

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000-315 | PAGE (3) 1 OF 3 |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|

TITLE (4)
Vulnerability in a Safeguard System That Could Allow Unauthorized or Undetected Access to the Protected Area

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAME | DOCKET NUMBER |
| 04 | 28 | 1999 | 1999 | S002 | 00 | 05 | 28 | 1999 | Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 | 05000-316 |
| | | | | | | | | | FACILITY NAME | DOCKET NUMBER |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------------|------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| OPERATING MODE (9) 5 | POWER LEVEL (10) 0% | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) | | | | | | | | |
| | | 20.2201(b) | 20.2203(a)(2)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | | | | |
| | | 20.2203(a)(1) | 20.2203(a)(3)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | | | | |
| | | 20.2203(a)(2)(i) | 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | X 73.71 | | | | | |
| | | 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) | 20.2203(a)(4) | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | OTHER | | | | | |
| | | 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) | 50.36(c)(1) | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A | | | | | |
| | | 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) | 50.36(c)(2) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | | | | | | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| | |
|---|---|
| NAME Dennis D. Snodgrass, Compliance Engineer | TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (616) 465-5901, X 1627 |
|---|---|

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO EPIX | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO EPIX |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----|--|-----------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) | | | | EXPECTED | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
| YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). | X | NO | | | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 28, 1999, at approximately 1500 hours EDT, with both units in Mode 5, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was discovered by the Security Operations Supervisor. At 1510 hours EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed and was reportable as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph I(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1). An Emergency Notification System (ENS) report was made to NRC at 1557 hours EDT on the same day.

The apparent cause for this condition was inadequate original plant design. Upon identification of the nonconforming wall opening, compensatory measures were promptly implemented to ensure unauthorized access did not occur. Modifications are being made to the wall opening to eliminate the nonconforming conditions. Compensatory measures will remain in place until the modifications are complete.

This condition was determined to be of minimal safety significance, since security personnel continuously man the SAS.

9906070103 990528
PDR ADOCK 05000315
S PDR



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET (2) NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
| Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 | 05000-315 | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | 2 OF 3 |
| | | 1999 | S002 | 00 | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Conditions Prior To Event

Unit 1 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown
Unit 2 Mode 5 in Cold Shutdown

Description Of The Event

On April 28, 1999, at approximately 1500 hours EDT, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was discovered by the Security Operations Supervisor. At 1510 hours EDT, it was determined that this nonconformance constituted a failure, degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

Cause Of The Event

The apparent cause for this event was inadequate original plant design. The investigation determined that the opening was part of original as-built condition of the SAS. Based on the available drawings, a barrier was never installed within this opening to prevent unauthorized access, and meet the Protected Area Barrier requirements for openings. The nonconforming wall opening was not readily visible from the SAS or Security Locker Room and remained undetected since original plant construction.

Analysis Of The Event

Commencing at approximately 1500 hours EDT April 28, 1999, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, an opening in a wall contiguous with the Security Locker Room and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) was identified as nonconforming and vulnerable to possible compromise. The identified conditions constituted a failure degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed. This event was reported as a safeguards event pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph I(c) and 10CFR73.71(b)(1) (1 hour ENS report). An ENS report was made to the NRC Operations Center at 1557 hours EDT on April 28, 1999. This report is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73, Appendix G, paragraph I(c) and 10CFR73.71(d) (30 day report).

Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the wall opening vulnerabilities. Follow-up investigation of the building walls and ceiling resulted in no additional openings being discovered. This condition was determined to be of minimal safety significance, since security personnel continuously man the SAS.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET (2) NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------|
| Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 | O5000-315 | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | 3 OF 3 |
| | | 1999 | S002 | 00 | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Corrective Actions

Compensatory measures were established by security upon identification of the wall opening vulnerabilities. These actions included immediately posting an armed security officer. After investigation of the opening, compensatory measures were downgraded to observation of the area by a security officer, securing access patrols of the affected area and monitoring the access portals by the Access Control Officer. These compensatory measures will remain in place until the wall opening is conforming.

A plant modification will install a permanent barrier in the nonconforming wall opening.

An assessment team is walking down security vital barriers as part of the Restart Readiness Assessment Program.

Similar Events

316/99-S001-00

