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RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION	R
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SUBJECT: LER 91-001-00:on 910112, discovered that fire hose station, use as backup compensatory backup fire suppression capability, isolated by red tag clearance, placed on 901230. Fire hose rerouted to transformer room.W/910204 ltr.

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NOTES:

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Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgman, MI 49106 616 465 5901

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February 4, 1991

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852

> Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled <u>Licensee Event Reporting System</u>, the following report is being submitted:

91-001-00

Sincerely,

-6 A.A. Blind

Plant Manager

AAB:sb

Attachment

D.H. Williams, Jr. c: A.B. Davis, Region III M.P. Alexich P.A. Barrett J.E. Borggren R.F. Kroeger B. Walters - Ft. Wayne NRC Resident Inspector T. Colburn - NRC J.G. Keppler M.R. Padgett G. Charnoff, Esq. Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D. Hahn INPO S.J. Brewer/B.P. Lauzau B.A. Svensson

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED OME	3 NO, 3150-0104
		, I	EXPIRES	: 4/30/92
		 ESTIMAT INFORMAT 	ED BURDEN PER RES	PONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS
LICENSEE EVEN I	REPORT (LER)	COMMEN	TS REGARDING BURDE	N ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS
		REGULA	TORY COMMISSION, WA	ASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO
		OF MANA	GEMENT AND BUDGET	PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE , WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)			DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant	- Unit 1	۴	0 15 10 10 10	131115 1 OF 014
TITLE (4) TS 3.7.9.5 Required Fire	Hose Station Inon	erable without 1	Required Bag	kun Fino
Suppression Hose Due to T	nadequate Adminic	trative Control	required bac	Kup File
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6)	REPORT DATE (7)	OTHER	FACILITIES INVOLVED	(8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL	IVISION MONTH DAY VEAR	FACILITY NAL		KET NUMBERIS
NUMBER SSS NU	UMBER MOITH CALL LEAN	-		
			·	5000
	0101210141911	<u> </u>	0	5 0 0 0
MODE (9)	UANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF	10 CFR §1 (Check one or more o	of the following) (11)	
20.402(6)	20.405(c)	50,73(a)(2)(iv)		73,71(b)
20,405(a)(1)(i)	50.35(c)(1)	50,73(a)(2)(v)		73,71(c)
	50,36(c)(2)	50,73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract
20,405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50,73(a)(2)(i)	50,73(e)(2)(viii)(/	A)	366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	60.73(s)(2)(ii)	50,73(a)(2)(viii)(8	3)	
20,405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50,73(a)(2)(x)		
	LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TH	IS LER (12)		
NAME ,			TELE	PHONE NUMBER
	1	13	AREA CODE	
J. R. Sampson, Operations Depar	rtment Superintend	lent '	61116 41	6151-15191011
COMPLETE ONE LIN	E FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILUI	E DESCRIBED IN THIS REPOR	<u> </u>	
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CAUSE STATEM COMPONENT TURER TO NP	RDS CAUS	E SYSTEM COMPONENT	TURER T	O NPRDS
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SUPPLEMENTAL RI	EPORT EXPECTED (14)		┟━┸╍┸╌┸╴	
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	EXPECTED	TAN TAN
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	V NO	ĸ	DATE (15)	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 speces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spe	ce typewritten lines! (16)		I	╾┸╾┸╌┸╌┸╼┸╼┨

On January 12, 1991, at 2115, it was identified that a fire hose station (FHC) being used as compensatory backup fire suppression was isolated by a red tag clearance. On December 30, 1990, the FHC for the pressurizer (PZR) heater (HTR) transformer (XFMR) room was isolated by a clearance and a backup fire suppression hose was routed from FHC-30. On January 12, a request to remove an additional section of the fire protection water system from service, which included FHC-30, was approved. The red tag clearance for this additional work was placed at about 0400 on January 12. It was identified at about 2115 on January 12 that FHC-30 had been isolated while it was serving as a backup fire suppression. A second fire hose was routed from an operable FHC to the PZR HTR XFMR room at about 2130.

