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	Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529
AUTH.NAME	AUTHOR AFFILIATION
Shriver,T.D.	Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
HAYNES,J.G.	Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power
RECIP.NAME	RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 89-004-00:on 890617, operability & action requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.a not met.W/890717 ltr.

TRIBUTION

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W/8 ltr.

SYSTEM

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05000529

DISTRIBUTION CODE: 122T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / ENCL / SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant.

ACCELERATED

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	NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	l	1	REG FILE 02	1	1	R
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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

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Arizona Public Service Company

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P O BOX 52034 • PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034

> 192-00499-JGH/TDS/RKR July 17, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51) Licensee Event Report 89-004-00 File: 89-020-404

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-004-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours,

SUMA

J. G. Háynes Vice President Nuclear Production

IE22

JGH/TDS/RKR/bjh

Attachment

.cc:

(all w/a)

W. F. Conway D. B. Karner

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. J. B. Martin T. J. Polich M. J. Davis A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center

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Accounty Name(11) Palo Verde Unit 2	NRC For (9-83)	n 366 °						LIC	ENSE	E EVE		EPORT	(LER)		- A		DOMB	ORY COM NO. 3150-0	
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A previous similar event was reported in Unit 2 LER 529/88-003.																			

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NRC Form 344A										^			
NRC Form 365A (9 83)		LICENSEE EVENT REPO	RT (LER) T	EXT CONTINU	JATIO	N	ι	АРР	EAR REG ROVED OF RES: 8/31/	48 NO 3			
FACILITY NAME 11)		DOCKET NUM	IBER (2)	1	LER	NUMBER	(6)			AGE (J	r)	
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Palo Vo		-	0 5 0	0 0 5 2 9	819	_	0101	4' _	010	0 2	OF	0 7	
I.		edenonal NRC Form 3854 (s) (17) RIPTION OF WHAT OC	CURRED:										
	А.	Initial Condition	s:	÷									
		On June 17, 1989, Unit 2 was in Mod temperature and p	e 3 (Ho	t Standby)	7 032 at	20 : no	MST, rmal	Pa] ope	lo Ve erati	erde Ing			
	в.		Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):										
, ,	Event Classification: Condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS)												
	,	Shift Supervisor OPERABILITY and A Specification (TS of the onsite Classing supplied by two p 3.8.1.1 ACTION a. inoperable, the O circuit be demonst per eight hours t	by 0320 MST on June 17, 1989, the Unit 2 for (utility, licensed) discovered that the ACTION requirements of Technical (TS) 3.8.1.1.a had not been met as a result Class 1E distribution system (EB) not being by physically independent circuits (EA). TS a. requires that with one offsite circuit OPERABILITY of the remaining offsite constrated within one hour and at least once s thereafter by verifying correct breaker cating power availability.										
		Palo Verde Nuclea site. Three star NAN-X02, and NAN- distribution syst normal power to U Bus 3E-NAN-SO6 (B to Unit 1 Bus 1E- SO5 (BU)(EA). NA Bus 1E-NAN-SO5 (B (BU)(EA). Each s power source for X01 is the altern NAN-SO5 and 1E-NA KV Class 1E bus (two independent c switchyard (FK) t system.	tup tra X03) su em (EA) nit 2 B U)(EA). NAN-S06 N-X03 s U)(EA) tartup its res ate pow N-S06. BU)(EB) ircuits	nsformers pply power for each us 2E-NAN- NAN-X02 (BU)(EA) upplies no and Unit 2 transforme pective ur er source Each 13.8 . This co for each	(XFM unit -S05 supp and ormal 2 Bus ormal 2 Bus ormal 5 KV onfic unit	R) t.Binp2aFnurf	(EA) e 13 NAN U)(E es n it 3 ower E-NA lso er 1 s su atio rom	(NAN -X01 A) a borma Bus to N-S(the Bus pp1: n p1 the	V-X0: XV or L sup and U al pos 3E- Unit 06 alte ole, sses ies a covio	l, nsit opli Jnit ower -NAN t 1 erna NAN 1E- a 4. des	e s - te		
		Prior to the even NAN-X01 and NAN-X busses being supp their alternate p	03. Th lied by	is require the start	ed tr cup t	ran Era	sfer nsfo	ring	g the rs to	e 0	r		

