



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

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December 2, 1985
ANPP 34143 EEVB/GEC

Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-41
Special Report - Diesel Generator Failure
to Start During Surveillance Testing
File: 85-020-404

Dear Mr. Martin:

Attached please find a Special Report (1-SR-85-027) prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2. This report discusses a diesel generator start failure during Surveillance Testing.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Project Director

EEVB/GEC/rw
Attachments

cc: R. P. Zimmerman (all w/a)
A. L. Hon
E. A. Licitra
A. C. Gehr
INPO Records Center

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Attachment to
ANPP 34143

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1
DIESEL GENERATOR FAILED TO START DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

Docket No. STN 50-528

License No. NPF-41

Special Report 1-SR-85-027

At 0420 on October 30, 1985, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 when Diesel Generator "A" failed to start from the Control Room while performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01 (Emergency Diesel Generator A Start and Load 4.8.1.1.2.a). At 0450, an attempt was made to start the diesel from the local control station, but it again failed to start. The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor complied with Technical Specifications (T.S.) 3.8.1.1, ACTION a, by verifying the operability of the remaining A.C. power sources.

The cause of the unsuccessful start was a faulty fiber optic cable failing to actuate the 86S1Y relay (test mode starting relay). The failure of the 86S1Y relay to actuate simulated a nonessential trip to the diesel engine control logic, with no actual trip signal present, and prevented test mode operation. Since nonessential trips are bypassed in an emergency condition, this fiber optic cable failure would not have prevented an emergency (accident) start. The opposite train diesel generator was proven operable in accordance with procedure 41ST-1ZZ02, satisfying T.S. 3.8.1.1., ACTION a. This was not logged as a valid test or failure in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e.(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108, and a substantiating Engineering Evaluation Report was written.

The faulty fiber optic cable was replaced and Diesel Generator "A" was declared OPERABLE at 0358 on October 31, 1985. Diesel Generator "A" had been unavailable for 23 hours and 38 minutes.

Plant Change Request PCR-85-13-DG-058 was initiated on November 1, 1985, to modify the fiber optic system to increase its reliability

There have been two failures in the last 100 valid tests. The current surveillance test interval is every 14 days and is in conformance with Regulatory Position C.2.d.(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

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