U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 386 (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: OII FIL CONT 01 [017] [A review of Maintenance Procedure 15537.2 by OC personnel to verify TS 4.15.3.a compliance revealed that a fire hose station was not fully. 031 operable as required by TS 3.14.3.a, in that the installed fire hose OS I Was 25 ft. too short. Due to a misunderstanding of what constituted operability, the hose station remained inoperable for 4 months. During 05 the period that hose station HS-AB-02 was inoperable, backup equipment. 07 [013] [was available at nearby stations for emergency response, SYSTEM COOR CAUSE SUSCODE 22022 2002 SUSCODE COMPONENT CODE A B II 09

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 <td REVISION NQ. 0 12 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER X 9 9 9 9 [1] The fire hose station inoperability was due to (1) a misunderstanding of. what constitutes operability, (2) lack of understanding of the action required if a Limiting Condition of Operation is not met, and (3) [1] failure of administrative controls which require both strict compliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results OISCOVERY OF CONTROL C METHOD OF DISCOVERY
 Image: Stratus
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10 30 20 30 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY NA 2HONE: (305)552-3802 M. A. Schoppman NAME OF PREPARER _ 8004080608

ը առաջո Երա հետությունը։ Արանանանություն առաջուներություն ու են է բունեն ճանորե է ենչնեն տեղ է ենչ ենչներ, հետություն է Հայուստությունը։ REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 250-80-05 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO

Additional Cause Description and Corrective Actions:

The fire hose station inoperability was due to (1) a misunderstanding of what constitutes Operability, (2) lack of understanding of the action required if a Limiting Condition of Operation is not met, and (3) failure of administrative controls which require both strict compliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.

Maintenance Procedure 15537.2 incorporates the requirements of TS 4.15.3.a, the property insurance underwriter, and the preventive maintenance program. Hose station HS-AB-02 is atypical in that it should have been fitted with an extra length of hose to reach remote areas of the Auxiliary Building. The need for the additional hose length to reach safety related equipment was identified by the licensee in our report, "Fire Protection - A Re-evaluation of Existing Design Features and Administrative Controls," which was transmitted by letter dated February 25, 1977 (L-77-57). Through an oversight, the additional length of hose and a new hose reel were not installed. However, MP 15537.2 was revised to require the proper length of fire hose at this location.

The Fire Marshall had noted the deviation on the surveillance procedure, and had ordered the equipment necessary to properly equip the fire hose station. He, however, was not aware of the timely response required by the "Action Statement" in the event a Limiting Condition of Operation associated with the fire hose stations could not be met.

The deviation noted in the completed copy of the procedure was overlooked during review of surveillance results by the On-Site Fire Protection Coordinator. However, a third review (required in the procedure) by QC personnel detected the deviation, and corrective action was initiated.

A review of previously completed copies of the procedure disclosed similar instances of deviations that had not been corrected.

The corrective action will include revision of MP 15537.2 to require notification of the on-shift Nuclear Plant Supervisor should any fire protection system/component (required by Technical Specifications) be found in a condition other than specified by the procedure.