

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-315/95003(DRS); No. 50-316/95003(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316

Licenses No. DPR-58; No. DPR-74

Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Company
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus, OH 43216

Facility Name: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Inspection At: Donald C. Cook Plant, Stevensville, MI

Inspection Conducted: March 9-31 and June 20-30, 1995

Inspectors: Patricia Loughed for 7/26/95
H. A. Walker, Lead Inspector Date

Patricia Loughed 7/26/95
V. P. Loughed Date

G. Y. Cha, Contractor

Approved By: M. A. Ring 7/28/95
M. A. Ring, Chief Date
Maintenance and Outages Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection from March 9-31 and June 20-30, 1995 (Reports
No. 50-315/95003(DRS); No. 50-316/95003(DRS)):

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's internal assessment of the service water system using selected portions of NRC inspection module 40501 and Temporary Instruction 2515/118, Revision 1, to ascertain whether the licensee assessment was effective in meeting the inspection requirements of Temporary Instruction 2515/118, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)," Revision 1.

Results: The overall internal assessment activities of the essential service water system at D. C. Cook appeared to be good and no additional NRC inspections appear to be necessary to evaluate and determine the adequacy of this system. The assessment appeared to be thorough and addressed the items required to be addressed by Generic Letter 89-13 and NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/118, Revision 1, "Service Water System Operational Performance



Inspections." The design and maintenance of the essential service water system was determined to be adequate for the system to perform its intended function. No plant equipment problems were identified that would prevent satisfactory operation.

A significant number of problems and concerns were identified during the assessment and, in most cases, the problems identified were properly addressed (exceptions are discussed in Section 5 of this report).



DETAILS

1.0 Principal Persons Contacted

Internal Assessment Team

- D. Powell, Team Leader & Mechanical
- A. Tattersal, Team Co-leader & Operations
- J. Haverty, Maintenance and Corrective Actions
- C. Hehl, Maintenance and Corrective Actions
- G. Hines, Mechanical
- D. Kosack, Instrument & Control & Electrical
- * W. McCrory, Surveillance and Testing
- J. Olson, Surveillance and Testing
- P. O'Neil, Operations
- R. Stanley, Mechanical

Response Team

- ** W. McCrea, Response Team Leader
- L. Gibson, Response Team Management Representative
- D. Ethridge, Plant Operations
- * A. Feliciano, AEPSC Service Water Engineer
- * C. Golden, Plant Staff Engineer - Mechanical Systems
- T. Hart, Plant Senior Engineer - Electrical Systems
- * M. Horvath, Plant NRC Facilitator
- R. Kalinowski, AEPSC Quality Assurance Department
- K. Koebel, Plant Documentation
- E. Mallen, Plant Environmental - Zebra Mussel Specialist
- L. Ormson, Plant Maintenance Engineering
- R. Scott, Plant Operations Department Training
- * R. Siada, SWSOPI Facilitator & Contractor Liaison
- * R. Smith, Plant Engineering - Heat Exchanger Testing
- D. Willemin, Plant Maintenance Department Training

American Electric Power Service Corporation

- ** P. Barrett, Quality Assurance Manager
- ** E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President Nuclear

Indiana Michigan Power Company

- * A. Blind, Plant Manager
- * K. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager - Production

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- * J. Isom, Senior Resident Inspector
- * M. Jordan, Chief, Operations Program Section
- * C. Orsini, Resident Inspector

- * Denotes those present at the June 30, 1995 exit meeting.



** Denotes those participating in the June 30, 1995 exit meeting by telephone.

Other persons were contacted as a matter of course during the inspection.

2.0 Introduction

The licensee assessment of the essential service water (ESW) system was conducted to ensure that the D. C. Cook service water system would perform as designed and that problems described in Generic Letter 89-13 were adequately addressed. The internal assessment was performed as an alternative to the NRC service water system operational performance inspection (SWSOPI) required by NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/118, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)," Revision 1.

The purpose of the NRC inspection of this internal assessment was to evaluate the adequacy of the assessment and to determine if additional inspection was required to meet the requirements of TI 2515/118. The inspection included a sampling review of all aspects of the assessment and was conducted in two phases. The first phase was completed while the assessment was in progress to observe and review the methods used and the thoroughness of the assessment. The second phase was conducted to determine the adequacy of the report, the findings and the actions taken to resolve identified problems and concerns.

