident functioning of these components. The licensee has (has provided) the requisite emergency power supplies. The licensee has proposed adequate TSs which provide for a 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration and actions in the event of component inoperability. We have reviewed these proposed TSs and find that the emergency power supplies are reasonably ensured for post-accident functioning of the subject components and are thus acceptable.

2.1.3.a Direct Indication of (of Flow) Valve Position

The licensee has provided a direct indication of power-operated relief valve (PORV) and safety valve position in the control room. These indications are a diagnostic aid for the plant operator and provide no automatic action. The licensee has provided TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requirement; thus, the TSs are acceptable and they meet our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.

2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Inadequate Core Cooling

The licensee has installed an instrument system to detect the effects of low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling. These instruments, sub-cooling meters, receive and process data from existing plant instrumentation. We previously reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated April 7, 1980. The licensee submitted TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requirement and actions to be taken in the event of component inoperability. We conclude the TSs are acceptable as they meet our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.

2.1.4 Diverse Containment Isolation

The licensee has modified the containment isolation system so that diverse parameters will be sensed to ensure automatic isolation of non-essential systems under postulated accident conditions. These parameters are safety inspection or main steam isolation. We have reviewed this system in our Lessons Learned Category "A" Safety Evaluation dated April 7, 1980. The modification is such that it does not result in the automatic loss of containment isolation after the containment isolation signal is reset. Reopening of containment isolation would require deliberate operator action.

2.1.7a Auto Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems

The plant has provision for the automatic initiation of auxiliary (emergency) feedwater flow on loss of normal feedwater flow. The TSs submitted by the licensee list the appropriate components, describe the tests and provide for proper test frequency. The TSs contain appropriate actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.

2.1.7.b Auxiliary (Emergency) Feedwater Flow Indication

The licensee has installed auxiliary (emergency) feedwater flow indication that meets our testability and vital power requirements. We reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated April 7, 1980. The licensee has proposed a TS with 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration requirements. We find this TS acceptable as it meets the criteria of our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.

2.2.1.b. Shift Technical Advisor (STA)

Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA. The licensee's application would add one STA to each shift to perform the function of accident assessment. The individual performing this function will have at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents. Part of the STA duties are related to operating experience review function. Based on our review, we find the licensee's submittal to satisfy our requirements and is acceptable.

EVALUATION TO SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS

2.1.4 Integrity of Systems Outside Containment

Our letter dated July 2, 1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a Systems Integrity Measurements Program. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor containment. By letter dated March 10, 1981, the licensee agreed to adopt such an administrative condition; accordingly we have included this condition in the TSs.

2.1.8.c. Iodine Monitoring

Our letter dated July 2, 1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a condition related to iodine monitoring. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions. By letter dated March 10, 1981, the licensee agreed to adopt such an administrative condition; accordingly, we have included this condition in the TSs.

2.1.3.b Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin

Our letter of July 2, 1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a condition related to the determination of subcooling margin; this is a precursor to warn of inadequate core cooling in the event of an accident. Such a condition would require the training of personnel and the generation of procedures to accurately monitor the reactor coolant system subcooling margin. By letter dated March 10, 1981, the licensee agreed to adopt such an administrative condition; accordingly, we have included this condition in the TSs.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: JUL 6 1981