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NRC Form 366A 19-831			U.S	NUCLEAR REG	ULATORY COMM	ISSION
.9.811	LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU	ATION	APPROVED OF EXPIRES: 8/31/	MB NO 3150-010 /88)4
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6		PAGE (3)	
			YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	NUMBER		
Palo Verde Unit	2	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9	819 - 01014		013 OF (017
TEXT III more space is required, use i	edérbonel NRC Form 306A's) (17)				<u> </u>	<u> </u>
TEXT (If more space is required, use i	performed in accord approximately 0143 was shifted from it Transformer NAN-X03 (Startup Transformer Startup Transformer on June 15, 1989 NA NAN-X01 was reenerd maintenance was con June 16, 1989 the W licensed) informed Supervisors (utilit NAN-X01 had been re Transformer NAN-X03 the day for schedu In preparation for NAN-X03, the need Transformer NAN-X03 the day for schedu In preparation for NAN-X03, the need Transformer NAN-X03 turnover at approx of 2E-NAN-S05 not I not discussed. At 1989, 2E-NAN-S06 wa (NAN-X03) to its ba accordance with an both Unit 2 13.8 K Startup Transforme Class 1E busses we independent circui of TS 3.8.1.1. At approximately 0 Shift Supervisor c and discussed the S06 were both bein X02. The Unit 2 S 2E-NAN-S06 inopera TS 3.8.1.1. At ap 2E-NAN-S06 was shi accordance with ap declared OPERABLE Unit 2 completed t ACTION a. at approx	dance with an ap MST on June 15, ts normal power 1) to its altern er NAN-X02) to a r NAN-X01. At a AN-X01 was deene gized at approxi mplete. At appr Jnit 1 Shift Sup the Unit 2 and ty, licensed) th eturned to servi 3 was going to b led maintenance on to shift 2E-NAN- 3 was discussed imately 0700 MST being on its nor approximately 1 as shifted from ackup power sour approved proced V busses being sup ts which require 320 MST on June ontacted the Uni fact that Busses g powered from s hift Supervisor ble and entered proximately 0326 fted to its norm proved procedure and ACTION a. of he one hour require	proved proc 1989, Bus source (Sta ate power s 11ow mainte pproximatel rgized for mately 0604 oximately 0 ervisor (ut Unit 3 Shif at Startup Tra SO6 from St during the . However, mal power s 037 MST on its normal ce (NAN-X02 ure. This upplied by a result, plied by tw d entry int 17, 1989, t t 2 Shift S tartup tran immediately ACTION Stat MST on Jun al power Su S 3.8.1.1	2E-NAN- rtup ource nance of y 0348 mainter MST willity, t Transfor ed late startup Unit 2 the san to power s ource of June 10 power s ource of s ource	-S05 on MST nance. hen F on ormer up er in er shift tatus was 6, source ed in me it 2 ically ON a. t 1 sor E-NAN- red a. of 1989, n 6 was xited.	
с.	Status of structur inoperable at the the event:	es, systems, or	components	that we	ere ed to	
	As described in Se	ction I.B, Start	up Transfor	mer NA	N-X03	