3.0 System Description

The ESW system at the D. C. Cook Plant supplies the necessary cooling water to maintain acceptable temperatures for essential plant components. The system provides the cooling water requirements for the component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers, the emergency diesel generator coolers, the containment spray (CTS) heat exchangers and the control room air conditioning condensers. It also provides a back-up supply of water for the auxiliary feed-water (AFW) pumps in the event that the normal AFW system water supply is not available.

The ESW system, shared by both units, consists of four ESW pumps, each with an automatic "back washing" duplex strainer and associated piping, valves, and instrumentation. The system contains two identical main supply headers. Each header is served by two pumps and each header serves half of the system load in each unit. The headers are cross-tied between units and two isolation valves, which are normally open and do not automatically close, are available to separate the units if necessary.

The ESW pumps are located in the screenhouse and, during normal operations, water is supplied from Lake Michigan, through the circulating water intake pipes to the ESW pumps suction well. An alternate water supply is available by opening the slide gates between either discharge tunnel vault and the forebay, assuring a water supply in the event the intakes are unavailable. The ESW discharge line returns water to the lake through the circulating water system discharge piping.

During normal system operations and during startup or shutdown, ESW is supplied to the CCW heat exchangers and the control room air conditioning condensers. The remaining heat exchangers are supplied during a loss of off-site power and/or a safety injection.



4.0 In-Process Review

The first inspection phase of the internal assessment of the ESW system was conducted March 9-31, 1995 while the internal assessment of the system was being performed. The inspection included a review of the quality and effectiveness of the internal assessment. The inspection was performed by a selective examination of documents and representative records, discussions with assessment and response team personnel, and observations of assessment activities in progress.

4.1 Assessment Organization

An assessment team was organized to perform the internal service water system operational performance assessment. A full time response team was assigned to interface and coordinate the assessment and to provide assistance to the assessment team. These two organizations are discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

4.1.1 Assessment Team

The assessment team consisted of ten members, five were from American Electric Power/Indiana & Michigan Electric (AEP/I&M), and five were outside consultants. The team was divided into six groups. These groups were mechanical design, operations, maintenance, surveillance and testing, quality assurance and corrective actions, and electrical. The first four groups each had two members: one consultant and one in-house person, while the last two each had only one member.

The NRC inspectors evaluated the assessment team members by review of respective resumes and by selected interviews and witnessing of assessment activities. All team members appeared knowledgeable in their respective areas.

The inspectors noted that none of the AEP/I&M personnel on the assessment team were from the licensee's quality assurance group or any other oversight area. While this had no impact on the quality of the self-assessment, it left the licensee's normal oversight groups without direct experience from this internal assessment.

4.1.2 Response Team

The licensee had designated twelve people from different functional areas to coordinate with and respond to requests for information, questions, and concerns of the assessment team. These individuals appeared to be knowledgeable of their functional areas and provided necessary coordination and assistance to the assessment team. The response team could also secure additional specialists in specific areas as necessary to respond to specific assessment team requests.

4.2 Planning and Preparation

The inspectors considered the licensee's planning and preparation for the SWSOPI self-assessment to be thorough and complete. An assessment plan was developed prior to the assessment team arriving on site. This assessment plan addressed each of the items detailed in NRC Temporary Procedure 2515/118,



"Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)," Revision 1. During the designated planning week, this assessment plan was further refined to assign assessment team members to each issue and to provide a correlation between the assessment area and Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."

4.3 In-Progress Observation

The assessment team appeared to have completed a very thorough review of all aspects of the ESW system. This review included system descriptions, system diagrams including electrical control drawings, and the records of past system performance and repair. Licensee commitments made in response to Generic Letter 89-13 and the draft ESW system design basis document were also reviewed. ESW piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) were compared to actual ESW installations. Other applicable design documents such as design changes and selected calculations were reviewed. Non-engineering areas such as operations and maintenance were also included.

4.3.1 Requests for Information and Identification of Concerns

The assessment team used a single form, "SWSOPI Request for Information Form (RFI)" to request information as well as to document concerns. The form contained a block for the originator to indicate if the RFI involved a concern. This method caused some difficulties in differentiating between requests for information and concerns. These difficulties were amplified because of the number of RFIs (160) issued during the assessment.