This event was caused by inadequate administrative controls to assure fire impairment reviews were based on the current status of the fire protection system. A memo was issued on January 18 to address the lessons learned from this event. The administrative controls will be revised by February 15, 1991, to add assurance that fire impairment reviews will be based on the current status of the fire protection system.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPOF TEXT CONTINUATIO	RT (LER) N DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5	EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE T INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIM AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGT THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJEC OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHIN LER NUMBER (6) YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER (6) YEAR 0 0 0 1 0 0 0	O COMPLY WTH THIS 50.0 HRS, FORWARD ATE TO THE RECORDS (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR ON, DC 2055, AND TO T (3150-0104); OFFICE NGTON, DC 20503. PAGE (3) 0 2 OF 0 4
C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17) <u>Conditions Prior to Occurrence</u> Unit One in Mode Three (Hot Sta Unit Two in Mode One (Power Ope	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5 andby)	LER NUMBER (6) VEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER 9 1 0 0 1 0 0	PAGE (3)
C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 (# more space is required, use additional NRC Form 300A's)(17) <u>Conditions Prior to Occurrence</u> Unit One in Mode Three (Hot Sta Unit Two in Mode One (Power Ope	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 9 1 0 0 1 0 0	0 2 OF 0
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Unit One in Mode Three (Hot Sta Unit Two in Mode One (Power Ope	andby)		
Unit Two in Mode One (Power Ope			,
	eration) at 100% Power		
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Description of Event			
		·	
ON January 12, 1991, at 2115, i (FHC)(EIIS/KP-HYD) being used a capability was isolated by a re	t was identified that as compensatory backup ed tag clearance.	a fire hose station fire suppression	6
A red tag clearance was placed system (EIIS/KP) on December 30 valves (EIIS/KP-XCV). The appr compensatory actions were initi fire hose from FHC-30 to the pr by TS 3.7.9.5.	on a portion of the fi), 1990, which isolated opriate Technical Spec ated at that time and essurizer heater trans	ire protection water d multiple FHCs and del cification (TS) included routing a bac sformer room as require	Luge Skup Sd
On January 11, 1991, a Fire Pro Order [OSO] 071, Attachment 1) protection water system for rep valve was approved by the Plant clearance was written by a lice the deluge valve. The boundary resulted in also isolating the approved the clearance.	tection Impairment Req to isolate an addition air of a transformer (fire protection coord nsed senior reactor op for this work involve supply to FHC-30. A s	quest (Operations Stand nal section of the fire (EIIS/EL-XFMR) deluge linator. A red tag perator (SRO) to isolat ed closing valves which second SRO reviewed and	ling ce
The clearance for the transform January 12, 1991, at 0403, by a placing an out-of-service tag o verified by a second RO at 0512	er deluge valve repair licensed reactor oper n FHC-30. The placeme	was placed on ator (RO) and included ant of this clearance w	l Vas
At 2115 on January 12, 1991, the deluge valve clearance identified used as TS 3.7.9.5 required back identified when the SRO observed pressurizer heater transformer boundaries in an attempt to loc	e SRO who reviewed and ed that FHC-30 had bee kup fire suppression. d the hose laid out fr room during a walkdown ate the source of isol	approved the transfor in isolated while being This problem was fom FHC-30 to the of the clearance ation point leakby.	mer

LICENSEE EVE TEXT CON	INT REPORT (LER)	ESTIN INFO COMP AND REGU THE OF M	MATEI RMATEI REPO DLATO PAPEI ANAG	D BU TION S REC RTS DRY (RWOI SEME:	APPF COLL GARD MANA COMM RK R NT AP	ROVED EXPII N PER I LECTIOI NING BU AGEMEN AISSION IEDUCT ND BUD	OMB RES: RESP N RE RDE NT B I, WA ION OGET,	NO, 3 4/30/ PONSE EQUE N EST RAN(SHIN PROJ WAS	3150 4 /92 E TO ST: 6 FIMA1 CH (P IGTOP JECT SHING	0104 COMP 0.0 HI TE TO -530), V, DC (3150- 3TON,	PLY N RS. F THE U.S. I 20555 0104 DC 20	ATH ORW RECO NUCL 5, ANI 5, ANI 0503,	THIS ARD RDS EAR D TO FICE
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Cause of Event