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NRC Form 344 :9 831	5A		LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU			ULATORY COMMISSION
FACILITY NA	NE (N)	<u> </u>	•			EXPIRES: 8/31	
-				DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMB	ER (6)	PAGE (3)
Palo V	Vordo	llni+	2				
			ddroonel NRC Form 3064/s/ (17)	0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9	8 9 0 0	4 - 0 0	0 4 0 0 7
			(XFMR) (EA) was ino structures, system start of the event	s, or components	were ino	perable a	
			The required offsi status approximate Supervisor discove circuit was inoper minutes prior to d Supervisor.	ly six minutes a red it was inope able for approxi	fter the rable. T mately 16	Unit 2 S he offsi hours 4	hift te
	D	•	Cause of each comp	onent or system	failure,	if known	:
			Not applicable - n involved.	o component or s	ystem fai	lures we	re
	E	•	Failure mode, mech component, if know		t of each	failed	
			Not applicable - n	o component fail	ures were	involve	d.
	F	•	For failures of co of systems or seco affected:	mponents with mu ndary functions	ltiple fu that were	nctions, also	list
			Not applicable - n	o component fail	ures were	involve	d.
- - - -	G	•	For failures that inoperable, estima the failure until	ted time elapsed	from the	discove	ry of
			Not applicable - n	o component fail	ures were	involve	d.
	Н	•	Method of discover or procedural erro		ent or sy	stem fai	lure
	ï		Notapplicable - th failures or proced	ere were no comp ural errors.	onent or	system	
	I	•	Cause of Event:				
	Ţ	·	The cause of the e the operations per for being aware of responsible indivi the plant configur not take the appro Not discussing the shift turnover may	sonnel (utility, the abnormal pl duals did not re ation discussed priate ACTIONS r abnormal electr	licensed ant confi cognize t in Sectio equired b ical line) respon guration he effec n I.B an by TS 3.8 up durin	sible . The ts of d did .1.1.

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NRC Form ,366A (9.83)		LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU		GULATORY COMMISSION OMB NO 3150-0104 N/88
FACILITY NAME (1))		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
	4	•	* J	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER	1 1
Palo '	Verde	Unit 2	0 15 10 10 10 15 12 19	819-01014-010	0150F017
TEXT IN more space i	is required, us	ae addroonal NRC Form 305A's/ (17)		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
		Not taking the app is contrary to app procedural errors. single startup tran approved procedure characteristics of contributed to the	roved procedures The transfer o nsformer was don . There were no the work locati	5. There were no of the busses to a ne in accordance w o unusual	L ,
		An investigation of accordance with the If additional info significantly alter event, a supplement	e PVNGS Incident rmation is devel r the readers' p	: Investigation Pr oped which would perception of this	ogram.
	J.	Safety System Resp	onse:		
		Not applicable - no none were necessar		responses occurre	and and
	к.	Failed Component I	nformation:		
		Not applicable - no	o component fail	ures were involve	:đ.
II.	ASSE Even	ESSMENT OF THE SAFET	Y CONSEQUENCES A	ND IMPLICATIONS O	FTHIS
-	dist syst clas dist 4.10 are Clas desi supp bus. dies	startup transformers tribution system (EA tem is designed to p plies from the offsi as 1E busses (BU)(EB tribution system is 6 KV Class 1E bus. also available to p ss 1E bus. The offs igned such that, with ply would still be a . With a complete 10 sel generators provident). The offsite rovide physicall te transmission) for each Unit. the preferred po Emergency diesel rovide standby p ite power distri h a single failu vailable to a si oss of offsite p de power to each	power distributio y independent pow network to the 4. The offsite pow ower source for ea generators (DG) (ower to each 4.16 bution system is ire, one offsite p ingle 4.16 KV Class ower, the emergen 1 4.16 KV Class 1E	on Jer Je KV Ver Jeb Se KV Sower Se 1E Jey Se bus.
	Star supp	the event described rtup Transformer NAN- oly would have resul t 2.	-X02 or Startup	Transformer power	:
	brea	ACTION requirements aker alignment) were tion I.B. Verificat	successfully pe	erformed as descri	bed in .