In most cases, the designated response team provided adequate and timely responses to requests for documents and information on concerns and findings. Inadequate RFI responses to some issues, an issue throughout the assessment, was especially a problem early in the assessment. Because of this problem, sometimes two or more RFIs were required to get adequate information or answers on specific issues. The inspectors noted that sufficient review, coordination, and control were not in place to assure that the responses were adequate before they were submitted to the assessment team. This problem made it difficult for both the assessment team leader and the NRC inspectors to determine how much time was being spent by the assessment team to resolve questions or concerns.

The licensee's assessment and the inspectors also noted that contributors to this problem appeared to be inadequate communication, inadequate review of responses and in some cases lack of appreciation for the issue. This matter was discussed with the response team and the problem appeared to have improved considerably later in the assessment.

Requests for information and identification of concerns (RFI forms) were adequately documented and tracked.

4.3.2 Assessment Team Findings and Concerns

During the assessment, the team identified a number of problems or concerns, some of which appeared to be significant. No problems or concerns were noted that would appear to prevent or seriously impede the operability or function of the ESW system.



The findings or concerns considered most significant were documented on condition reports (CRs) with the lesser significant findings or observations documented on other plant documents, such as action requests or procedure change requests. These documents provided a method to initiate and track action on the findings identified during the assessment. In some cases, ESW action items were assigned, scheduled and tracked utilizing plant tracking systems.

The NRC inspectors reviewed the actions taken to correct or resolve most of the problems or concerns noted by the assessment team. This review was completed during the final phase of the inspection. The final inspection phase is discussed in Section 5 of this report.

5.0 Final Review and Evaluation

The second and final phase of the inspection of the internal assessment of the ESW system was conducted June 20-30, 1995. This portion of the inspection included a review of the assessment report and other service water system related records as well as a review of the actions taken to correct the findings, observations and concerns noted by the assessment team.

5.1 Evaluation of Assessment Report

The inspectors did a detailed review of the Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI) Self-Assessment Report, which was issued May 5, 1995. The report was thorough, adequately implemented the self-assessment plan and met the intent of the inspection requirements of TI 2515/118.

Numerous findings, deficiencies and concerns were located in the text throughout the report. Some of these included those items requiring procedure changes for which procedure change requests were referenced in Section 4.0 of the report. In addition, the report contained a listing of CRs issued as a result of the assessment as Attachment B, "Condition Reports," and a listing of recommendations as Attachment E, "Recommendations". The inspectors reviewed action taken on these to verify that adequate action had been taken or was in progress to resolve or correct the problem. In most cases, satisfactory resolutions were achieved as was determined by the additional reviews during the final phase of this inspection (exceptions are discussed in the following paragraphs of Section 5).

5.1.1 Comparison with Assessment Exit Meeting Notes

During the review of the report, the inspectors noted that some of the issues identified at the SWSOPI assessment team exit on March 31, 1995 did not appear to be discussed in the report. The inspectors compared the assessment report to the exit meeting notes and found this to be true.

When these issues were discussed with licensee personnel, the inspectors were told that a conscious decision was made not to include details in the assessment report, if the details were included in a referenced CR. The inspectors verified that CRs were written for four of the five noted issues, and that the respective CRs adequately addressed the concerns. The other item was determined to have been resolved and was no longer an issue.

5.1.2 Lake Water Temperature

The lake water (ultimate heat sink) temperature is a critical parameter in the design and performance of the Essential Service Water System, especially in the performance of the various safety-related heat exchangers. The Self-Assessment Report briefly mentioned a discrepancy (87.5 °F versus 90 °F) for the maximum allowable ESW inlet temperature and did not provide further discussion on the current temperature status.

Action Item DB-12-ESW-006 of the unreleased Design Basis Document for the ESW system provided a more detailed discussion, however it was not clear that a temperature value had been established.

Licensee personnel stated that an analysis on a separate issue confirmed 87.5 °F to be the proper lake water temperature (ESW inlet). This analysis has been submitted under AEP:NRC:1207 on May 26, 1995 to NRR for review and approval.

