

DISTRIBUTION
 Docket File
 NRC PDR
 Local PDR
 ORB 1 File
 D. Eisenhut
 OELD
 E. Jordan
 D. Wigginton
 C. Parrish
 NSIC
 J. Taylor
 ACRS (10)

AUG 10 1983

Docket Nos. 50-315
 and 50-316

Mr. John Dolan, Vice President
 Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
 c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation
 1 Riverside Plaza
 Columbus, Ohio 43216

Dear Mr. Dolan:

As part of our continuing review of hydrogen control for ice condenser plants during postulated degraded core accidents, we have identified the need for additional information on several matters. The items pertain to the CLASIX code which has been used to support the licensing activities associated with ice condenser plants; e.g., determining the environmental conditions against which equipment survivability is to be evaluated.

It is requested that the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company establish a schedule to provide the information in response to the enclosed questions. These questions are also being sent to the Duke Power Company and TVA and a coordinated response will be acceptable. In regards to the overall review program for hydrogen control and equipment survivability, it is also requested that you inform us of your plans and schedules, particularly of the remaining submittals. We suggest that this can be done in a meeting between our staffs but no later than early September.

This request affects less than ten respondents, therefore, OMB clearance is not required.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
 S. A. Varga

Steven A. Varga, Chief
 Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
 As stated

cc w/enclosure:
 See next page

8309020521 830810
 PDR ADOCK 05000315
 P PDR

OFFICE	ORB 1 DWigginton	ORB 1 SVarga					
SURNAME							
DATE	8/5/83	8/10/83					

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

Mr. John Dolan
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company

cc: Mr. M. P. Alexich
Assistant Vice President.
for Nuclear Engineering
American Electric Power
Service Corporation
2 Broadway
New York, New York 10004

Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

W. G. Smith Jr., Plant Manager
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 458
Bridgman, Michigan 49106

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Resident Inspectors Office
7700 Red Arrow Highway
Stevensville, Michigan 49127

The Honorable Tom Corcoran
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION

1. With regard to the CLASIX code, the staff has previously requested clarification of the structural heat sink heat transfer models. The following pertinent points have been derived from the responses:

- i) Heat transfer is based on a temperature difference determined by $(T_{\text{bulk}} - T_{\text{wall}})$.
- ii) Heat transfer coefficients for degraded core accident analysis are determined from a natural convection (stagnant) correlation applicable to condensation heat transfer.
- iii) CLASIX does not explicitly model mass removal due to condensation heat transfer.

Based on the description of the CLASIX structural heat sink model, it appears that the CLASIX model differs dramatically from generally accepted approaches and is not, as is claimed, consistent with standard methods such as those used in CONTEMPT. The differences are related to the treatment of the three items cited above. By comparison, previously accepted approaches are characterized by the following:

- i) Heat transfer is based on $(T_{\text{sat}} - T_{\text{wall}})$, when the surface temperature of the heat sink is less than T_{sat} ; i.e., $T_{\text{wall}} < T_{\text{sat}}$.
- ii) Heat transfer coefficients are based on condensation only when $T_{\text{wall}} < T_{\text{sat}}$.
- iii) Condensed mass removal is based on condensation heat transfer with provisions for reevaporizing a small fraction of the condensate.

A more detailed description of accepted practice is contained in NUREG-0588 and NUREG/CR-0255.

The effect of the CLASIX models would appear to be the de-superheating of the atmosphere too rapidly thus reducing gas temperatures and possibly altering the combustion characteristics.

Based on the above discussion, provide justification for the models incorporated in CLASIX or provide the results of analyses with acceptable models as outlined above. The analyses should encompass selected sensitivity studies to assure that the effects of the changes are determined for both containment integrity and equipment survivability considerations.

2. Provide a complete evaluation of fan (both air return and hydrogen skimmer as applicable) operability and survivability for degraded core accidents. In this regard discuss the following items:
 - a. The identification of conditions which will cause fan overspeed, in terms of differential pressure and duration, and hydrogen combustion events.
 - b. The consequences of fan operation at overspeed conditions. The response should include a discussion of thermal and overcurrent breakers in the power supply to the fans, the setpoints and physical locations of these devices, and the fan loading conditions required to trip the breakers.
 - c. Indication to the operator of fan inoperability, corrective actions which may be possible, and the times required for operators to complete these actions.

- d. The capability of fan system components to withstand differential pressure transients (e.g., ducts, blades, thrust bearings, housing), in terms of limiting conditions and components.
3. Provide an evaluation of the ultimate capability of ice condenser doors to withstand reverse differential pressures.

