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STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
VAN BRUNT,E.E. Arizona Public Service Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
KNIGHTON,G.W. Licensing Branch 3

SUBJECT: Confirms that pump & valve operability assurance program for Unit 1 complete w/exceptions noted in encl justifications for interim operation,per Section 3.9.3.2 of SER (NUREG-0857).

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

Arizona Public Service Company

ANPP-31416-EEVB/WFQ/MWH
December 10, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos. STN-50-528/529/530
Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program
File: 84-056-026; G.1.01.10

Reference: NUREG-0857, Supplement No. 5 "Safety Evaluation Report" Related to the Operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, dated November, 1983.

Dear Mr. Knighton:

As required by Section 3.9.3.2 of the referenced SER, Arizona Public Service hereby confirms that the Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program for PVNGS-Unit 1 is complete with the exceptions noted in Attachment 1.

Attachment 1 contains justification for interim operation for each item which is not expected to be completed prior to fuel load.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. W.F. Quinn of my staff.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President
Nuclear Production
ANPP Project Director

EEVBJr/KEJ/no
Attachment

cc: E.A. Licitra w/a
H. Garg w/a
A.C. Gehr w/a
R.P. Zimmerman w/a

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PDR ADOCK 05000528
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STATE OF ARIZONA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I, Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr., represent that I am Vice President, Nuclear Production of Arizona Public Service Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.

Edwin E. Van Brunt

Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this 10 day of December, 1984.

Dora E. Meador
Notary Public

My Commission Expires:
My Commission Expires April 6, 1987

Attachment 1

Justifications for Interim Operation

PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER:		DESCRIPTION:	PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION OF OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM:
13-JM-601A		Atmospheric dump valves	April 15, 1985
TAG NUMBER:	ENVI. DESIG.*	SAFETY FUNCTION	
J-SGB-HV-178	II	Decay heat removal for safe shutdown	
J-SGB-HV-179	II	Same as above	
J-SGB-HV-184	II	Same as above	
J-SGB-HV-185	II	Same as above	

HISTORY:

During preoperational testing of the four (4) atmospheric dump valves (ADV), HV-178, 179, 184 and 185 it was observed that HV-178 behaved erratically. Subsequent investigation revealed condensate buildup in the lines created excess force which damaged the internals of the valves. All four (4) ADVs were disassembled, inspected and repaired.

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION:

Additional drain capability is being installed to remove condensate from the outlet port of the valve. These valves will be tested prior to Unit 1 initial criticality. The ADVs are not required to perform their safety function prior to initial criticality since no decay heat is present.

PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER:		DESCRIPTION:	PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION OF OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM:
13-PM-221C		Q-Class check valves	April 15, 1985

TAG NUMBER:	ENVI. DESIG.*	SAFETY FUNCTION
P-SGA-V887	II	Opens when steam flow is required to drive the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater system pump
P-SGA-V888	II	Same as above

HISTORY:

During preoperational testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, the Terry Turbine tripped on overspeed when starting from a cold, ambient condition (DER 84-51). The solution to the problem was to make necessary design changes which included adding Q-class check valves V887 and V888 listed above. Due to the unavailability of Q-class valves, non-Q-class valves were installed to validate the design modification. After successfully completion of the test Q-class valves became available and were installed.

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION:

The function of the check valves is to allow steam flow to the Terry Turbine which in turn drives the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater system pump. The testing of these check valves will be performed prior to Unit 1 initial criticality. Prior to this time, these valves are not required to perform their safety function since there is no decay heat present.

PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER:		DESCRIPTION:	PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION OF OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM:
13-PM-221B		Anchor Darling air operated valve	January 15, 1985
TAG NUMBER:	ENVI. DESIG.*	SAFETY FUNCTION	
J-SGB-UV-130	II	Close on MSIS	
J-SGB-UV-135	II	Close on MSIS	
J-SGA-UV-172	II	Close on MSIS	
J-SGA-UV-175	II	Close on MSIS	

HISTORY:

During preoperational testing, these Anchor Darling supplied downcomer feedwater isolation valves failed to close fast enough due to the misdesign of the actuators (Refer to DER 84-66). The modified actuators are being reinstalled under design change package 1SM-AF-500. Due to the testing and documentation time involved, it is not expected that the operability assurance program for these valves will be complete prior to issuance of the operating license.

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION:

The safety function of these valves is to isolate feedwater from the steam generators in the event of a steam line break. Testing will be complete prior to Post Core Hot Functional testing. Accordingly, there will be no adverse safety consequences in granting a schedular exemption to January 15, 1985.

PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER:		DESCRIPTION:	PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION OF OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM:
13-NM-001		Containment sump return check valves	April 15, 1985

TAG NUMBER:	ENVI. DESIG.*	SAFETY FUNCTION
P-SIA-V205	III	Opens when in recirculation mode
P-SIB-V206	III	Same as above

HISTORY:

The containment sump check valves have not successfully passed required operability testing.

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION:

The function of the containment sump check valves is to open during the recirculation mode. These valves will be tested prior to Unit 1 initial criticality. These valves are not required to perform their safety function prior to initial criticality.

PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER:		DESCRIPTION:	PROJECTED DATE OF COMPLETION OF OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM:
13-JM-705		Excess Flow Check valves	April 15, 1985

TAG NUMBER:	ENVI. DESIG.*	SAFETY FUNCTION
J-ECA-XCV-15A	IV	Close on rupture of downstream piping
J-ECA-XCV-15B	IV	Same as above
J-ECB-XCV-16A	IV	Same as above
J-ECB-XCV-16B	IV	Same as above
J-EWA-XCV-89A	III	Same as above
J-EWA-XCV-89B	III	Same as above
J-EWB-XCV-90A	III	Same as above
J-EWB-XCV-90B	III	Same as above

HISTORY:

The excess flow check valves have not succesfully passed required operability testing.

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION:

The excess flow check valves will be tested prior to Unit 1 initial criticality. The excess flow check valves are not required to perform their safety function prior to initial criticality since no decay heat is present.

NOTE: *Environmental Designations (FSAR Section 3.11)

I - Components Inside Containment - The temperature, pressure, humidity, and chemical environment inside containment after a LOCA or MSLB.

II - Components inside containment which are required after a design basis LOCA.

III - Components Outside Containment - The expected temperature and humidity environmental conditions specified in appendix 3E of the PVNGS FSAR.

IV - Components outside containment that are required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis LOCA.