5.2 Evaluation of Findings and Corrective Action

The NRC inspectors reviewed the actions taken to correct or resolve most of the problems or concerns noted by the assessment team. The findings or concerns considered most significant were documented on CRs with action requests or procedure change requests used to correct less significant issues. Some of the less significant concerns, which were not designated as findings, were included in the report as recommendations.

5.2.1 Review of Condition Reports


CRs were written on the primary findings identified by the assessment team. The Self-Assessment Report of May 5, 1995 identified 15 CRs, which were written on the findings or concerns identified during the assessment. These CRs are listed in Appendix B of the report. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to correct or resolve the problems noted on the listed CRs. Actions had been completed to correct some of the identified findings; however, actions, requiring longer periods of time, were only partially complete with final actions scheduled for a later date.

In most cases, the inspectors concurred in the actions taken to resolve the problems described in the CRs. The CRs which appeared to require additional action are discussed below.

○ CR 95-0421 -- Partial summary report not issued for RFC 12-3076

A partial summary report was not issued for RFC 12-3076 after a root isolation valve and piping were added to the existing the ESW system. The partial summary report would initiate drawing, procedure, and valve lineup sheet revisions to include the new valves. The applicable drawings and procedures were not updated to inform operators of the new valves.

The inspectors reviewed the requirements of the controlling procedure PMP 5040 MOD.004 "Request for Change," Revision 6. The procedure required that a partial summary report be issued following the partial installation of a modification. Licensee personnel concluded that the



procedure was not violated since the valves were not formally released to operations and the procedure did not specify any time limit for preparing partial summary reports. This was a program weakness since the valves were installed in the ESW piping and were serving an isolation boundary function for nearly a year before the assessment team questioned the situation.

Licensee personnel stated that partial summary reports had been prepared on twelve other partial installations for this same modification. As a result, the drawings and procedures were updated to reflect the other partial modifications.

Based on discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors concluded that there was little configuration control on the valves up until the time the condition report was written. Because of the CR a partial summary report was issued and the appropriate drawings and procedures/valve lineup sheets were updated.

Licensee personnel had recognized that there were problems with the control of partially installed modifications and had established a working group between project engineering and operations to resolve the problem. This group had prepared some preliminary recommendations, which were under review at the time of the inspection. Additionally, the licensee was in the process of revising its entire modification process.

○ CR 95-0435 -- Piping to and from 2-QP56W is 1/2" vs. 1" on OP Flow Diagram

Piping on the inlet & outlet to the ESW vent valve (2-QP-56W) was verified to be 1/2". Drawing OP-2-5113-43 showed the outlet piping to be 1". Licensee personnel determined that the drawing was in error and stated that the drawing would be corrected.

Since vent valve 2-QP-56W was one of four similar vent valves in the ESW system, the inspectors requested that the associated inlet and outlet piping size for the remaining three vent valves be verified as correct. This verification confirmed that the inlet and outlet piping connected to all four of the ESW vent valves (1-QP-56E, 1-QP-56-W, 2-QP-56-E, and 2-QP56-W) to be 1/2" rather than 1" as shown on drawings OP-1-5113-55 and 2-5113-43.

The licensee considered this to be one drawing error since the design was identical for the four valves. The problem was to be resolved by a drawing change.

○ CR 95-0475 -- Emergency Diesel Generator After Cooler Temperature Indicator Attached by Masking Tape

The problem, covered by CR 95-8475, was noted during the assessment team walkdowns of the ESW system. The CR, as originally written, described the problem as the use of masking tape. The NRC concern, which initiated the CR, was unauthorized or uncontrolled work. During additional discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors were told that the work control concern would also be addressed.



During the final inspection phase, the inspectors verified that the CR had been signed off as completed and that the temperature indicator had been properly installed; however, discussion of the uncontrolled work issue was limited.

- CR 95-0509 -- No Formal Program for Capturing Inspection Data When System Components Are Opened for Maintenance

AND

- CR 95-0511 -- Insufficient Proceduralized Acceptance Criteria for Inspection of Safety-Related Heat Exchangers

These two CRs were inter-related and addressed parallel deficiencies identified during the self-assessment. The issues were minimum inspection for microbiologically induced corrosion and fouling of the ESW system and a lack of proceduralized acceptance criteria for inspection of safety-related heat exchangers.

