NRC Form 366 (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1	05000-315	1 of 1

TITLE (4)

As-Found Residual Heat Removal Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than Technical Specification Limit

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03.	04	1999	1999	–	009	–	00	04	12	1999	DC Cook, Unit 2	05000-316
											FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
		20.2201 (b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL (10)	00	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Ms. Brenda O'Rourke, Compliance Engineer	616/465-5901, x2604

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If Yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO		06	18	1999

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 4, 1999, during the Expanded System Readiness Review of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, several concerns were identified regarding the RHR shutdown cooling relief valve (SV-103) lift setpoints for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (LTOP). Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.9.3 requires the RHR safety valves to have a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 pounds per square inch gage (psig). A preliminary review of recent In-Service Testing data identified that the as-found lift setpoints for the 1- and 2-SV-103 were 455 and 452 psig, respectively. These values are greater than the TS limit of 450 psig, and as a result, the valves were declared inoperable on March 10, 1999. On March 11, 1999 it was determined that 1-SV-103 had been taken credit for in October and November 1998 to satisfy LTOP requirements when a Unit 1 Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) was inoperable.

Preliminary investigation indicates the cause was incorrect implementation of TS surveillance requirements. The ASME Operations and Maintenance Standards Code-1995 allows the application of a 3 percent setpoint tolerance to valve lift settings during valve testing and requires a temperature correction factor to be incorporated into the lift setting. However, the TS limit is a strict value that does not take into account allowable Code tolerances or the use of a temperature correction factor when determining the setpoint. As immediate corrective action both unit's safety valves were declared inoperable. Engineering evaluation results indicate that the reactor vessel and the RHR system piping were always adequately protected against overpressure, and there was no safety significance associated with the inoperable valves. The RHR system is currently operable and the LTOP TS requirements are being met. The root cause investigation for this condition has not been completed. As part of the investigation, instances where credit was taken for either SV-103 being operable with a PORV inoperable will also be reviewed. Upon completion of the investigation an update to this LER will be submitted, including any additional corrective and preventive actions.