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 AUTH. NAME: LEVINE, J.M. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
 RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Special rept 3-SR-92-006: on 921217, PASS declared inoperable following failure to meet pressurized sample portion of acceptance criteria for monthly functional SR. PASS returned to operable status following satisfactory repairs & testing.

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Arizona Public Service Company
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192-00822-JML/TRB/KR
January 22, 1993

JAMES M LEVINE
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

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
Dear Sirs:

**Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 3
Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)
Special Report 3-SR-92-006
File: 93-020-404**

Attached please find Special Report 3-SR-92-006 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven (7) days. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely,



JML/TRB/KR

Attachment

cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)
J. B. Martin
J. A. Sloan

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PDR ADOCK 05000530
S PDR





**PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3
POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS**

Docket No. 50-530

License No. NPF-74

Special Report No. 3-SR-92-006

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven (7) days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1515 MST on December 24, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On December 17, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) when Control Room personnel declared PASS inoperable at approximately 1515 MST following the failure to meet the pressurized sample portion of the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement. On December 19, 1992, following troubleshooting, two valves (HV-22 and HV-23) were replaced due to suspected leakage. An additional valve (PSV-101) was replaced when Chemistry technicians could not establish a vacuum on the PASS pressurized sample flask. When Chemistry technicians were unable to obtain the proper flow for the PASS pressurized sample, following troubleshooting, it was discovered that an incorrect actuator was installed during the replacement of HV-22. Following replacement of the actuator, at approximately 1625 MST on December 22, 1992, a pressurized sample was obtained and the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement was met.



However, on December 22, 1992, a new revision of the monthly functional surveillance procedure, which included intent changes, became effective and Unit 3 Chemistry management determined that the pressurized portion of the surveillance testing (ST) should be reperformed using the new ST procedure. PASS failed to meet the pressurized sample portion of the new acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement.

On December 23, 1992, during attempts to reperform the PASS pressurized sample portion of the ST, Chemistry technicians discovered seat leakage on valve HV-22 and packing leakage on HV-23. Further troubleshooting, performed on December 24, 1992, discovered that HV-22 had been installed backwards. At approximately 1815 MST on December 24, 1992, the Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program was initiated in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28. On December 26, 1992, following replacement of HV-22 and restoration of PASS, a pressurized sample was obtained and the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement was met.

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

An investigation is being performed in accordance with the PVNGS Incident Investigation Program. As part of the investigation, the cause of the inoperability is being evaluated and appropriate actions to prevent recurrence will be developed. The investigation is scheduled to be completed on March 31, 1993. The results of the investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report. The supplement is expected to be submitted by April 30, 1993.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 1100 MST on December 26, 1992.

