May 22, 1979

Docket Nos. 50-315
and 50-316

Mr. John Tillinghast, Vice President
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
Indiana and Michigan Power Company
Post Office Box 18
Bowling Green Station
New York, New York 10004

Dear Mr. Tillinghast:

SUBJECT: NRC STAFF REVIEW OF RESPONSES TO I&E BULLETINS 79-06 AND 79-06A

(see 50-305 for encl)

We have completed a preliminary review of the licensee responses to I&E Bulletins 79-06, 79-06A, and amendment 1 to 79-06A. The purpose of this letter is to advise you of the preliminary results of that review, with particular emphasis on potential problem areas, and to identify related concerns which we believe require your further examination.

We have scheduled a meeting with the owners of all operating plants having Westinghouse designed nuclear supply systems. This meeting will be held on May 30, 1979, in rooms P-110/114 at our Phillips Building office in Bethesda, Maryland. You are expected to attend the meeting and be prepared to discuss those matters identified below along with a schedule and procedure for providing the information needed by NRC to complete the review of these issues.

(1) Our preliminary review of the Bulletin responses indicates that a number of the Bulletin items are not yet satisfactorily resolved. Enclosure 1 provides a summary of our current assessment of the responses to the Bulletins issued on Westinghouse plants.

(2) In certain instances, licensee responses differ, without apparent justification, from the Westinghouse recommendations for individual Bulletin items. We expect to resolve each such difference, as well as licensee exceptions to specific Bulletin responses, prior to our approval of the Bulletin responses. A copy of the Westinghouse recommendations is provided as Enclosure 2.

7907240605 A02 GD

(3) The Westinghouse advice is prescriptive on resetting of the high pressure injection system and incomplete as to the need for keeping the reactor coolant pumps running.

OFFICE➤					
SURNAME➤					
DATE➤					

NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 265 - 769

(4) We are finalizing a generic report on TMI-2 matters related to Westinghouse operating plants. Although this report is not yet complete, among other things, we expect that it will recommend further analyses of transients and small reactor coolant system breaks, the development of appropriate written procedure guidance to operators in the use of these new procedures.

(5) In certain instances, licensees are using fuel and relying on safety analyses, which were not provided by Westinghouse. As a result, it is not clear to us what the respective roles of the licensees, Westinghouse, the fuel suppliers, and/or other parties should be in implementing those requirements described in item (4) above. We need a clear and concise definition of their respective roles in these cases.

(6) The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has issued five letters to the Commission as a result of their examination of the TMI-2 accident. We need a clear and concise position from all licensees with respect to each of the recommendations contained in these letters. A summary of the ACRS recommendations is provided as Enclosure 3.

(7) Individual licensees have indicated an interest in meeting directly with the staff regarding the Bulletin items for their facilities. Experience to date has demonstrated that the staff does not have time to meet individually with each licensee to resolve these items.

It is clear that there are a significant number of technical issues yet to be resolved for a large number of Westinghouse operating plants. There are limited resources available within the NRC staff to perform the necessary work. This situation is exacerbated by the need to conduct similar and concurrent activities with those owners of B&W, C-E, and GE designed operating plants. At the same time, there is a need to resolve these matters promptly.

To resolve the issues described above in a prompt and expeditious manner, we believe there is a compelling need to establish an owner's group for Westinghouse operating plants. We expect that such a group would be needed for the remainder of calendar year 1979. Owner's groups have worked effectively in the past in minimizing staff and industry resource requirements to resolve other generic problems. We strongly urge you to meet with other owners of Westinghouse operating plants to consider the formation of such a group prior to our meeting on May 30. This will be one of the principal agenda items at that meeting.

OFFICE➢						
SURNAME➢						
DATE➢						

Please note that investigation of a number of areas related to the TMI-2 accident, including the long-term ACRS recommendations and long-term action items from NUREG-0560, will be specifically included as part of the future "Lessons Learned" staff activity. You can expect additional correspondence in the future on these items.