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4	LICE	NSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU	ATION APPROVED O	ULATORY COMMISSION
			•	EXPIRES: 8/31	
			DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
	_			VEAR SEQUENTIAL SEQUENTIAL SECUSION NUMBER	
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also Spec: after satis durin busso There	a we ificat r the sfacto ng the es up efore	ekly surveillan tion 3/4.8.1. event demonstr ory. Both Emer e event and ava- on a loss of th	The surveillanc rated that break rgency Diesel Ge ailable to supply neir offsite pow	es performed befo: er alignment was nerators were OPE y the 4.16 KV Clas er supplies.	RABLE SS 1E
CORR	ECTIVI	E ACTIONS:			
Α.	Immed	liate:			
	Bus (Star I.B.	2E-NAN-S05 was rtup Transform	shifted to its er NAN-X01) as d	normal power supp iscussed in Sectio	ly on
в.	Actio	on to Prevent 1	Recurrence:		
			ons to prevent r	ecurrence are bei	ng
	1.	Personnel invo	olved with the e	vent were counsel	ed.
	2.	operations pe	rsonnel of the n	eed for thorough :	shift
	3.	breaker contro requirements configuration interim correcy yellow caution corrective ac	ols to remind pe of TS 3.8.1.1 ap changes. This ctive action. C n tags will be b tions developed	rsonnel that the ply to any is considered to i ontinued use of t ased on the final	be an he
	4.	Unit 2 proced System (NA)" aware of the 3.8.1.1 when supplied from an enhancement applicable Te The correspon	ure 420P-2NA01, was revised to a requirements of in-plant electri a single source t to aid personn chnical Specific ding procedures	"13.8 KV Electric dd a precaution t Technical Specifi cal loads are bei . This is consid el in recognizing ation requirement	al o be cation ng ered s.
	also Spec afte: sati: duri: buss There publ CORR	also a wee Specificat after the satisfacto during the busses upo Therefore, public. CORRECTIVI A. Immed Bus 2 (Stat I.B. B. Actio The 2 taken 1. 2. 3.	 also a weekly surveillar Specification 3/4.8.1. after the event demonstr satisfactory. Both Emer during the event and avai busses upon a loss of the Therefore, there was no public. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A. Immediate: Bus 2E-NAN-S05 was (Startup Transformed I.B. B. Action to Prevent 1 The following action taken: Personnel involution A night order operations per turnovers and alignment. Yellow caution breaker contropy requirements of configuration interim corrective action interim corrective action interim corrective action interim corrective action interim corrective action system (NA)" aware of the 3.8.1.1 when supplied from an enhancemen applicable Te The correspon 	 also a weekly surveillance requirement Specification 3/4.8.1. The surveillanc after the event demonstrated that break satisfactory. Both Emergency Diesel Ge during the event and available to suppl busses upon a loss of their offsite pow Therefore, there was no threat to the h public. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A. Immediate: Bus 2E-NAN-S05 was shifted to its (Startup Transformer NAN-X01) as d I.B. B. Action to Prevent Recurrence: The following actions to prevent r taken: 1. Personnel involved with the e 2. A night order was issued in U operations personnel of the n turnovers and that they be co alignment. 3. Yellow caution tags were plac breaker controls to remind pe requirements of TS 3.8.1.1 ap configuration changes. This interim corrective action. C yellow caution tags will be b corrective actions developed investigation of this event. 4. Although it was not part of t Unit 2 procedure 420P-2NA01, System (NA)" was revised to a aware of the requirements of 3.8.1.1 when in-plant electri supplied from a single source an enhancement to aid personn applicable Technical Specific 	 Verde Unit 2 a s 0 0 0 5 2 9 8 9 - 0 0 4 - 0 0 also a weekly surveillance requirement of Technical Specification 3/4.8.1. The surveillances performed before after the event demonstrated that breaker alignment was satisfactory. Both Emergency Diesel Generators were OPE during the event and available to supply the 4.16 KV Clarbusses upon a loss of their offsite power supplies. Therefore, there was no threat to the health and safety opublic. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A. Immediate: Bus 2E-NAN-S05 was shifted to its normal power suppl (Startup Transformer NAN-X01) as discussed in Section 1.8. B. Action to Prevent Recurrence: The following actions to prevent recurrence are bein taken: 1. Personnel involved with the event were counseled to requirements of TS 3.8.1.1 apply to any configuration changes. This is considered to interim corrective action. Continued use of the yellow caution tags were placed on the final corrective actions developed during the investigation of this event. 4. Although it was not part of the cause of this Unit 2 procedure 420P-2NA01, "13.8 KV Electric System (NA)" was revised to ad a precaution taware of the requirements of TE data applicable Technical Specification requirement to aid personnel in recognizing applicable Technical Specification requirement to aid personnel in recognizing applicable Technical Specification requirement to a data precaution taware of the requirements for Technical Specification requirement to aid personnel in recognizing applicable Technical Specification requirement to aid personnel in recognizing applicable Technical Specification requirement the corresponding procedures for Units 1 and 3

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