

NRC FORM 388  
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

011 | F | L | I | T | P | I | S | I | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 9 |  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

011 | R | E | P | O | R | T | S | O | U | R | C | E | X | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 9 |  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40  
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 | Notification was received that the inspection/evaluation in progress in  
 013 | accordance with USNRC I & E Bulletin 79-14 had revealed a deficiency  
 014 | involving inadequate support of the 3A and 3B resistance temperature  
 015 | detector (RTD) bypass loops. Reference FSAR Figure 4.2-1. This deficiency  
 016 | could have potentially resulted in overstress of this piping during a SSE.  
 017 |  
 018 |

019 | SYSTEM CODE | CAIA (11) | CAUSE CODE | B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE | A (13) | COMPONENT CODE | S U P I O R I T (14) | COMP. SUBCODE | B (15) | VALVE SUBCODE | Z (16)  
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 017 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 810 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0018 | OCCURRENCE CODE | OIL | REPORT TYPE | X | REVISION NO. | 1  
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 ACTION TAKEN | F (18) | Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT | A (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD | A (21) | HOURS | 0068 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y (22) | NRC FORM SUB. | Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | X 91919 (26)  
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 | Evaluation revealed that the potential overstress problem existed on all  
 111 | RTD bypass loops. The unit was shutdown and a plant change/modification  
 112 | was implemented to properly support the piping. The RTD loop piping on  
 113 | Unit No. 4, was also evaluated and a plant change/modification was  
 114 | installed prior to start-up.

115 | FACILITY STATUS | E (23) | % POWER | 1100 (29) | OTHER STATUS | NA (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | C (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | I & E Bulletin 79-14 Inspection (32)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

115 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z (33) | Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA (36)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

117 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0010 (37) | TYPE | Z (38) | DESCRIPTION | NA (39)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

113 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0010 (40) | DESCRIPTION | NA (41)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

119 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z (42) | DESCRIPTION | NA (43)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

211 | PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION | NA (44) | NRC USE ONLY  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

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8008250452

Additional Event Description and Probable Consequences:

On Monday, May 5, 1980, notification was received from our Architect-Engineer that inspections and reanalyses in progress in accordance with USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14 had revealed a potential problem involving inadequate support of the 3A and 3B resistance-temperature detector (RTD) bypass loops. Reference FSAR Figure 4.2-1. Specifically, the results indicated that the calculated maximum stress associated with the piping exceeded the acceptance criteria established for this review. USNRC I & E Region II was notified of the above information both verbally and by facsimile transmission.

Further review and evaluation revealed that each of the three primary system RTD loops were affected by the overstress problem. This deficiency could have potentially resulted in overstress of this piping during a SSE. This type of deficiency should not be generic since pipe routings and support arrangements are unique.

Evaluation of the RTD loop piping on Unit No. 4 revealed that each of the three primary system RTD loops were affected by the same type of overstress problem due to inadequate support.

Similar occurrences (relating to the inspections pursuant to USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14) were reported as LER 250-79-26 and LER 250-79-40.

Additional Cause Description and Corrective Actions:

The evaluation confirmed that an overstress condition could potentially exist. Based on these results, a plant change/modification was designed and installed (subsequent to unit shutdown) to correct the deficiency.

Subsequent evaluation of the RTD loop piping on Unit No. 4 confirmed an overstress condition could potentially exist. Based on these results, a plant change/modification was designed and installed (prior to unit startup) to correct the deficiency.

A full accounting of inspection results and repairs will be made in response to USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14.