If you require any clarification of the matters discussed in this letter please contact Patrick D. O'Reilly, the staff's assigned project manager for these activities on Westinghouse plants. Mr. O'Reilly may be reached on (301) 492-7745.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
As Stated

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

OFFICE➤						DOR:ORB#1
SURNAME➤						ASchwencer
DATE➤						5/ /79

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

May 22, 1979

Docket Nos. 50-315
and 50-316

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Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
Indiana and Michigan Power Company
Post Office Box 18
Bowling Green Station
New York, New York 10004

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If you require any clarification of the matters discussed in this letter please contact Patrick D. O'Reilly, the staff's assigned project manager for these activities on Westinghouse plants. Mr. O'Reilly may be reached on (301) 492-7745.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
As Stated

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

cc: Mr. Robert W. Jurgensen
Chief Nuclear Engineer
American Electric Power
Service Corporation
2 Broadway
New York, New York 10004

Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
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Washington, D. C. 20036

David Dinsmore Comey
Executive Director
Citizens for a Better Environment
59 East Van Buren Street
Chicago, Illinois 60605

Maude Reston Palenske Memorial
Library
500 Market Street
St. Joseph, Michigan 49085

Mr. D. Shaller, Plant Manager
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 458
Bridgman, Michigan 49106

Kenneth R. Baker
2874 Robin Hood Drive
Stevensville, Michigan 49127

DMB/LER

American Electric Power System
INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
P.O. Box 458, Bridgman, Michigan 49106
(616) 465-5901

June 18, 1981

Mr. J.G. Keppler, Regional Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Operating License DPR-74
Docket No. 50-316

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Enclosed please find a Licensee Event Report that exceeds the 10 day time limit reporting requirement. On June 18, 1981, we advised your Senior Resident Inspector, Mr. E.R. Swanson, of this delay.

Sincerely,

D.V. Shaller
Plant Manager

/bab

cc: J.E. Dolan
R.S. Hunter
R.W. Jurgensen
R.F. Kroeger
K.J. Vehstedt
E. Swanson/N. DuBry RO:III
R.C. Callen MPSC
G. Charnoff, Esq.
J.M. Hennigan
W. Lavallee EPRI
PNSRC
J.F. Stietzel
E.L. Townley
Dir., IE (30 copies)
Dir., MIPC (3 copies)

AD/1
4

JUN 22 1981

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	M I D C C 2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 6 0 4 8 1
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 6 1 8 8 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 DURING NORMAL OPERATION, THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN STARTUP FLASH TANK WAS IN
0 3 SERVICE TO REDUCE SECONDARY SYSTEM CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION FROM CONDENSER INLEAKAGE.
0 4 ON JUNE 4 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS NO FLOW THRU RAD MONITOR R-19 FROM ANY
0 5 OF THE FOUR STEAM GENERATORS. THIS IS NON-CONSERVATIVE IN RESPECT TO APPENDIX "B"
0 6 T.S. 2.4.2.G. THIS UNIT IS EXPERIENCING A SMALL PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK. THE
0 7 TOTAL POSSIBLE TIME FOR THE UNMONITORED RELEASE WAS 35 MINUTES. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE
0 8 OF A SIMILAR NATURE INCLUDES 050-316/81-04.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	M C	X	X	I N S T R U	X	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 1	—	0 2 0	/	0 4	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X	F	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	N	B 4 4 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 THE LOSS OF FLOW FROM R-19 FROM ALL FOUR STEAM GENERATORS WAS DUE TO A BUILD UP OF
1 1 CRUD AT THE ROTO-METER FLOW REGULATOR. CYCLING OF THE FLOW TO THE MAXIMUM
1 2 DISLODGED THE CRUD AND FLOW WAS RE-ESTABLISHED. DESIGN CHANGE RFC 12-1825 WAS WRITTEN
1 3 TO PROVIDE TO CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATION DURING LOSS OF FLOW. THE ATTACHED
1 4 SUPPLEMENT EXPLAINS THE EVENT IN DETAIL.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E	1 0 0	NA	B	CHEMICAL TECHNICIAN OBSERVATION

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	M	M	SEE CAUSE DESCRIPTION	S.G. BLOWDOWN STARTUP FLASH TANK TO ATMOS.

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER R. A. PALMER PHONE: 616-465-5901

GPO 917-926

SUPPLEMENT TO RO 50-316/81-020/04T-0

During normal operation the steam generator startup blowdown flash tank was in service to reduce secondary system chemical contamination. Flow through radiation monitor R-19 had been previously verified. Routine technician surveillance at 1415 hrs noted the absence of flow. By rapidly cycling the valves full open and shut, the lines were blown out and flow reestablished immediately. Leaving the area to notify control room of the situation would have resulted in a longer time period of unmonitored release. Blowdown had been on the startup flash tank since 1340 hrs. The maximum time the unmonitored release could have existed was 35 minutes.

