JAN 3 1 1980

Docket No. 50-315 Docket No. 50-316

American Electric Power Service
Corporation
Indiana and Michigan Power Company
ATTN: Mr. John E. Dolan
Vice Chairman
Engineering and Construction
2 Broadway
New York, NY 10004

Gentlemen:

This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NEC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NEC Regional Office.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler Director

Enclosure: IE Information Notice No. 80-03

cc w/encl:
Mr. D. V. Shaller, Flant
Manager
Gentral Files
Director, NRR/DPM
Director, NRR/DOR
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC
Ronald Callen, Michigan Public
Service Commission

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SURNAME V-Heishman/blk	Keppler			
1/31/80			*********	

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6870 Accession No.: 7912190666

January 31, 1980

IE Information Notice No. 80-03


MAIN TURBINE ELECTROHYDRAULIC CONTROL SYSTEM

Description of Circumstances:

On September 6, 1979, while performing a routine startup of the Trojan Nuclear Plant, a speed control problem was encountered during warmup of the General Electric turbine and increase of turbine speed to normal operating speed (1800 RPM). Technicians were notified and trouble shooting in accordance with the technical manual was commenced to resolve the apparent oscillation between the primary and backup speed control circuits which was hindering normal turbine startup operations. The technical manual indicates that it is permissible to remove either the primary or backup low value gate circuits which contain speed and acceleration error amplifiers. Upon removal of the primary low value gate circuit card, the backup card amplifiers, coming from a saturated condition, became the controlling circuit. During the shift in control circuits (primary to backup), the speed/acceleration error signal went to maximum which resulted in a full open signal to the turbine control valves. Under existing plant conditions this appeared to the safety injection system as a major steam break downstream of the main steam isolation valves which resulted in a safety injection system actuation and reactor trip.

The Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) technical manual indicated that slight load changes are likely when a low value gate card is removed. The effect on an unloaded turbine appears to be much more significant and tests conducted by

^{*}GEK Instruction Book 11381-D, "Speed Control Unit", Maintenance Section, Page 4.




Trojan personnel indicate that the transient is initiated whether the turbine is at a set speed or in an acceleration mode to a set speed. Discussions with General Electric personnel by the licensee have been initiated in an attempt to verify the phenomenon observed and, if applicable, alert other facilities which operate a turbine with a MK 1 EHC System regarding the potential operation of the control valves when trouble shooting the speed control unit in accordance with existing instructions.

This information is provided as an early notification of a possible significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Enclosure:

List of Recently Issued
IE Information Notices



IE Information Notice No. 80-03-January 31, 1980

Enclosure

RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To .
80-02	8X8R Water Rod Lower End Plug Wear	1/25/80	All BWR Facilities holder power reactor OLs or CPs
80-01	Fuel Handling Events	1/4/80	All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs
79-37	Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Discs	12/28/79 [*]	All power reactor OLs and CPs
.79-36	Computer Code Defect in Stress Analysis of Piping Elbow	12/31/79	All power reactor OLs and CPs
79-35	Control of Maintenance and Essential Equipment	12/31/79	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
79-34	Inadequate Design of Safety-Related Heat Exchangers	12/27/79	All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs
79-33	Improper Closure of Primary Containment Access Hatches	12/21/79	All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs
79-32	Separation of Electrical Cables for HPCI and ADS	12/21/79	All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs
79-31	Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra (ARS)	12/13/79	All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs
79-30	Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, 10 CFR Part 21.	12/6/79	All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs and vendors inspected by LCVIP
79-29	Loss of NonSafety-Related Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation During Operation	11/16/79	All power reactor facilities holding OLs or CPs

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