U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report Nos: 50-528/87-28, 50-529/87-28, 50-530/87-29

Docket Nos: 50-528, 50-529, 50-530

License Nos: NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-65

Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Project
P. O. Box 52034
Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034

Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 & 3.

Inspection Conducted: August 2, 1987 through September 12, 1987.

Inspectors: _____ FOR _____ 9-23-87
J. Ball, Resident Inspector — Date Signed

_____ FOR _____ 9-23-87
G. Fiorelli, Resident Inspector — Date Signed

_____ FOR _____ 9-23-87
K. Ivey, Resident Inspector — Date Signed

Approved By: _____ 9-23-87
S. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section — Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on August 2, 1987 through September 12, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-528/87-28, 50-529/87-28, and 50-530/87-29)

Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the three resident inspectors. Areas inspected included: followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; plant tours; engineered safety feature system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; preoperational testing; followup on valve position indication problem; activities of the onsite and offsite safety review committees; licensee event report followup; and review of periodic and special reports.

During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered: 30702, 30703, 35701, 40701-B, 61726, 62700-1, 62703, 70315-B, 70316-B, 71707, 71707-1, 71709, 71710, 71881, 81601, 90713, 92700, 92701, 92702, 93702.

Results: Of the 13 areas inspected, no violations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted:

The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:

Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP)

R. Adney,	Operations Superintendent, Unit 2
J. Allen,	Operations Manager
L. Brown,	Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager
R. Buckhalter,	Outage Management Superintendent, Unit 3
J. R. Bynum,	PVNGS Plant Manager
B. Cederquist,	Chemical Services Manager
J. Dennis,	Operations Supervisor, Unit 1
W. Fernow,	Training Manager
*R. Gouge,	Operations Superintendent, Unit 3
J. G. Haynes,	Vice President, Nuclear Production
W. E. Ide,	Corporate Quality Assurance Manager
D. Nelson,	Operations Security Manager
R. Nelson,	Maintenance Manager
G. Perkins,	Radiological Services Manager
*J. Pollard,	Operations Supervisor, Unit 2
F. Riedel,	Operations Supervisor, Unit 3
*T. Shriver,	Compliance Manager
L. Souza,	Assistant Quality Assurance Manager
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.,	Executive Vice President
*R. Younger,	Operations Superintendent, Unit 1
*O. Zeringue,	Technical Support Manager

The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.

*Attended the Exit Meeting on September 10, 1987.

2. Previously Identified Items.

Unit 1

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (528/86-33-02): "Ion Exchanger Purge Problem".

This item concerned an event in which a small amount of resin was blown into the Auxiliary Building exhaust duct while purging the "A" purification ion exchanger. This item remained unresolved pending further inspector review of the event and associated corrective actions.

The inspector followed the licensee's review of the event as it developed and verified the completion of major corrective actions. The licensee revised operating procedure 410P-1CH02,

Purification System, to include detailed instructions to be used for purging the ion exchangers. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and verified the valve line-ups on system diagrams. The inspector concluded that the concerns addressed by this item were resolved. This item is closed.

b. (Closed) Followup Item (528/86-33-03): "Review of Licensee's Engineering Change Evaluations (ECE's) Investigation".

This item related to the licensee's commitment to review all engineering change evaluations (ECE's) for proper implementation as a result of the failure to apply fully the restrictions placed on the usage of unqualified switchboard wire by a previously issued ECE. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's efforts to date in this area. The inspector determined that the licensee had conducted a thorough investigation into the implementation of all previously issued ECE's and had adequately resolved any past discrepancies. The inspector noted changes to the licensee's administrative controls which should prevent the lack of proper implementation of ECE provisions in the future. This item is closed.

c. (Closed) Followup Item (KI-79-09): "NUREG/CR-3791 - Closeout of Bulletin 79-09" - Units 1, 2 and 3.

IE Bulletin 79-09, "Failures of General Electric (GE) Type AK-2 circuit breakers in Safety-Related Systems", was issued for response and actions by all licensees and construction permit holders on April 17, 1979. The licensee responded that the bulletin was not applicable to Palo Verde since GE Type AKR-30 circuit breakers were used instead of the AK-2 Type. The bulletin was closed for all three units at Palo Verde in NRC Inspection Reports 50-528/84-22, 50-529/84-20 and 50-530/84-13.

