UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-250/79-26 and 50-251/79-26

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4

Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

Inspection at Turkey Point Site near Homestead, Florida

Inspector: R. J. Vogt-Lowell — Date Signed: 9/4/79

Approved by: R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch — Date Signed: 9/4/79

SUMMARY

Inspection on August 6-10, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 34 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of followup on reportable events; followup of licensee actions for IE Bulletins; unit trips from power operation; Chemical and Volume Control System Holdup Tanks; Plant Nuclear Safety Committee review of plant changes.

Results

Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were found in two areas (Infraction: Failure to follow procedures-paragraph 7.a; Deficiency: Failure to report-paragraph 9).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
*J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
*J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear
*V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear
*D. W. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor
*D. W. Haase, Technical Department Supervisor
*J. P. Mendieta, I&C Department Supervisor
L. L. Thomas, Assistant Superintendent Nuclear Maintenance-Primary
R. E. Garrett, Plant Security Supervisor
J. Hardy, Plant Engineer
*W. A. Klein, Engineer, Technical Department
*R. J. Spooner, QAO Supervisor
J. Labarraque, Plant Engineer

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. Based on a request by the inspector, licensee representatives committed to reviewing, by September 15, 1979, all nonvital loads on "D" Motor Control Center. This review would focus on the corrective action that could prevent occurrences such as the August 3, 1979 trip of Unit 3 and thus result in the reduction of unnecessary challenges to the safety systems.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Unresolved item 50-250/79-24-02 is upgraded to an item of noncompliance (50-250/79-26-02). For more information see paragraph 9 of this report.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Followup on Reportable Events

The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:

a. reporting requirements were met;

b. corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50;

indication. This resulted in a reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure. At the time, neither of the two pressurizer spray valves was available. One was considered inoperable prior to the transient and the other, temporarily powered by the non-vital portion of MCC-D had become unavailable earlier as a consequence of the Unit 4 trip.

A review of the pressurizer spray valves disclosed inadequacies in the administrative controls over the correction of operational problems exhibited by spray valve PCV-3-455B. The original Hagan controller for spray valve PCV-3-455B had been disconnected and was replaced by another manual controller which was plugged into the valve control circuit and which had been taped to the top of a console in the main control room. No temporary procedure had been promulgated to ensure consistent understanding between shifts of the operational control of this unusual component configuration. The lack of a temporary procedure indicates that A.P.0109.6, "Temporary Procedures", was not followed as required.

The actual installation of the manual controller was not performed under the guidelines of A. P. 190.15, "Plant Changes and Modifications" which defines a plant modification as "any change in the plant systems which accomplishes a given function by a new method or which alters the existing approach to accomplishing the function".

This condition also represents a failure to follow established plant procedures.

This is an item of noncompliance.

b. The inspector reviewed the RTES for Unit 4 Trip Number T101-392 on August 5, 1979. While performing routine testing of the turbine trips a malfunction occurred in the trip reset lever and a turbine trip was indicated as reset when in fact it was not. This resulted in a turbine trip and a reactor trip. To prevent recurrence of trips due to malfunctions of the reset lever, a Plant Change/Modification was being processed for implementation on both units that would provide the operator with an indication light showing whether or not a turbine trip was reset. The inspector had no further comments.

8. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) - Holdup Tanks

The inspector reviewed the circumstances associated with the various failures experienced with the CVCS-Holdup Tanks (HUT). Although the initiating events for the various failures have not been the same, the mode of failure

process" is representative of an observed inadequacy in "the implementation of administrative or procedural controls..." (dictated primarily by A. P. 190.15, Plant Changes and Modifications) and as such should have been reported to the NRC as required by Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.3.

Thus, unresolved item 50-250/79-24-02 is upgraded to an item of noncompliance (50-250/79-26-02).