A Plant Manager Instruction PMI-50XX titled "Essential Service Water System Inspection Program" was under development to describe the methods and controls to be used in the ESW system inspection program. The PMI was scheduled to be issued by July 31, 1995.

The inspectors reviewed the draft procedure and noted that the program included ESW components and piping, with specific guidelines that would identify piping locations, anticipated debris to be found in heat exchangers, and methods to document the findings. The procedure appeared to be adequate with one exception. There were no requirements for inspections or evaluations to establish base line data and subsequent periodic inspections to determine possible degrading of heat exchanger tubes. Since the plant had very few tube failures in ESW system heat exchangers, this was not considered a significant concern by licensee personnel.

Licensee personnel agreed to review the feasibility, practicality, and desirability of determining base line data for the component cooling water (CCW) and other safety-related heat exchangers at the D. C. Cook Plant. The decision to implement an inspection program or continue with the existing practice would be made before July 31, 1996.

- CR 95-0512 -- Testing and Analysis of Heat Exchanger Performance do not Meet the Requirement of GL 89-13 to Calculate the Heat Transfer at Design Conditions After Obtaining the Fouling Factors From the Test Data

The "Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger GL 89-13 Test Guide" was developed to enhance and improve the GL 89-13 CCW heat exchanger test procedure. To achieve convergence, the analytical model required that an adjustment factor of 4.7 be applied in the calculation of the shell side heat transfer coefficient for this test guide.

Even though AEP engineering considered the use of this adjustment factor to provide acceptable results, the inspectors were not sure this was an adequate approach. During discussions of this issue, licensee personnel stated that AEP had procured QA-N heat exchanger software Proto-Hx to



more accurately evaluate the CCW heat exchanger performance, and that plant engineering was in the process of evaluating procurement of the same software package.

Other actions taken to address the ESW related CRs were considered acceptable.

5.2.2 Assessment Team Recommendations

Attachment E of the assessment report contains 21 recommendations for improvement of the ESW system and supporting documentation. Ten of the more significant recommendations are listed in the introduction to the report. The NRC inspectors concur in these recommendations and feel that serious consideration should be given to implementation of, at least, the ten included in the report introduction.

There were no specific commitments to address the listed recommendations; however, some of these recommendations are being addressed and others will be addressed as actions are taken to resolve other findings or concerns identified during the assessment.

5.2.3 Procedure Change Requests

The assessment report documented eleven procedure change requests (PCRs) written to correct procedure problems noted in the operations and surveillance and testing areas of the self-assessment. The inspectors reviewed the procedures and found, with one exception, the PCRs had been appropriately addressed in the revised procedures.

The exception was on a PCR written for procedures 1/2 OHP SP.102 and 106. The procedure change request was closed even though Procedure 1/2 OHP SP.106 had not been revised.

The inspectors noted that the wording of this procedure could lead to an operator establishing a minimal flow rather than trying to maximize the flow. The response team had similar concerns about the wording and agreed that the procedure needed to be revised. A new procedure correction request was written to address these concerns.

The procedure problems corrected by the PCRs and the additional procedure problems noted during the assessment appeared to indicate a possible generic procedure problem. This concern is addressed in Section 5.3.1 of this report.

5.3 Additional Findings and Concerns

The following items were identified by the NRC inspectors during the second inspection phase of the internal SWSOPI assessment or they were the result of NRC follow up or verification of action taken to resolve assessment team identified items.

5.3.1 Procedure Problems

The assessment report documented a significant number of procedure problems in the ESW operations, test and surveillance, and maintenance areas.

Action was taken to correct the individual identified procedure problems by issuing procedure change requests (PCRs) or, in some cases, reviews that determined that a procedure was not required. The number of problems with procedures in the ESW area indicated a possible generic procedure problem which could involve areas other than the ESW system. In responding to the assessment team's findings, this possible generic issue was not addressed. The possible inadequacy of other plant procedures was discussed with licensee personnel; however, no commitment was made to address the procedure problem outside the ESW area.

5.3.2 Generic Letter 89-13 Response

A number of the problems identified by the assessment team had been previously identified in the responses to Generic Letter 89-13, which were issued on January 25, 1990 and January 30, 1991. The licensee made commitments in these responses to address or correct many of the documented problems. Little action appeared to have been taken on these problems or to meet these commitments until shortly before the SWSOPI internal assessment in March of this year. Since the assessment, action appeared to have been initiated on most ESW issues.

