

indicated that PER 293-489 was the only known instance in which a service air check valve had been removed without the proper authorization since the violation. Based on observations in the plant, the inspectors determined the unauthorized removal of service air check valve SA-V-102/7 was an isolated event. This matter will be reviewed again during a future inspection to ensure that all the licensee's corrective actions to violation 50-397/92-41-05 have been implemented.

- b. Item 50-397/93-07-01 (Open): As a part of WNP-2's corrective actions to a previous violation (discussed in inspection report 50-397/92-35), WNP-2 stated that "a program will be established to control the movement and use of hoses in the plant [which will] include the use of hoses for temporary routing of fluids." This hose control program (established by PPM 1.3.19, Section 4.2.11(a), "Rubber/Tygon Hose Tagging") was implemented to correct the licensee's failure to control the release of low-levels of radioactive fluids via the Turbine Building sumps to the onsite storm drain pond. The date established for full compliance with this hose control program was February 1, 1993.

Violation 50-397/93-07-01 identified four instances in which the licensee did not comply with PPM 1.3.19, Section 4.2.11(a), "Rubber/Tygon Hose Tagging." Two of the instances involved hoses which were used to route potentially radioactive fluids to sumps in the Turbine Building.

In response to violation 50-397/93-07-01, the licensee stated line management had initiated frequent plant walkdowns to ensure compliance with PPM 1.3.19, and that PPM 1.3.19 would be revised by June 1, 1993, to incorporate recommended clarifications and improvements identified. The date for full compliance was stated as August 1, 1993.

Subsequent to violation 50-397/93-07-01 during a tour of the Reactor Building on March 22, 1993, the resident NRC inspectors identified eleven instances in which WNP-2 failed to comply with PPM 1.3.19.

As a result of a conference call held with a member of the licensee's staff on May 14, 1993; the inspectors decided to followup on this item despite the fact that full compliance in response to violation 50-397/93-07-01 was not to be completed until August 1, 1993. The inspectors were informed during the conference call that WNP-2's hose control program was a high priority issue and that much progress had been made in the implementation of this program. However, during a tour of the Turbine Building, the inspectors observed that only one of eleven hoses identified as being used to temporarily reroute fluids to sumps was tagged according to PPM 1.3.19. The inspectors also identified an untagged hose on the east side of the 501' Reactor Building.

the Radiation Protection Manager and the Health Physics Operations Supervisor were both notified of this procedural violation.

The inspectors concluded that the observations and findings noted in the NSA activities records and the daily observation checklists were effective at identifying and correcting licensee problems. These records and observations provided the reviewers with an indication of workers' day-to-day performance during the outage, provided near real-time feedback to WNP-2 management, and allowed immediate implementation of corrective actions.

The inspectors were informed that QA was in the process of developing a monitoring program, which will formalize the method in which daily observations and records are recorded and provided to the appropriate levels of management. The inspectors concluded that this program should provide the licensee's management with a better awareness of WNP-2's strengths and weaknesses.

b. External Exposure Control

(1) Practices and Procedures

(i) Observations of Work in Progress

The inspectors observed several jobs being performed in a radiologically controlled area for conformance to WNP-2's procedures and Radiation Work Permit requirements during the inspection. The inspectors also observed two shift change-overs at the turbine building health physics control point on the 501' elevation to determine whether workers were properly dressing-out of contamination areas and frisking themselves prior to exiting contaminated areas. The inspectors had no concerns in either of these two matters.

(ii) Records Review

The inspectors reviewed a random sample of dose records for individuals working at WNP-2, three of which had had their quarterly dose limits extended beyond WNP-2's administrative limit of 1000 mrem. All records reviewed complied with NRC requirements and WNP-2 procedures. The inspectors had no concern in this matter.

(iii) Contamination Area Work Practices

During tours, the inspectors noted that workers were leaving their plastic face shields and safety glasses lying on the floor or horizontal surfaces in areas posted as contaminated areas at the end of each shift.

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(YES) / NO	(YES) / NO	(YES) / NO

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(YES) / NO