Additional problems with GE AK-2 circuit breakers resulted in the issuance of subsequent bulletins, circulars, and information notices and Generic Letter 83-28. NUREG/CR-3791 was issued to suggest followup inspection to verify that the latest GE Service Advisory Letter (SAL) recommendations for Type AK-2 circuit breakers were incorporated into the licensee's procedures and technical manuals. Even though Palo Verde did not have the Type AK-2 circuit breakers, the Type AKR-30 undervoltage device was subject to the same failures as the Type AK-2. Therefore, the Type AKR-30 circuit breakers were included in this inspection effort.

Vendor information for equipment that was supplied by Combustion Engineering (CE) is sent to the licensee in CE Availability Data Program (ADP) Information Bulletins. Since CE supplied the GE Type AKR-30 circuit breakers, the GE Service Advisory Letters (SALs) are forwarded to the licensee in these bulletins. Procedures governing the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) required that the CE bulletins be

reviewed and the findings and recommendations for action be documented in an ISEG Operating Experience Review (OER).

The inspector reviewed the ISEG procedures and OER reports for CE bulletins containing GE SALs for circuit breakers. The inspector noted that the following SALs, associated with this issue, had been reviewed:

- o SAL 175-9.3
- o SAL 175-9.3S
- o SAL 175-9.15
- o SAL 175-9.20

From a review of procedure 32MT-9SB01, "Six Month Maintenance of Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers", the inspector verified that the vendor recommendations were incorporated into the licensee's procedures.

Based on these reviews, the inspector concluded that a program exists to ensure that GE Service Advisory Letters and other vendor information on the Type AKR-30 circuit breakers are received, reviewed, and incorporated into the licensee's procedures. This item is closed for all three units.

Unit 2

a. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (529/86-33-04): "Quality Assurance (QA) Role in Engineering Evaluation Reports (EERs)".

The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee in connection with the findings that were made during a previous team inspection in which it was observed that several "Information Only" EERs had not been properly dispositioned, and that the "Information Only" EERs were not being reviewed by the plant QA staff. The inspector confirmed that the licensee's QA staff had conducted several reviews of "Information Only" EERs. The sample included documents generated in 1985 and 1986. Monthly reviews of more recent EERs had been conducted since February, 1987. Future reviews of "Information Only" ERRs were added to the audit scoping matrix for the annual nonconformance audit. The licensee's findings were similar to those of the NRC and a Corrective Action Report was issued to engineering management highlighting findings which challenged the disposition of some of the "Information Only" EERs. The inspector confirmed that the actions documented in the licensees' response to the NRC letter dated April 13, 1987, had been implemented. This item is closed.

b. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (529/86-33-10): "Review of Effectiveness of Licensee GL 83-28 Vendor Information Program".

The inspector reviewed the program related to the updating of technical information on safety related system components

previously received from vendors as discussed in Generic Letter 83-28. The inspector established that the licensee has established a program for receipt, tracking, distribution, review and evaluation of vendor information; as well as the implementation of program updates resulting from recommended safety related component changes or maintenance practices received from the vendor. The system implementation involves several plant procedures and organizational units. Some of these procedures will require modifications due to the upcoming staff reorganization. The inspector concluded a program to implement the vendor interface provisions as discussed in Generic Letter 83-28 exists.

Additionally a licensee Quality Assurance audit was conducted in this area and will also be scheduled on a routine basis in the future. This item is closed.

c. (Closed) Enforcement Item (529/87-11-01): "Inoperable Pressurizer Heater Group Control Room Switch".

The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee in regards to this matter. The restoration of heater operability and communications issued to the operating staff identifying management instructions related to this matter were confirmed by the inspector to be consistent with the licensee's response to the violation. This item is closed.