Daily analysis to monitor the primary to secondary leak on Unit 2 had been completed and all parameters were within limits for release via the startup flash tank. A grab sample at the blowdown flash tank was taken at 1415 hrs and analyzed and showed secondary system activities had not significantly changed since the previous analysis.

Time	Sample	Tritium(μCi/cc)	Gross β-γ(μCi/cc)	Iodine-131(μCi/cc)
0015	#21 S/G	2.52×10^{-6}	4.38×10^{-5}	6.43×10^{-7}
0015	#22 S/G	2.74×10^{-6}	1.67×10^{-5}	2.89×10^{-7}
0015	#23 S/G	3.58×10^{-6}	1.54×10^{-5}	N.D.
0015	#24 S/G	2.42×10^{-6}	1.06×10^{-5}	2.75×10^{-7}
1415	2-DSX-350 (flash tank composite)	5.21×10^{-6}	4.46×10^{-6}	5.81×10^{-7}

Using the 1415 steam generator blowdown flash tank composite analysis of the following releases were calculated:

		Release Rate	Total Release
Tritium	2.48×10^{-9} μCi/cc/sec	2.29×10^{-11} Ci/sec	4.81×10^{-8} Ci
Gross β-γ	2.12×10^{-9} μCi/cc/sec	1.96×10^{-11} Ci/sec	4.11×10^{-8} Ci
Iodine-131	2.77×10^{-10} μCi/cc/sec	2.55×10^{-12} Ci/sec	5.36×10^{-9} Ci

A design change, RFC-12-1825, is currently being engineered which will provide an immediate loss of flow warning to the Operations control room, whenever flow to R-19 is interrupted.

DMB/LER

American Electric Power System
INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
P.O. Box 458, Bridgman, Michigan 49106
(616) 465-5901

June 19, 1981

Mr. J.G. Keppler, Regional Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Operating License DPR-74
Docket No. 50-316

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Pursuant to the requirements of the Appendix A Technical Specifications, the following report/s are submitted:

RO 81-021/03L-0.

Sincerely,

D.V. Shaller
Plant Manager

/bab

cc: J.E. Dolan
R.S. Hunter
R.W. Jurgensen
R.F. Kroeger
K.J. Vehstedt
E. Swanson/N. DuBry RO:III
R.C. Callen MPSC
G. Charnoff, Esq.
J.M. Hennigan
W. Lavallee EPRI
PNSRC
J.F. Stietzel
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Dir., IE (30 copies)
Dir., MIPC (3 copies)

RO/1
4

JUN 22 1981

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	LICENSEE CODE (2)	M I D C C 2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 5 2 3 8 1
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 6 1 9 8 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 FOLLOWING A TRIP OF THE UNIT 2 REACTOR, FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES FOR #1 AND #4

03 STEAM GENERATOR (FMO-201 AND FMO-204), FAILED TO CLOSE UPON RECEIPT OF A FEEDWATER

04 ISOLATION SIGNAL. THIS CONDITION WAS NON-CONSERVATIVE WITH REGARDS TO TECHNICAL

05 SPECIFICATION 3.3.2.1.

06

07

08

09	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	I B	X	B	C K T B R K	E	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 1	—	0 2 1	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
B	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	N	W 1 2 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 THE CAUSE FOR THE FAILURE OF THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES, FMO 201 and 204 WAS DUE

11 TO THE MISALIGNMENT OF THE SWITCH ACTUATING ARM ON REACTOR BYPASS BREAKER A, CAUSING

12 THE SWITCH TO STAY IN THE OPEN POSITION. THIS SWITCH, IN SERIES WITH SWITCHES ON

13 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER A, SUPPLY THE "REACTOR IS TRIPPED" SIGNAL TO TRAIN A SSPS FOR

14 FEEDWATER ISOLATION. (SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENT)

15	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	G	0 0 0	NA	A	OPERATOR OBSERVATION

16	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

19	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

20	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER R. A. PALMER PHONE: 616-465-5901

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT TO LER #81-021/03L-0

SUPPLEMENT TO CAUSE DESCRIPTION

THE SWITCH LINKAGE WAS REALIGNED, AND FUNCTIONALLY TESTED AND THE SYSTEM RETURNED TO OPERATION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS PLANNED.