

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III

Reports No. 50-315/95007(DRSS); 50-316/95007(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316

Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74

Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Company  
1 Riverside Plaza  
Columbus, OH 43216

Facility Name: D. C. Cook

Inspection At: D. C. Cook Site, Bridgman, MI

Inspection Conducted: May 8-12, 1995

Inspectors: J. E. Foster  
J. Foster

5/30/95  
Date

J. E. Foster for  
R. Jickling

5/30/95  
Date

Accompanying Personnel: J. Hickman  
E. Hickey  
A. McQueen

Approved By: James R. Creed  
James R. Creed, Chief  
Safeguards & IR Section

5/30/95  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 8-12, 1995 (Reports No. 50-315/95007(DRSS); 50-316/95007(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the D. C. Cook emergency preparedness (EP) exercise involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), observations by NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Overall performance during the exercise was very good. NRC personnel participated in the exercise. Facility upgrades were noted in the Emergency Operations Facility. An Exercise Weakness was identified regarding verbal communication of Protective Action Recommendations to the State of Michigan.



## DETAILS

### 1.0 NRC Evaluators and Areas Evaluated

J. Foster, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC),  
Operations Staging Area (OSA), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)  
R. Jickling, TSC  
E. Hickey, EOF  
J. Hickman, CRS  
A. McQueen, OSA

### 2.0 General (IP 82301)

An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan was conducted on May 9, 1995, including the partial participation of the State of Michigan and the full participation of Berrien County. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III personnel also participated in this exercise, activating the regional Incident Response Center and dispatching a site team. The exercise demonstrated that the onsite emergency plans are adequate and the licensee is capable of implementing them.

The performances of State and local response organizations were evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). NRC and FEMA representatives summarized their preliminary findings at a media briefing at the D. C. Cook Visitor Center on May 12, 1995.

### 3.0 Specific Observations (IP 82301)

#### 3.1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)

Overall CRS performance was excellent. Classifications were correct and timely. Required notifications were timely and repeated as required. Control Room crew briefings were regular and comprehensive, including the status of the plant and current course of action.

Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) usage was good with efficient transitions between procedures. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) performed regular checks of Critical Safety Function status trees.

The Shift Supervisor (SS) received an initial call from Security regarding the bomb threat. The SS asked comprehensive and thorough questions about the threat, immediately briefed the operators, and decided to have Area Operators (AOs) return to the Control Room. A plant announcement was made, per procedure, banning use of radios, pagers, and changes to electrical equipment due to bomb activation considerations.

Operators correctly recognized the limiting 8 hour action statement to get emergency electrical power or the "AB" emergency

diesel generator back in service. Based on this and an earlier problem with ice condenser doors, operators properly decided to initiate a plant shutdown.

The turnover briefing by the SS to the Plant Manager was very comprehensive and complete.

### 3.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)

Overall performance in the TSC was very good. Activation of the TSC was rapid and efficient. Minimum staffing was rapidly achieved, and the facility was declared operational approximately 20 minutes after the Alert declaration.

Excellent internal communications were observed. These included the discussions concerning plant conditions and emergency action levels (current status and near term potential situations) and protective action recommendations.

Excellent, timely briefings were provided in the TSC by the Technical Director.

The use of an NRC liaison to brief and support NRC Site Team needs allowed the Technical Director to accomplish his responsibilities without undue burden.

Status boards were updated in a timely manner. The projected plant data information was extremely useful to all TSC personnel. Excellent tracking of response teams and priorities were observed by the inspector.

The plant evaluation team (PET) members were proactive in their assessment of plant conditions and emergency classifications. They continuously looked ahead for potential considerations that could impact the situation.

After the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) had been activated, the system disconnected, and reactivation was unsuccessful. Excellent followup was performed by notifying the Senior Resident Inspector and offering to fax ERDS data.

### 3.3 Operations Staging Area (OSA) and Inplant Teams

The OSA was activated in a timely manner, about 15 minutes after public address announcement of the declaration of an Alert. The activation was coordinated and efficient. Communications with the Control Room, TSC, and EOF were effective. Inplant teams were adequately briefed prior to departure. Location, tasks, and exposures of inplant teams were appropriately monitored.

The OSA Manager exercised good command and control and the OSA staff exhibited good team work and coordination. OSA briefings of



the staff consisted of posting a copy of the chronological log as major events occurred. OSA habitability was confirmed by a constant air monitor. The position of Resource Coordinator was particularly effective in managing team activity and available skilled resources.

