

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RID'S)

ACCESSION NBR: 8309300016 DOC. DATE: 83/09/26 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET #
 FACIL: STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Public 05000528
 STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Public 05000529
 STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Public 05000530

AUTH. NAME	AUTHOR AFFILIATION
VAN BRUNT, E.E.	Arizona Public Service Co.
RECIP. NAME	RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
KNIGHTON, G.	Licensing Branch 3

SUBJECT: Forwards supplemental info re: Joy fan blade failure, per 830916 telcon request. Evaluation concluded that failure not safety significant. Fans outside containment separated by concrete from redundant safety shutdown components.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B001S COPIES RECEIVED: LTR / ENCL / SIZE: 3
 TITLE: Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FSAR Amdts & Related Correspondence

NOTES: Standardized plant.	05000528
Standardized plant.	05000529
Standardized plant..	05000530

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
NRR/DL/ADL	1 0	NRR/LB3 BC	1 0
NRR LB3 LA	1 0	LICITRA, E. 01	1 1
 INTERNAL:		 IE FILE:	
ELD/HDS3	1 0	IE/DEPER/IRB 35	1 1
IE/DEPER/EPB 36	3 3	IE/DEPER/AEAB	1 0
IE/DEQA/QAB 21	1 1	NRR/DE/EHEB	1 1
NRR/DE/CEB 11	1 1	NRR/DE/GB 28	2 2
NRR/DE/EQB 13	2 2	NRR/DE/MTEB 17	1 1
NRR/DE/MEB 18	1 1	NRR/DE/SGEB 25	1 1
NRR/DE/SAB 24	1 1	NRR/DHFS/LQB 32	1 1
NRR/DHFS/HFEB40	1 1	NRR/DL/SSPB	1 0
NRR/DHFS/PSRB	1 1	NRR/DSI/ASB	1 1
NRR/DSI/AEB 26	1 1	NRR/DSI/CSB 09	1 1
NRR/DSI/CPB 10	1 1	NRR/DSI/METB 12	1 1
NRR/DSI/ICSB 16	1 1	NRR/DSI/RAB 22	1 1
NRR/DSI/PSB 19	1 1	REG FILE 04	1 1
NRR/DSI/RSB 23	1 1	RM/DDAMI/MIB	1 0
RGNS	3 3		
 EXTERNAL:		 BNL (AMDTS ONLY)	
ACRS 41	6 6	FEMA-REP DIV 39	1 1
DMB/DSS (AMDTS)	1 1	NRC PDR 02	1 1
LPDR 03	1 1	NTIS	1 1
NSIC 05	1 1		

Arizona Public Service Company

P.O. BOX 21666 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85036

September 26, 1983
ANPP-27890 - ACR/WFQ

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. George Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos. STN-50-528/529/530
File: 83-056-026; G.1.01.10

Reference: Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. (APS), to
G. W. Knighton, (NRC), dated September 1, 1983
(ANPP-27700 - WFQ/MAJ), Subject: Joy Fan Blade Failure.

Dear Mr. Knighton:

The referenced letter provided information in response to the NRC staff's concerns regarding a fan blade failure. We were requested during a telephone conversation with the NRC (September 16, 1983) to supplement our response.

Attached is the supplemental information requested.

Please contact me if you have any further questions.

Very truly yours,




E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President,
Nuclear Projects
ANPP Project Director

EEVBjr/WFQ/sp
Attachment

cc: E. A. Licitra (w/a)
A. C. Gehr "

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
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S PDR




September 26, 1983
ANPP-27890 - ACR/WFQ

STATE OF ARIZONA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I, Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr., represent that I am Vice President, Nuclear Projects of Arizona Public Service Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.



Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this 26th day of September 1983.


Dora E. Meador
Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

My Commission Expires April 6, 1987



ATTACHMENT

To adequately demonstrate that this missile and other similar Joy Fan Blade missiles could not adversely affect the capability to shutdown, an analysis similar to that described in FSAR Section 3.6.1.2 was performed. First, a new Zone Of Influence (ZOI) of missile hazards was postulated since the actual missile failure was different from the mechanistic failure that was used in prior separation reviews. The ZOI extended in all directions until the missile impacted a structure of sufficient mass to prevent missile penetration. Next the equipment location drawings and electrical raceway drawings were reviewed for safety-related structures, systems or components within the new ZOI of the fan blade missiles. There were no redundant safe shutdown components located within the ZOI. Thus, even for the extreme assumption that every component within the ZOI was disabled, there would still be a fully operable safe shutdown train. This meets the guidance and criteria of USNRC standard review plan 3.5.1.2.

Outside containment, all Joy fans are separated by concrete from redundant safe shutdown components.

Therefore, the evaluation concluded that the fan blade failure identified in the subject DER was not safety significant.

