



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 REGION II  
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100  
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-250/80-10 and 50-251/80-10

Licensee: Florida Power & Light  
 9250 West Flagler Street  
 Miami, FL 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4

Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

Inspection at Turkey Point site near Homestead, Florida

Inspector: *[Signature]* April 2, 1980  
 R. J. Vogt-Lowell Date Signed

Approved by: *[Signature]* April 2, 1980  
 R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RPS#2, RONS Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on February 1-29, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 135 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant nuclear safety committee meetings; plant operations; followup on reportable events; adherence to plant procedures; and auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance procedures.

Results

Of the 5 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 3 areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction - failure to follow procedure - paragraph 8); one apparent deviation was found in one area (deviation - failure to generate final approved maintenance procedures for Auxiliary Feedwater - paragraph 9).



## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

H. E. Yaeger, Site Manager  
J. K. Hays, Plant Manager - Nuclear  
J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent - Nuclear  
D. W. Haase, Technical Department Supervisor  
K. E. Beatty, Training Supervisor  
V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor  
P. W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor  
C. A. Coker, Nuclear Plant Supervisor  
L. C. Huenniger, Nuclear Plant Supervisor  
J. E. Crockford, Nuclear Plant Supervisor  
V. A. Kaminkas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor  
D. C. Bradford, Refueling Coordinator  
W. A. Klein, Licensing Engineer  
W. R. Williams, Assistant Superintendent Electrical Maintenance  
J. P. Mendieta, I&C Department Supervisor  
D. Jones, QC Supervisor  
S. Feith, Operations QA Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included operators, craftsmen, technicians, security personnel, QA personnel, and engineering personnel.

### 2. Management Interviews

Management interviews were conducted on February 22, 1980, and March 4, 1980 with the Site Manager and selected members of his staff. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of his inspection activities. The items of noncompliance and deviations discussed in this report were presented to the licensee during the management meetings. The licensee did not take exception to the findings.

### 3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected during this report period.

### 4. Unresolved Items

No new unresolved items were identified during this inspection report period.

### 5. Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) Meeting

The inspector attended PNSC meeting 80-13 conducted on 2-29-80. Procedure changes, procedure revisions, plant changes and modifications proposed changes to the Technical Specification, inservice inspection for valves and licensee event reports were reviewed during the meeting. The inspector



ascertained that the provisions of the Technical Specifications dealing with membership, review process, and member qualifications and quorum were met.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

#### 6. Plant Operations

The inspector reviewed plant operations to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative directive. The control room logs, shift supervisors logs, and equipment clearance logs for both units were reviewed. Interviews with a number of plant operations personnel were held on the day and night shifts.

Supervisor and control room operator actions were observed during shifts and at various shift changes. The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the requirements of the Technical Specifications. Operators were responsive to annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant status.

The following areas were toured by the inspector at various times during the inspection report period:

- a. Control Room
- b. Cable Spreading Area
- c. Rod Control Equipment room
- d. Auxiliary Building
- e. Radwaste Building
- f. Turbine Area
- g. Diesel Generator Rooms

During the tours, observations were made of housekeeping and cleanliness, ongoing activities, security equipment status and radiation control practices.

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

#### 7. Followup on Reportable Events

The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:

- a. reporting requirements were met;



b. corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and the Technical Specifications subsequent to the event.

50-250/79-40 "Feedwater Bypass Line" licensee committed to a timely review of the subject LER to determine the applicability of a report to the NRC pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 21.

50-250/79-39 "Foreign Material in the RCS"

50-250/79-36 "A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump"

50-250/79-35 "ECCS Analysis - Potential Nonconstruction"

50-250/79-33 "LOCA Analyses"

50-250/79-27 "East Fire Pump"

50-250/79-26 "Blowdown Line Supports"

50-250/79-24 "West Fire Pump"

50-250/79-23 "3B Charging Pump"

50-250/79-20 "Diesel Generators"

50-250/79-13 "Turbine Stop Valves"

Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

#### 8. Adherence to Plant Procedures

##### a. Reactor Protection System - Periodic Test O.P. 1004.2

The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the 11:41 p.m., February 4, 1980 trip of the unit 3 reactor. At the time of the trip, the operations personnel were involved in the performance of the monthly test of the reactor Protection System reactor trip and permissive matrices as required by Table 4.1-1, Item 24 of the Technical Specifications.

