


USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



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August 1, 1980
L-80-248

Central File

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO
50-250, 50-251
IE Bulletin 80-10

Florida Power and Light Company has reviewed the non-radioactive systems as requested by the subject Bulletin. A list of these systems and the established sampling program is included as an attachment to this letter. In some cases sampling was not felt necessary due to the low probability of contamination.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Uhrig

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology


REU/PLP/pa

Attachment

cc: Director, of Reactor Construction Inspection
Harold F. Reis, Esquire

OFFICIAL COPY

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ATTACHMENT

Re: RII:JPO
50-250, 50-251
I&E Bulletin 80-10

CONTAMINATION OF NONRADIOACTIVE SYSTEM AND RESULTING POTENTIAL FOR UNMONITORED, CONTROLLED RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO ENVIRONMENT

Florida Power and Light has reviewed the design and operation of those systems considered as nonradioactive, but which could become radioactive through interfaces with radioactive systems. These systems and the established sampling frequencies and analysis methods are shown below. Excluded from this review were the systems which were previously included in the Process Radiation Monitoring System.

<u>System</u>	<u>Comments</u>
potable water	-drinking water is sampled monthly, and analyzed using gross β - γ techniques
sanitary	-sanitary tank is sampled monthly, and analyzed using gross β - γ techniques
auxiliary steam	-due to the extremely low probability that both fossil Unit Nos. 1 & 2 are shutdown and steam is being supplied from nuclear Unit No. 3 or 4, a sampling program has not been established -main steam system for Unit Nos. 3 & 4 is sampled weekly, and analyzed using isotopic analysis techniques
service air	-sampling program has not been established to detect activity in this system for the fossil Unit Nos. 1 & 2 because of the small probability for the concurrent multiple failures listed below: -leakage from the primary to secondary system -leakage from the steam generator sample coolers to the turbine plant cooling water system -leakage from the air compressors allowing contaminated cooling water to enter the air system -service air being supplied to the fossil Unit Nos. 1 & 2 from nuclear Unit Nos. 3 & 4
instrument air	-(interconnected with service air system... see service air system)