Some of the commitments made in these GL 89-13 responses had been changed or deleted. For example, the diesel driven fire protection pump coolers were deleted from the program and inspections were not performed on the control room air conditioner cooler heat exchangers although the responses had committed to performing these inspections. It was not clear if these were the only changes to the original commitments. Licensee personnel agreed to review the 1990 and 1991 responses to GL 89-13, evaluate the issue and make the necessary changes and revisions to these commitments. Licensee personnel stated that a memorandum would be written to document the commitment changes.

5.3.2.1 FSAR Table 9.8-6, "Malfunction Analysis"

The response to Generic Letter 89-13 indicated that a review of FSAR Table 9.8-6, "Malfunction Analysis" was used as the single failure review for the ESW System and was found to be acceptable. The inspectors questioned the completeness of Table 9.8-6 since the table only contained information for mechanical equipment. The report also discussed electrical aspects of the single active failure vulnerabilities, which basically stated that redundancy and separation were adequately provided.

Licensee personnel agreed to perform a review of mechanical, electrical and instrumentation ESW equipment for the impact of single failure criteria. This review was scheduled to be completed by June 30, 1996. Based on this review, Table 9.8-6 will be revised as needed.

5.3.3 Design Basis Document

The assessment team reviewed the unreleased draft of the ESW system design basis document (DBD). The draft had been recently completed and was in the review/signature cycle. Appendix A, "Action Item Log" of the DBD contained a list of 17 action items to be completed. Some of these action items were applicable directly to wording in the DBD; however, most applied to ESW hardware or functional items. Since the document had been recently developed,



little had been done on the action items; however, the items were in the plant open items tracking system.

Additional actions required on or by the DBD were:

- Resolution of the 17 action items identified in Appendix A, "Action Item Log," of the ESW Design Basis Document.
- Completing, reviewing, approving and issuing the ESW Design Basis Document.

5.3.4 Improper Safety Classification of Condition Reports

During the review of the ESW CRs initiated during the assessment, the inspectors noted that 10 of the 15 CRs were designated as non-safety related. All but two of these CRs affected safety-related equipment or activities.

Based on a review of the controlling procedure, PMI 7030, "Processing Condition Reports," it was evident that most of these CRs were inappropriately classified as non-safety related. Discussions with the AEP QA Manager, who had the primary responsibility for PMI 7030, indicated that this portion of the procedure was not being properly implemented.

The inspectors reviewed selected work requests and maintenance work orders, initiated as a result of these CRs, and noted that the documents were appropriately classified as safety related. During discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors were told that all CRs were handled the same regardless of the safety classification.

Licensee personnel stated that personnel classifying the CRs would be trained to ensure that future CRs were properly classified or, as an alternative, the requirement for safety classification might be eliminated for CRs altogether. Action was scheduled to be completed on this item within three months.

5.3.5 Service Water System Engineer Vacancy

During the initial phase of the inspection, the inspectors and the assessment team noted that the systems engineer for the service water system had resigned from the company in November of 1994 and the position had not yet been filled. Most of the work of this system engineer was divided among several other systems engineers and was performed by specific assignments. During the final inspection phase, the inspectors noted that this important position still had not been filled and specific portions of this work was still being performed by other systems engineers. This concern was discussed with plant management, however, no commitments were made.

6.0 Conclusions

The internal assessment of the ESF system at D. C. Cook appeared to be adequate and no additional NRC inspections were determined to be necessary to evaluate the adequacy of the system. The assessment appeared to be thorough and addressed the items required to be addressed by Generic Letter 89-13 and NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/118, Revision 1, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspections." A significant number of problems and

concerns were identified during the assessment and, in most cases, the problems identified were properly addressed.

The ESW system was determined to be adequate to perform its intended function and no plant equipment problems were identified that would prevent satisfactory operation.

7.0 Exit Meeting

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the D. C. Cook Power Station on June 30, 1995, to summarize the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection. The inspectors discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection. Licensee personnel were asked to identify any proprietary information or material discussed during the exit meeting. The licensee did not identify any proprietary information and no documents or processes reviewed during the inspection were identified as proprietary.