The cause of the trip was the result of opening the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker "A". This noted sequence was contrary to the sequence required by the procedure and as such constitutes a failure to follow an existing plant procedure.



The inspector noted the following aspects as possible contributors to the trip:

(1) Procedure Clarity

The procedure does not specify the number of people required to perform the test nor all of the plant locations where various system manipulations are to take place. It does specify establishing communications between the control room and the cable spreading room but is silent on the communications with the operators performing a number of procedurally specified manipulations in the 3B Motor Control Center (MCC).

(2) Plant Communications System Inadequacies:

Shortly after the trip, the inspector accompanied by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor toured the 3B MCC room and noted that after requesting via 2-way radio communications with the reactor operators that he be paged over the Gaitronics page system, such page was not receivable over the installed equipment in the room. Also, the only other means of communicating out of the 3B MCC room was the in-plant PAX System and it had the dial missing on the telephone.

The inspector and the Nuclear Plant supervisor then visited the cable spreading room and noted that the speaker associated with the page system in this room was unexplainably missing.

The inspector indicated that the specific means of communications between all participants in a test should be clearly spelled out in the procedure and that in parallel with this, a broad program of preventive maintenance on installed plant communications systems should be more vigorously pursued. The inspector received from plant management a commitment that a semi-annual preventive maintenance module entitled "PAX Telephone Servicing" which has never been completed in its entirety at the facility, would be so completed by March 31, 1980.

The inspector expressed the opinion that corrective action to preclude recurrence of trips such as these would necessarily have to address the procedural clarity and communication system inadequacies discussed above.

b. Pressurizer Relief Tank Operation - O. P. 1300.1

The inspector was conducting a tour of the Auxiliary Building on 2/26/80. During the course of the tour the inspector paused to observe while the Nuclear Operator manipulated controls to effect purging down of the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to the chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks (HT). The inspector questioned the operator



as to the availability of an operating procedure covering such evolution and was told that based on a communication with the Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS), he, the Nuclear Operator (NO), had been advised that there was no procedure for that manipulation. Shortly after this took place, the NPS called the N. O. on the telephone to inform him that he had made a mistake and that there was in fact a procedure available that addressed the work that was done. Such evolution was covered in paragraph 8.2 of O. P. 1300.1, "Pressurizer Relief Tank Operation". This procedure requires, in part, that the pumping down be discontinued when the PRT level reaches 75% as shown by LI-470 on the console in the main control room. As an aid, the licensee has utilized on many of its meters, indicators, etc. a green band to indicate what the normal range of the parameter being displayed. For the case of LI-470, the green band extends below the 75% level addressed in OP 1300.1. Consequently, the operator was unable to confirm that all the procedural requirements had been met. This inability to confirm adherence to procedural requirements is the result of a failure to follow an existing procedure.

The above two examples of failure to implement existing plant procedures are contrary to the requirements of the Technical Specifications and as such are an item of noncompliance (50-250/80-10-01).

9. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFWP) Maintenance Procedures

During the inspection report period, the inspector followed up on a commitment made by the licensee (reference paragraph 5 of IE Inspection report 50-250, 251/79-24) to have available for use in final approved form by October 1979, procedures for the followup activities:

- . AFWP Turbine Overhaul
- . AFWP Turbine Throttle Trip Valve Overhaul
- . AFWP Overhaul and Maintenance

Such procedures were not yet available at the time the inspector discussed the matter with the Quality Control Supervisor on February 28, 1980.

This lack of availability of the aforementioned procedures in final approved form is considered to be a deviation from a commitment to the Commission (50-250,251/80-10-02).