3. Review of Plant Activities.

a. Unit 1

The unit operated at 100% power until August 27 when a plant shutdown was required to evaluate a possible Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak (see paragraph 12). The unit remained shutdown in Mode 5 while the RCS leak was repaired. The unit was restarted on September 1, reached a power level of 100% on September 2, and continued to run at 100% power through the end of this reporting period.

b. Unit 2

Unit 2 has operated at 100% during the entire report period.

c. Unit 3

During this inspection period, the licensee completed retests of the train "B" diesel generator which was damaged during initial preoperational testing in December, 1986. Preparations for the reperformance of integrated safeguards testing of train "A" engineered safety features were begun. Replacement of the train "A" containment spray pump motor was also completed. The licensee currently anticipates initial criticality to occur in mid-October, 1987.

d. Plant Tours

The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:

- o Auxiliary Building
- o Containment Building
- o Control Complex Building
- o Diesel Generator Building
- o Radwaste Building
- o Technical Support Center
- o Turbine Building
- o Yard Area and Perimeter

The following areas were observed during the tours:

1. Operating Logs and Records Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.

2. Monitoring Instrumentation Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.

3. Shift Manning Control room and shift manning were observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.

4. Equipment Lineups Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode. This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.

5. Equipment Tagging Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.

6. General Plant Equipment Conditions Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfilling their functional requirements.

7. Fire Protection Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.

8. Plant Chemistry Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.

9. Security Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.

10. Plant Housekeeping Plant conditions and material/-equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping. Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.

11. Radiation Protection Controls Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

4. Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns - Units 1, 2 and 3.

Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety) were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures. During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.

Unit 1

Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated date.

System	Date
Hydrogen Analyzers, Trains "A" and "B"	August 7
Hydrogen Recombiners, Trains "A" and "B"	August 11, 13
Essential Chilled Water System, Trains "A" and "B"	August 20, 24-25
Containment Spray System, Train "B"	August 26
Boron Injection Flow Paths	September 2
Essential Cooling Water System, Trains "A" and "B"	September 5

High Pressure Safety Injection System, Trains "A" and "B"	September 10

Unit 2

Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.

System	Date
High Pressure Safety Injection System, Train "A"	August 6
Class 1E Batteries Trains "B" and "D"	August 14
Control Room Essential Chilled Water system, Train "A"	August 21
Safety Injection Tanks	August 26
Diesel Generator System, Train "A"	September 4
Spray Ponds, Trains "A" and "B"	September 10

Unit 3

Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.

System	Date
125V DC Electrical Distribution, Channels "A" and "C"	August 5
Diesel Generator System, Train "A"	August 16
Boron Injection Flow Paths	August 26
Low Pressure Safety Injection Aligned for Shutdown Cooling, Train "B"	September 5

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

5. Surveillance Testing - Units 1, 2 and 3.

a. Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that: 1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS;

and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.

b. Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:

Unit 1

Procedure	Description	Dates Performed
73ST-9CL01	Containment Leakage Type "B" and "C" Testing.	August 6
36ST-9HP03	Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System Calibration Test	August 6
72ST-9RX03	DNBR/LHR/AZTLT/ASI with Core Operating Limits Supervisory System (COLSS) Inoperable	August 10
36ST-9SA01	Essential Safety Features Actuation System, Train "A" Subgroup Relay Monthly Functional Test	August 13
73ST-1SI01	Essential Core Cooling System Throttle Valve Testing	September 10

Unit 2

Procedure	Description	Dates Performed
73ST-9CL06	Containment Ventilation Purge Isolation Valve Leak Test	August 4
42ST-2DG01	Diesel Generator "A" Test	August 5
42ST-2SG01	Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Surveillance Test	August 9
42ST-2ZZ33	Mode 1 Surveillance Logs	August 12
42ST-2ZZ16	Containment Air Temperature Surveillance	August 18
42ST-2SF01	CEA Operability Checks	August 23
42ST-2DG01	Diesel Generator "A" Test	September 4

Unit 3

Procedure	Description	Dates Performed
36ST-9SI02	Safety Injection/Shutdown Cooling System Instrumentation Surveillance	August 21
32ST-3SE03	Excore Safety Linear Channel Quarterly Calibration	August 26, 27

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

6. Plant Maintenance - Units 1, 2 and 3.

a. During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting. The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.

b. The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:

Unit 1

Description	Dates Performed
o Preventive and Corrective Work on Motor Operated Valves SI UV-667 and SI UV-699.	August 27
o Inspect/Adjust Main Circuit Breaker for "B" Train Containment Spray Pump.	September 8
o Preventive Maintenance on Charging Pump "E" Circuit Breaker Alarm Relay.	September 10

