



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 15 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41
AND AMENDMENT NO. 9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-51
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. STN 50-528 AND STN 50-529

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 19, 1987, the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Southern California Edison Company, El Paso Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), requested changes to the Technical Specifications for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 (Appendices A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-41 and NPF-51, respectively). The application requests the deletion of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) from Table 3.6-1 in the Specifications.

2.0 DISCUSSION

In order to ensure proper containment isolation following an accident, such as a loss of coolant accident, and to preclude unacceptable radiological releases to the environment, the automatic valves listed in Table 3.6-1, which is a part of Specification 3/4.6.3, receive operability verification as identified in the specification. However, the limiting conditions for operation and action statements of Specification 3/4.6.3 are written assuming each identified containment penetration in Table 3.6-1 has two (redundant) containment isolation valves. This is not the case with the main steam lines where the requirements of GDC 57 permit a single MSIV for each penetration. The current requirements of Specification 3/4.6.3 would force entry into Specification 3.0.3, and a corresponding immediate plant shutdown, whenever an MSIV is determined to be inoperable from testing which is normally conducted during power operation. This results because a redundant valve is not available to secure the penetration and allow continued plant power operation while repairs are made.

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The above requirements are in conflict with existing Specification 3/4.7.1.5 which specifically governs operability of the MSIVs. This specification permits power operation for four hours to restore an inoperable MSIV to operable status before shutdown is required. Because of these considerations, the licensees have requested that the MSIVs be removed from Table 3.6-1 of the Technical Specifications.

3.0 EVALUATION

The existing Specification 3/4.7.1.5 is consistent with the CE Standard Technical Specifications for ensuring MSIV operability (closure) on receipt of a main steam isolation signal (MSIS). An MSIS is generated by a high containment pressure, low steam generator pressure, or high steam generator level signal. These signals are accounted for in the Palo Verde accident analyses and are unaffected by the proposed change. Thus, the design basis accident analyses assumptions for containment isolation, and prevention of unacceptable releases of radioactivity to the environment, are not affected by elimination of the MSIVs from Table 3.6-1. Further, deletion of the MSIVs from Table 3.6-1 will potentially reduce the challenges to the plant by permitting additional time to take corrective action upon indication of an inoperable MSIV rather than initiating a shutdown by entering Specification 3.0.3 directly. It was the staff's intent to permit MSIV repair for a limited time period and not impose the action statement in Specification 3.0.3, whenever an MSIV was inoperable.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the operability of the MSIVs in accordance with the design basis accident analyses is adequately assured by existing Specification 3/4.7.1.5. Thus, deletion of the MSIVs from Table 3.6-1 in Specification 3/4.6.3 will not adversely affect post-accident containment isolation capability nor the prevention of unacceptable releases of radioactivity to the environment. Further, the proposed change eliminates conflicting specification requirements and is consistent with the standard technical specifications which are intended to provide a limited time in which to restore an inoperable valve to operable status. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed change acceptable.

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency has been advised of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration with regard to this amendment request. No comments were received.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS


These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need to be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Principal Contributor: J. Wermiel

Dated: April 8, 1987



April 8, 1987

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 15 TO FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE NPF-41 AND FOR PALO VERDE UNIT 1 AND AMENDMENT NO. 9
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-51 FOR PALO VERDE UNIT 2

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