

# UNITED STATES **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION** 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos.: 50-250/78-23 and 50-251/78-23

Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251

Licensee Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company

P. O. Box 013100

9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4

Inspection at: Turkey Point Site, Florida City, Florida

Inspection conducted: September 12-15, 1978

Inspector: E. H. Verdery

Reviewed by:

R. C. Lewis, Chief

Reactor Projects Section No. 2

Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Inspection Summary

Inspection on September 12-15, (Report Nos. 50-250/78-23 and 50-251/78-23) Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations and followup of reportable events, IE Bulletins and Circulars and outstanding items. The inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector. Results: In the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.



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DETAILS I

Prepared by

y Heiler Reactor

10/23/78.

E. H. Verdery, Reactor Inspector Reactor Project Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear

Support Branch

Dates of Inspection: September 12-15, 1978

Reviewed by: R.C. Leune

R. C. Lewis, Chief

10/23/78

Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

#### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Florida Power and Light Company

\*H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager

\*J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear

\*D. W. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor

\*J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear

V. B. Wagner, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear

\*G. D. Whittier, Licensing Engineer, General Office

\*A. E. Siebe, Assistant Manager of QA-Operations, General Office

The inspector contacted several operators and technical support personnel not listed.

\*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

## 2. <u>Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings</u>

(Open) Unresolved Item (78-09-02): Ability to Determine Head of Safety Injection pumps. The licensee has scheduled a special test to more accurately determine the design head of the Safety Injection Pumps. The results of this test will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

## 3. New Unresolved Items

None identified during this inspection.






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#### 4. Exit Interview

The inspector met with Mr. Yaeger and other licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on September 15, 1978. The inspection findings were discussed. The results of the inspection conducted by the Radiation Support Section are documented in Region II Report Nos. 50-250/78-21 and 50-251/78-21.

#### 5. Plant Operations

The inspector reviewed plant operations for both units including an examination of selected operating logs, special orders, equipment out of service logs, jumper and clearance logs for the period August 18, 1978 through September 12, 1978. This inspection was made to determine compliance with Technical Specifications, Regulations and licensee procedures.



#### 6. Licensee Action on IE Bulletin and Circulars

IE Circular 78-08 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Components '


During a previous inspection the licensee agreed to develop a program for a complete review of all safety-related electrical components which must continue to function in a hostile environment after a Design Basis Accident. The licensee committed to having the program developed and in progress by October 31, 1978 (78-18-02).

This issue will remain open.

## 7. Reportable Events Followup

The following reportable event was reviewed to ascertain that (1) reporting requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2 were met, (2) corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50; (3) the event was reviewed and evaluated; and (4) the facility was operated within the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the Technical Specification subsequent to the event.





#### Reportable Event 251/78-08

This event involved the discovery of missing flow restricting orifices in the branch lines to the emergency containment filter spray system from the containment spray header. These orifices are designed to preclude passive failures in the branch lines from causing a complete loss of containment spray flow. The licensee discovered this problem during the preparations for conducting the containment spray nozzle functional test required by Technical Specification 4.6 to be performed every five years. The same check had been performed on Unit 3 during the last refueling outage. The orifices had been verified to be properly installed in Unit 3 at that time.

As part of the investigation and corrective action for this event the licensee obtained a verification of orifice sizing from Bechtel Power Corporation. The inspector reviewed this verification (Bechtel letter to S. G. Brain dated September 1, 1978) and Florida Power and Light Company evaluation which supports the orifice size as being sufficient to remove the anticipated decay heat value of 750,000 btu/hr. Proper size orifices will be installed prior to the startup from the current Unit 4 refueling outage.

The licensee discovered in his investigation of all safeguards systems on Unit 4 that the recirculation flow limiting orifices for the containment spray pumps on Unit 4 were also missing. There orifices were verified to be installed correctly on Unit 3. The inspector requested the licensee to submit a supplementary report after his completion of the ongoing investigation and corrective actions.

This item will remain open (78-23-02).

### 8. Regional Office Review of Reportable Events

Reportable events described below were reviewed at the Regional Office to verify that:

- Regional Office initial screening actions were completed based on assessment of the reportable event notification.
- Details were clearly reported to the NRC as required by Technical Specifications, Licensee conditions or regulations.
- Reporting requirements have been met.
- The cause appeared accurate and was supported by report details.



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- Corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause.
- The generic applicability to other components, similar systems or activities within the facility has been considered.
- The Licensee Event Report (LER) form was complete and the responses appeared to be appropriate.
- The Regional Office has assessed the generic applicability of the LER (e.g., to the affected plant and other plants).

The review included review of Technical Specifications and the following event reports:

- a. 50-250/78-05: Charging Line Vent Connection Leaks
- b. 50-250/78-06: Diesel Generator "B" Fuel Tank Level Switch Failure.
- c. -50-250/78-07: Failed Pipe Supports in Charging Line to 3A Cold Leg.
- d. 50-250/78-09: Failure to Conduct Equalizing Battery Charge Within Required Surveillance Interval.
- e. 50-250/78-10: 3C Condensate Pump Motor Circuit Breaker Failure
  To Open From Control Room
- f. 50-251/78-05: Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump Failure
- g. 50-251/78-07: Condensate Storage Tank Low Level

The above event reports were closed out based upon a satisfactory review in the regional office.