The cause of this event was that the administrative controls did not assure that the fire impairment reviews were based on the current status of the fire protection system. The fire protection review for the work which required FHC-30 to be used as backup fire suppression was completed by an SRO at a time when the fire protection coordinator was not on site. The fire protection coordinator identified that FHC-30 would be isolated for the transformer deluge valve, but he was not cognizant that FHC-30 was being used as backup fire suppression.

Contributing to this event was the failure of the SROs writing and approving the transformer deluge valve clearance to verify that FHC-30 was not being used. Also contributing to this event was the failure of the ROs to recognize that FHC-30 was being used as backup fire suppression when they observed the hose laid out while placing and verifying the out-of-service tag for the clearance.

Analysis of Event

This event is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications. TS 3.7.9.5 requires the routing of an equivalent capacity fire hose within one hour when required hose station is inoperable. This action was initially satisfied, but was subsequently negated when the backup fire hose was isolated. The pressurizer heater transformer room was without the TS 3.7.9.5 required fire protection for a total of about 17 1/2 hours from about 0400 on January 12, 1991, until about 2130 on January 12, 1991, when a second backup fire hose was routed from FHC-28.

The pressurizer heater transformer room fire detection system was operable at the time of this event. Since the fire detection was operable, a fire in the room would have been promptly identified and the Plant Fire Brigade could have promptly responded to the event. Upon discovery of the out-of-service tag at FHC-30, the Plant Fire Brigade would have known that an alternate FHC would be needed. The Plant Fire Brigade could have routed a hose from FHC-28 located about 130 feet from the pressurizer heater transformer room. It is estimated that the hose from FHC-28 could have been routed within five minutes or less of identifying that FHC-30 was out of service.

LICENSEE EVENT REPOR TEXT CONTINUATION ILITY NAME (1) D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 'III more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3064(s) (17)	APPROVED DUE NO. SLOGHER LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED THE ADDRESS OF THE A	LY WT S. FOI HE RE J.S. NU 0555, / 104}, 4	H TH RWAF COR ICLE/																			
D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1		DOCKET	T NUI	MBER	(2)												C 2050)3.				
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(Analysis of Event Continued)																						
Since a fire in the pressurizer promptly identified, the combus suppression could have been ali scene, it is concluded that thi concern, nor did it create a si the general public.	he til gne s e gni	eater ole J ed wi event lfica	r t Loa Lth t d ant	ran adin ain lid : ha	isfo ig i fiv not zar	rme n t e m cr d t	r r he inu eat o t	oom room tes e a he 1	wou m is of sig heal	ld ar ni th	ha ow, riva fica and	ve an al ant i s	bee ad at sa afe	n acku the fety ty (up fi: 7 of	re						
Corrective Action															H							
Immediate corrective action tak routing a backup fire hose from room at about 2130 on January 1	en FH 2,	wher IC-28 1991	n ti 3 ti 1.	:he :o t	eve: he j	nt pre	was ssu	id riz	enti er h	fi ea	ed : ter	lnv tr	olvo ans:	ed forn	ner							
A memo was issued to Operations address the lessons learned from (OSO.071) will be revised by Fe impairment reviews will be base system.	De m t bru d o	epart his ary on th	eve 15 ae	ent ent , 1 cur	per 991 ren	son The , t t s	nel ad o a tat	on min: dd a us o	Jan Lstr assu of t	ua: at: rai he	ry 1 ive nce fin	L8, co th ce	199 ntro at : pro	91, ols fire tect	to : :ior	ı						
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