

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [1] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | M | I | D | C | C | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | [] | 5

CON'T. 01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) 02 | UNIT WAS SHUTDOWN IN MODE 5. WHILE CONDUCTING ISI TESTING OF CHECK VALVE PW-275 IT WAS FOUND THAT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE NCR-252 WAS NOT FULLY SEATED WITH SHUT INDICATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM. WHILE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION IS NOT REQUIRED IN MODE 5 IT IS POSSIBLE NCR-252 MAY NOT HAVE BEEN FULLY OPERABLE AS A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE SINCE JULY 29, 1980 IN VIOLATION OF T.S. 3.6.1.1. THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WERE NOT EFFECTED - (SEE SUPPLEMENT).

08 | PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE 80-007/03 L-0

09 | SYSTEM CODE | S | D | 11 | CAUSE CODE | X | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | Z | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | V | A | L | V | I | O | P | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | D | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | D | 16 | 17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 0 | 21 | 22 | 23 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 3 | 4 | 24 | 26 | 27 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | 30 | REPORT TYPE | X | 31 | 32 | REVISION NO. | 1 | 33 | ACTION TAKEN | E | 18 | 34 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | 35 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | 36 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | 37 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | 41 | NPD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | 42 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A | 25 | 43 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | G | 2 | 5 | 5 | 26 | 44 | 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) 10 | THE EXACT CAUSE FOR THE OPERATOR FOR NCR-252 BEING OUT OF ADJUSTMENT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE VALVE OPERATOR WOULD STROKE THE VALVE BUT IMPROPER ADJUSTMENT WOULD NOT PERMIT VALVE TO SHUT COMPLETELY. THE VALVE STROKE WAS ADJUSTED AND THE VALVE SHUT COMPLETELY AND CYCLING TIME WAS ACCEPTABLE. NO FURTHER ACTIONS PLANNED.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | D | 28 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 31 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 32 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | OPERATOR/TECHNICIAN OBSERVATION

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 33 | 34 | Z | 34 | 35 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 36 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 38 | Z | 38 | 39 | DESCRIPTION | NA

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 41 | DESCRIPTION | NA

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | Z | 42 | 43 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 8101210451

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | 45 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 8101210451



ITEM 10

Operations Department was performing ISI Test on Check Valve PW-275 on the Primary Water Supply to the Containment. Air operated valve NCR-252 was placed in the shut position and the test connection between these two valves opened to verify PW-275 seats on reverse flow in system. When leakage was observed at test connection the Operator looked at NCR-252 and found it was not fully seated, even though Control Room indication indicated valve was shut. A C&I Technician found the stroke adjusting nut improperly set and not permitting the valve to fully shut. The stroke was readjusted and the valve timing cycle was verified acceptable. The test connection was again opened with NCR-252 in the shut position and verified NCR-252 and PW-275 were both shut with no leakage from the test connection.

A review of maintenance and testing records revealed the last maintenance and stroke adjustment to NCR-252 were performed on February 4, 1980. Check valve PW-275 was successfully tested on July 4, 1980 with no leakage back through the check valve or through NCR-252. Valve NCR-252 had been cycled for Surveillance Testing on July 29, 1980 with acceptable timing and correct valve position indication in the Control Room.

Unit 2 had entered Mode 4 on July 12, 1980 and Mode 1 on July 13, 1980 and had operated at various power levels up to 100% until October 18, 1980 when the Unit tripped with a generator ground. Unit 2 had entered Mode 5 again on October 21, 1980. The maximum time NCR-252 could have been in a condition of not being able to fully shut as a Containment Isolation Valve was 81 days, but the exact number of days could not be determined.

