

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8105050559      DOC. DATE: 81/04/28      NOTARIZED: NO      DOCKET #  
 FACIL: STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi      05000528  
 AUTH. NAME:      AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 MILLS, L. M.      Tennessee Valley Authority  
 RECIP. NAME:      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 O'REILLY, J. P.      Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: Revised final deficiency report re unconservative loads on pipe support design mods, initially reported on 801217. Drawings w/load discrepancies are being evaluated on case-by-case basis to determine if redesign is necessary.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B019S      COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 2  
 TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (10CFR50.55E)

NOTES: Standardized Plant, 1 cy: C Grimes      05000528


ACTION:	RECIPIENT		COPIES		RECIPIENT		COPIES	
	ID CODE/NAME		LTTR	ENCL	ID CODE/NAME		LTTR	ENCL
ACTION:	A/D LICENSNG 04		1	1	LIC BR #3 BC 05		1	1
	LIC BR #3 LA 06		1	1	KERRIGAN, J. 07		1	1
INTERNAL:	ASLBP/J. HARD		1	1	D/DIR HUM FAC15		1	1
	EDO & STAFF 19		1	1	EQUIP QUAL BR11		1	1
	HYD/GEO BR 22		1	1	I&E 09		1	1
	IE/EES		1	1	LIC QUAL BR 12		1	1
	MPA 20		1	1	NRC PDR 02		1	1
	OELD 21		1	1	PROC/TST REV 13		1	1
	QA BR 14		1	1	<u>REG FILE</u> 01		1	1
	RUTHERFORD, W. IE		1	1	STANDARDS DEV 21		1	1
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 16		16	16	LPDR 03		1	1
	NSIC 08		1	1				

MAY 06 1981

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTR

39  
~~38~~ ENCL ~~38~~

JF



TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 28, 1981



SQRD-50-328/81-08

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - UNCONSERVATIVE LOADS ON PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN  
MODIFICATIONS - SQRD-50-328/81-08 - REVISED FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on December 17, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SON CEB 8039. This was followed by our interim reports dated January 19 and March 2, 1981. A final report was submitted April 1, 1981. Enclosed is our revised final report. We inadvertently deleted the last line of the corrective action from our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) ✓  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

B019  
S  
1/1

8105050559  
S



100

[The body of the document contains several paragraphs of text that are extremely faint and illegible due to the quality of the scan. The text appears to be organized into multiple sections, possibly separated by headings or sub-sections, but the specific content cannot be discerned.]

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
UNCONSERVATIVE LOADS ON PIPE SUPPORT DESIGN MODIFICATIONS  
SQRD-50-328/81-08  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
REVISED FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Piping system analyses and support design for class 1, 2, and 3 systems inside containment were contracted out to EDS Nuclear, Incorporated. EDS tabulated design loads for the pipe supports on support drawings. EDS had design and revision responsibility for all piping reanalysis results which could have an impact on existing support designs. Load increases that resulted from piping reanalyses but did not require design modifications were not revised on the support drawings. Design control responsibility for all support drawings was subsequently turned over to TVA, and subsequent design modifications by TVA were based on the design loads tabulated on the drawings. Therefore, some design modifications by TVA may be based on unconservative loads. At the time of EDS's contract, TVA did not recognize that these load increases could have an adverse impact on subsequent support designs and therefore did not require that EDS tabulate these loads on the affected support drawings.

Safety Implications

Piping supports being based on unconservative design loads could fail during a seismic event. Failure of the supports could lead to pipe break and subsequent reduced coolant to the core which could adversely affect the safety of the plant.

Corrective Action

TVA is comparing the load values shown on the individual pipe support drawings to the corresponding loading on the revised EDS load tables. Drawings which have load discrepancies are being evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if supports are adequate as designed or if redesign is necessary. The complete evaluation and rework of supports, if required, will be completed, if possible, for Sequoyah before fuel loading. Any required rework not accomplished by fuel loading will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

11/11/11