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G. CARL ANDOGNINI
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

RENOVIRAC

December 9, 1983
NOLD 83-348

Mr. John B. Martin
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1450 Marie Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek Plaza
Walnut Creek, CA. 94596

TE HQ FILE COPY

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Units 1, 2, and 3
Emergency Planning Notification Alert Network
Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530
File: 83-002-493

Dear Mr. Martin:

Attached is a summary of the operations of the Notification Alert Network (NAN) telephone during our May 11, 1983 exercise. Based on our records there were two periods of time when the NAN phone was not operational. Subsequent tests of the NAN system have all been positive. The routine monthly testing of the NAN system will begin in January 1984.

The attached summary responds to a request by Mr. Ross Scarano of your staff made during the NRC Open Forum held in Phoenix on November 9, 1983.

I hope this information clarifies the NAN outages during our 1983 exercise. This information will be made available for the media and John Stigner.

Sincerely,

G. Carl Andognini
G. Carl Andognini

GCA/SRF/GEC/mb

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - PVNGS
NRC Project Manager - PVNGS
Mr. Ross Scarano - NRC Region V

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EP2-1

PVNGS Emergency Preparedness
May 11, 1983 Exercise
Notification Alert Network (NAN)

APS Objective - May 11, 1983 Exercise

4.1.3: Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize emergency response personnel.

Post Drill Critique

APS: Objective Met - 05/12/83

Note: "Done well despite the fact that the NAN did not work initially."

NRC: Need Improvements - 05/12/83

Note: APS identified NAN problem.

FEMA: Evaluation Findings - 05/13/83

B. Specific Findings (Page II-3)

3. Field Operational Units

Communications

a) Finding: Communications essentially worked well throughout the system. The system, notwithstanding a few minor problems. The NAN circuit was inoperative from 5:00 AM to 8:10 AM. There was no delay in notifying offsite agencies of the Unusual Event and Site Area Emergency. Alternate means of communications were used.

NAN failure indicated at post Exercise critique meeting of APS, State and County 05/12/83 and public meeting with APS, County, State, FEMA and NRC 05/13/83.

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NAN Failure Sequence of Events

- 0525 - Control Room declared "Unusual Event".
- 0527 - STSC (Simulator) began call out on notification checklist.
- 0528 - STSC (Simulator) NAN not functioning and began call out on alternate communications backup.
- 0615 STSC (Simulator) made "Alert" notification using backup communications.
- 0713 STSC (Simulator) relieved of offsite communications by Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
- 0725 EOF initial call to offsite agencies on Voice Circuit #4 as per procedure.
- 0725 Communications technician checked NAN circuits - found to be in working order.
- 0730 Temporary cooling water to air conditioning units to Control Room Unit 1 developed a leak, water on floor of Control Room, pump shut off.
- 0755 EOF used NAN to inform offsite agencies that a "Site Area Emergency" had been declared.
- 0909 NAN failure - NAN phone in EOF rang, but no one on line. Communications Technician isolated NAN problem to Unit 1, STSC. Disconnected cord to Unit 1, STSC NAN and reconnected NAN circuit.

Simulating scenario play could not leave EOF to investigate Unit 1, STSC NAN. After Exercise determined NAN phone in Unit 1 STSC had been placed on the floor of the STSC due to construction (wall torn out) and chiller water flooding had shorted out phone instrument.
- 0933 EOF informed offsite agencies of declaration of "General Emergency" via NAN.
- 1155 EOF informed offsite agencies of downgrading to "Site Area Emergency" via NAN.
- 1245 EOF informed offsite agencies of Exercise termination via NAN.

SUMMARY: During the May 11, 1983, exercise observers noted two periods when the NAN communication line appeared inoperable. The first at 0527 when the STSC communicator attempted to notify offsite authorities of an unusual event. The second failure was noted at approximately 0910. The latter was due to an "electrical short" caused by a cooling water leak in Control Room Unit #1. Corrective action was promptly initiated and the NAN made operational. The cause of the earlier failure (0527) is undetermined. However, one hypothesis is that the STSC communicator only assumed the NAN was nonfunctional because he did not receive a response within a few seconds of initiating his call. The communicator (following his procedures) expeditiously notified offsite authorities utilizing a back-up communication network.

At 0725 a communication technician checked the NAN and found the circuit in working order. The NAN circuit has been checked on several occasions, subsequent to the exercise, and found in good working order. In addition, the NAN back-up radio network has since been installed at all onsite and offsite locations.

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