Unit 2

Description	Dates Performed
o Repair of Valve SI UV-636.	August 4
o Motor Operated Valve Test SI UV-698.	August 21
o Calibration of Turbine Shell Temperature Recorder.	August 31

Unit 3

Description	Dates Performed
o Diesel Generator "B" Generator Pole Piece Terminations.	August 13
o Troubleshooting Channel "C" Inverter Static Transfer Switch.	August 14
o Motor Operated Valve Test SI UV-616.	September 4
o Diesel Generator "B" Cylinder Head Replacement.	September 4

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

7. Preoperational Testing - Unit 3.

The inspector witnessed the performance of preoperational testing to verify that the procedure in use was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure satisfactory performance; test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; work was performed by qualified personnel; and results satisfied procedural acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.

The inspector witnessed the performance of portions of the following system testing activities:

Procedure	Description
73ST-3DG02	Class 1E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards Surveillance Test - Train "B"

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

8. Followup on Position Indication Problem on Valve SGA UV-204 - Unit 2.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities related to the troubleshooting efforts associated with the dual position indication on steam generator blowdown sample valve SGA UV-204, which occurred on June 4, 1987. This problem occurred when a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS) was received during the plant trip on June 4, 1987. The inspector determined based on discussions with the operating staff and a review of operating log entries, that the valve had closed on receipt of the CIAS signal and that the problem was associated with the valve position indication lights. During the maintenance followup, the inspector confirmed that the crafts people had initially removed the cover on valve SSA UV-204 instead of SGA UV-204 (valves are of identical design) while attempting to observe the operations of the limit switch contacts. This became

known to the crafts people after they observed no valve response to several requests made to the control room to stroke "valve 204".

When the mistake was discovered a new "O-ring" was installed on the valve operator and the cover replaced. This was done in the presence of a Quality Control inspector. The valve was also tested for proper operation.

Valve SGA UV-204 was then inspected and checked. However, the limit switch adjustments were not successful. The work on valve SGA UV-204 was performed in accordance with work package instructions. Work on valve SSA UV-204 was also performed in accordance with the instructions written for valve SGA UV-204, but no documentation was made of the replaced "O-ring" and the subsequent checkouts. The licensee stated that followup documentation would be completed for the record. A Quality Assurance report was written documenting involvement by Quality Control. An Engineering Evaluation Request (EER) document was also written as part of the acceptance of the work on valve SSA UV-204. The limit switch position indication problem remains on valve SGA UV-204 and will be corrected at a later date.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

9. Nuclear Safety Group Review - Units 1, 2 and 3.

A review of the licensee's Nuclear Safety Group (NSG) operations confirmed that the provisions of the current Technical Specifications regarding the NSG for Units 1, 2 and 3 were being implemented. The current staff composition including number of persons involved and the education and experience levels of each were found to be consistent with the requirements of the plant Technical Specifications.

The group was found to be actively engaged in safety reviews of plant problems. Procedures were found to have been written incorporating the authorities, responsibilities and functions of the group.

The inspector reviewed the group's monthly operations reports for the past two years along with the minutes of quarterly meetings held with plant management. The inspector also reviewed the schedule of audits in which the NSG staff members were participating.

Based on the inspectors review of records and discussions held with the NSG staff, it appears the NSG is currently functioning in accordance with the requirements of the plant Technical Specifications.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

10. Plant Review Board (PRB) Review - Units 1, 2 and 3.

The Plant Review Board (PRB) is a Technical Specification (T/S) required group which advises the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety. Members are designated in the T/S's and appointed in writing by the Plant Manager. The PRB is required to meet at least once per month with a quorum of five members and a chairman.

The inspector reviewed the procedure detailing the responsibilities and operation of the PRB (procedure 70AC-0ZZ06) and concluded that it addressed the T/S requirements. The inspector reviewed the minutes for PRB meetings held in 1987 (87-01 through 87-29) and verified that all meetings were attended by a quorum of designated members and all areas of responsibility were addressed. Included were special meetings held on potential safety issues known to the inspector. The inspector also observed the operation of the PRB at a meeting held on August 27, 1987. A review of the training records for a sample of PRB members and alternates verified that they were designated and trained in accordance with the approved procedures.