Logkeeping was appropriately accomplished on a chronology board in the OSA Manager's office and by the Radiation Protection Director (RPD) office in a log book. The magnetic board for managing technical personnel resources and inplant response teams was particularly effective.

One inplant team was accompanied by an inspector. The team exhibited good team work and coordination. The team was adequately briefed on the task assigned, expected radiation levels, stay times, and access routes prior to departure. Team members properly checked their equipment prior to departure.

There was no organized or structured debriefing process for returning inplant response teams. Instances were observed where only the first member of returning teams was questioned about what they saw and experienced. Inspection Followup Item 50-315/95007-01; 50-315/95007-01 will track improvement of the debriefing process.

The OSA decontamination area and shower were being used as a storeroom and were not readily usable.

#### 3.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Overall performance in the EOF was good. The EOF staff adequately performed all required functions while being in command and control of the licensee's response actions to the simulated emergency. The EOF had been recently upgraded and reorganized, with new furniture, a new layout, and ceiling projection units for the reactor status board.

The EOF was staffed and operational within one hour of declaration of the Alert classification. Offsite teams were deployed and waiting for dispatch in a timely manner.

Briefings of the NRC team and the corporate team on their arrivals were complete, but succinct. The NRC team was able to obtain the information they needed to perform their functions adequately. The EOF staff interacted well with the NRC Site Team staff and were able to continue their appropriate duties, even with the expected interruptions.

Classification of the General Emergency was timely and appropriate as were the determination of utility protective action recommendations.

There was confusion over the initial protective action recommendation (PAR). The formal PAR (notification form) from the utility was evacuation out two miles around the plant and 5 miles for downwind sectors. Verbal communication erroneously referenced a PAR of sheltering, and the State action was sheltering of the licensee-designated sectors. A wind change had altered the affected sectors by this time. The EOF manager called the State and clarified the issue, but confusion over the PAR continued for some time. An Exercise Weakness was identified regarding verbal communication of Protective Action Recommendations to the State of Michigan (Exercise Weakness (50-315/95007-02; 50-316/95007-02)).

Command and Control was adequately demonstrated at the EOF. The corporate team arrived at the EOF, but due to the confusion over the protective action recommendations, turnover of the facility was properly postponed for over an hour.

The dose assessment team used the wrong assumption for fuel failure in some of the earlier dose assessment calculations after the reactor tripped. This would have produced more conservative dose assessment calculations. To keep the exercise on track, the controller prompted the team to use the correct assumptions.

Communications and information flow within the EOF and between other facilities was good. Notifications to offsite authorities were timely.

Initial recovery planning discussions began late in the exercise. The incident response roles of NRC and the Department of Energy were discussed. A comprehensive list of onsite action items was developed.

### 3.5 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

The JPIC was activated in a timely manner, and was well staffed. Briefings covered the necessary material on a timely basis. Visual aids were well utilized.

There was very good coordination between the licensee, state, local officials and the NRC. The briefing moderator did an excellent job of moderating the media briefings.

The written news releases were very good. There was a "good practice;" the press release would be developed, reviewed by the spokesperson, the material discussed at the media briefing, and the release subsequently modified as necessary to clarify items before issuance.

No violations or deviations were identified.





#### 4.0 Exercise Control and Critiques (IP 82301)

There were sufficient numbers of personnel to control the exercise. No significant examples of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions were identified.

Controller-allowed simulation of inplant team activities appeared excessive.

The 24 hour "time jump" during the latter part of the exercise did not include a break in play to allow participants to understand the new conditions.

Licensee controllers held critiques in each facility following the exercise. A Controller Critique was held the following day. The OSA facility critique was limited in scope and attendance.

#### 5.0 Inspection Followup Items

Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with licensee management, will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and involve some action on the part of the NRC, the licensee or both. An Inspection Followup item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.3.

#### 6.0 Exit Interview

The inspectors held an exit interview on May 11, 1995, with those licensee representatives identified below to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.

##### 6.1 Key Persons Contacted

###### Indiana Michigan Power/Cook Nuclear Plant

E. Fitzpatrick, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation  
W. Smith, Chief Operations Manager  
D. Mahalik, Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinator  
D. Williams, NSRP Manager  
A. Blind, Site Vice President/Plant Manager  
K. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager-Operations  
L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager-Technical  
J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager-Support  
J. Wiebe, Quality Assurance & Control Superintendent  
J. Smith, Managerial Support/Assistant Emergency Plan Coordinator  
E. Smarella, Public Affairs  
R. Krieger, Managerial/Emergency Planning

The above and other licensee staff attended the exit interview. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.

