

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT

ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO AEP:NRC:0894F

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DESCRIPTIONS

Change No. 1

Unit No. 1: Page 3/4 1-11; Section 3.1.2.3, 4.1.2.3.2  
Page 3/4 4-3; Section 3.4.1.3  
Page 3/4 4-3d; Section 4.4.1.4.2  
Page 3/4 4-31; Section 3.4.9.3  
Page 3/4 5-7; Section 3.5.3  
Page 3/4 5-8; Section 4.5.3.2  
Page 3/4 4-1; Section 3/4.4.1  
Page B 3/4 4-11; Section 3/4 4.9  
Page B 3/4 5-2; Section 3/4 5.2 and 3/4 5.3  
Page B 3/4 1-3 Section 3/4.1.2

The above listed pages reflect the revised limits for cold overpressurization which were computed based on the revised heatup-cooldown curves forwarded to the NRC in our letter no. AEP:NRC:0894E dated July 18, 1985.

The proposed change constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications and complies with changes in the federal regulations. We believe that the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria since they are the direct result of an evaluation using methods previously accepted by the NRC. Therefore we believe the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

8507260241 850719  
PDR ADCK 05000315  
PDR

ATTACHMENT 2

TO

AEP:NRC:0894F



12  
13  
14  
15

16  
17  
18

19  
20  
21  
22

23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30

31

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

- a. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity.
- b. With more than one charging pump OPERABLE or with a safety injection pump(s) OPERABLE when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 170°F unless the reactor vessel head is removed, remove the additional charging pump(s) and the safety injection pump(s) motor circuit breakers from the electrical power circuit within one hour.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


---

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by:

- a. Starting (unless already operating) the pump from the control room,
- b. Verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of  $\geq 2390$  psig,
- c. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes, and
- d. Verifying that the pump is aligned to receive electrical power from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps and safety injection pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits at least once per 12 hours, except when:

- a. The reactor vessel head is removed, or
- b. The temperature of all RCS cold legs is greater than 170°F



SHUTDOWNLIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:
1. Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*
  2. Reactor Coolant Loop 2 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*
  3. Reactor Coolant Loop 3 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*
  4. Reactor Coolant Loop 4 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,\*
  5. Residual Heat Removal - East,\*\*
  6. Residual Heat Removal - West,\*\*
- b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation.\*\*\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5


ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 20 hours.
- b. With no coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.

\*A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 170 °F unless 1) the pressurizer water volume is less than 52.00% of span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50 °F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an OPERABLE auxiliary feedwater system.

\*\*The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.

\*\*\*All reactor coolant pumps and residual heat removal pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided 1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and 2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10 °F below saturation temperature.



## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### ACTION (Continued)

Below P-7:#

- a. Startup and Power operation below P-7 may proceed provided at least two reactor coolant loops and associated pumps are in operation.
- b. Hot standby, hot shutdown, and cold shutdown operation may proceed provided at least one reactor coolant loop in operation with an associated reactor coolant or residual heat removal pump; however, operation for up to 15 minutes with no pump in operation is permissible to accommodate transition between residual heat removal pump and reactor coolant pump operation.
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.4.1.4.1 With one reactor coolant loop and associated pump not in operation, at least once per 7 days determine that:

- a. The applicable reactor trip system and/or ESF actuation system instrumentation channels specified in the ACTION statements above have been placed in their tripped conditions, and
- b. If P-8 interlock setpoint has been reset for 3 loop operation, its setpoint is  $\leq 76\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER.

4.4.1.4.2 Within 30 minutes prior to the start of a reactor coolant pump when any RCS cold leg temperature is  $\leq 170^{\circ}\text{F}$ , verify that:

- a. The temperature of the secondary water of each steam generator is  $\leq 50^{\circ}\text{F}$  above the temperature of each of the RCS cold legs, or
- b. The pressurizer water volume is less than 1116 cubic feet, equivalent to less than 62% indicated on the wide range level indicator.

---

\*A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures less than or equal to  $170^{\circ}\text{F}$  unless 1) the pressurizer water volume is less than 1116 cubic feet (62% of span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than  $50^{\circ}\text{F}$  above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig, or
- b. One power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig and the RHR safety valve with a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig; or
- c. A reactor coolant system vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: When the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 170°F, except when the reactor vessel head is removed.

#### ACTION:

- a. With two PORV's inoperable or with one PORV inoperable and the RHR safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV(s) or RHR safety valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through an at least 2 square inch vent(s) within the next 8 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status.
- b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through an at least 2 square inch vent(s) within 8 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and the RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -  $T_{avg} < 350^{\circ}\text{F}$

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

- a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,#
- b. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger,
- c. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and
- d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
- b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchanger or residual heat removal pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{avg}$  less than  $350^{\circ}\text{F}$  by use of alternate heat removal methods.
- c. With more than one charging pump OPERABLE or with a safety injection pump(s) OPERABLE when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to  $170^{\circ}\text{F}$ , remove the additional charging pump(s) and the safety injection pump(s) motor circuit breakers from the electrical power circuit within 1 hour.
- d. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

#A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE and both safety injection pumps shall be inoperable whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to  $170^{\circ}\text{F}$ .

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 All charging pumps and safety injection pumps, except the above required OPERABLE charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits, at least once per 12 hours whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 170°F as determined at least once per hour when any RCS cold leg temperature is between 170°F and 200°F.

## 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. With one reactor coolant loop not in operation, THERMAL POWER is restricted to < 51 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER until the Overtemperature  $\Delta T$  trip is reset. Either action ensures that the DNBR will be maintained above 1.30. A loss of flow in two loops will cause a reactor trip if operating above P-7 (11 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) while a loss of flow in one loop will cause a reactor trip if operating above P-8 (51 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER).

In MODE 3, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump below P-7 with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 170° F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into or (2) by restricting starting of the RCP's to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50° F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

#### 3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

The shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  of the vessel material will be established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating, in accordance with ASTM E185-73, reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. Since the neutron spectra at the irradiation samples and vessel inside radius are essentially identical, the transition shift for a sample can be applied with confidence to the adjacent section of the reactor vessel. The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calculated  $\Delta RT_{NDT}$  for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-5 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and cooldown and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs, one PORV and the RHR safety valve, or an RCS vent opening of greater than or equal to 2 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 170°F. Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

---

---

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and safety injection pumps, except the required OPERABLE charging pump, to be inoperable below 170°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

#### 3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The limits on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met.

The OPERABILITY of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of the boron solution will be maintained above the solubility limit of 135°F at 21000 ppm boron.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

---

#### BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS average temperature above 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and safety injection pumps, except the required OPERABLE charging pump, to be inoperable below 170°F, unless the reactor vessel head is removed, provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boration capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1%  $\Delta k/k$  after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 835 gallons of 20,000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 9690 gallons of 1950 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod ejection accident. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. The reactivity worth of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the accident analysis for a rod ejection accident.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the accident analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg} \geq 541^\circ\text{F}$  and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