Based on these reviews and observations, the inspector concluded that the PRB was functioning in accordance with the T/S requirements.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

11. <u>(Closed) LER 86-56-LO "Reactor Trip Due to Excessive RCS Cooldown" - Unit 1.</u>

While in Mode 1 at approximately 24 percent reactor power, Unit 1 tripped on low departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) signals. The root cause of the trip was quick opening of a steam generator economizer valve admitting non-reheated feedwater which cooled loop 1 down at a rate that caused the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) to project a high differential cold leg temperature trip (Lo DNBR).

The licensee's review of this event was performed through the Post Trip Review process and included the following corrective actions:

- revisions to the Load Rejection procedure to encompass an overall strategy for reactor power reductions, including Feedwater Control System (FWCS) operations,
- adjustment of the feedwater pump turbine speed program settings to reduce the high differential pressure that was present on the valve, and
- evaluation and fine tuning of the FWCS to optimize its performance at low power levels (this included operational testing in automatic control at approximately 3 percent power).

The inspector reviewed the Post Trip Review report and associated corrective actions to conclude that this item was closed.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

12. RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage - Unit 1

On August 27, in Unit 1, a radiation protection technician noticed steam and water leakage from a 3/4 inch valve that is used in refueling level monitoring. This valve (RCS-V214) is off of the "A" train shutdown cooling line and has no isolation from the reactor coolant system (RCS). Total RCS leakage at the time was approximately 0.45 gpm. The licensee shutdown the unit to investigate the leak and found a crack of approximately 3/8 inch in length on the upstream nipple-to-valve weld. The leak was determined to be RCS pressure boundary leakage and the unit began a cooldown to Mode 5 in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

The licensee performed engineering evaluations for repair of the leak and developed a detailed work plan for replacement of the valve. The inspectors reviewed the work plan prior to its use and noted that it included a visual inspection prior to removal of the valve, freeze plugging procedures for isolating the valve during work, contingencies to provide emergency isolation in the event of failure of the freeze seal, post-maintenance weld and leak testing, and a return to service inspection. The licensee completed the valve replacement without incident and proceeded with normal operations to return the plant to power.

The licensee's evaluations of the root cause of this crack identified the following:

- this was the second valve crack on this nipple-to-valve weld location in Unit 1,
- neither vibration data that was taken with all four reactor coolant pumps running or with the "A" train shutdown cooling system running showed velocities that would cause cracking,
- destructive examination of the weld crack surface showed evidence of a lack of fusion at the weld root caused by a lack of weld penetration,
- the fracture surface showed no evidence of fatigue upon visual inspection, and
- the cracking may have occurred due to overloading failure caused by an individual stepping on the valve.

Corrective actions to be taken by the licensee include installing a sign on the valve in all three units to warn against using the valve as a handhold/foothold and the installation of a restraint mechanism or support for the valve in Unit 1 during the upcoming refueling outage and in the other units in the future. The licensee has also initiated a formal Root Cause of Failure analysis (RCF) to be performed by operations engineering and sent the cracked weld to an offsite inspection facility for metallurgical analysis to determine the type and cause of the fracture. The RCS and metallurgical analyses are to be used to determine further corrective actions.

The inspector will review the results of these analyses in a future inspection. (50-528/87-28-01).

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

13. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup - Unit 2

The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspector. Based on the information provided in the report it was concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate. The below listed LERs are considered closed.

LER NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
86-44-LO	Both Trains of CREFAS Inoperable Due to Inadequate Design.
87-03-LO	CEA Position Numbers Verified Due to Procedure Inadequacy.
87-04-LO	Reactor Trip While Performing Ground Isolation Due to Inadequate Information.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

14. Review of Periodic and Special Reports - Units 1, 2 and 3

Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.

This review included the following considerations: the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information. Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.

Unit 1

- Monthly Operating Report for July, 1987.

Unit 2

- Monthly Operating Report for July, 1987.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

15. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the inspection and held an exit on September 10, 1987.

The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representatives.