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APR 7 1988
L-86-154

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323


Dear Dr. Grace:

Re: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389
Inspection Report 86-02/01

Florida Power & Light Company has reviewed the subject inspection report, and a response is attached.

There is no proprietary information in the report.

Very truly yours,


C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

COW/PLP:de

Attachment

cc: Harold F. Reis
PNS-LI-86-111

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ATTACHMENT

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389
Inspection Report 86-02/01

Finding:

Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) paragraphs 9.4, air conditioning, heating, cooling and ventilation system, and 9.4.3.1, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) ventilation systems, state the design criteria/objectives for these systems as follows:

- a. provide air flow areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of progressively higher potential radioactivity (with exterior doors closed),
- b. assure that the ventilation system operation during normal operation does not cause an annual offsite release of gaseous radioactivity from the plant to exceed limits allowed by 10 CFR 50, Appendix I,
- c. ventilation air exhausted from potentially contaminated areas is filtered for the removal of particulates as required to satisfy 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, and
- d. air exhausted from the shield building annulus, fuel handling building and reactor auxiliary building (main ventilation system) is first filtered, and then discharged to the environment through vent stacks in order to facilitate an overall measurement of gaseous releases and to prevent potential contamination of ventilation air intakes.

Contrary to the above, on November 15, 1985, these FSAR design criteria/objectives could not be met in that several RAB exterior doors were blocked open and the RAB ventilation lineup was improper, i.e., building pressure was positive with air flow from inside to outside.

Response:

1. FPL has instructed the operating personnel to shut doors when found open. Management personnel have been directed to take steps to ensure their personnel are aware of the need to maintain the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) door closed.
2. FPL considered that the subject finding was caused by inattention to detail by all site personnel regarding the maintenance of the RAB doors in the proper position. FPL has determined that the increased attention given this area should preclude recurrence.
3. FPL has instructed Guard Force Personnel to close RAB outside doors during routine security checks or notify the Operating Shift Supervisor if unable to close door.

