



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

AUG 16 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. E. Dyer, Director, Division of Reactor Projects  
FROM: H. J. Wong, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch E *H. J. Wong*  
SUBJECT: WNP-2 OVERSIGHT PANEL MEETING MINUTES - July 26, 1996

The WNP-2 Oversight Panel convened by conference call on July 26, 1996. The topics included the following:

- H. Wong summarized the preliminary information regarding the early criticality event - the Oversight Panel's concern was the apparent failure of several barriers to prevent this event and the failure of on-shift personnel to raise this matter to higher management.
- H. Wong summarized the preliminary information regarding the change in reactivity by a GE engineer during adjustable speed drive (ASD) testing - the Panel's concern was the apparent lack of reactivity oversight by licensed personnel and operations management.
- R. Barr discussed several recent examples in which required surveillance tests were not performed, in some cases prior to mode changes. It appears that these examples may be indicative of programmatic control problems in surveillance testing. It was noted that this was a area of previous concern about 1 1/2 years ago and reviewed in the W. Johnson team inspection in early 1995. R. Barr discussed that one of the examples was NRC identified and involved a misinterpretation of an NRC generic letter.
- R. Barr discussed the licensee's response to the early criticality event and reactivity change by a GE engineer. The licensee's initial IRB on the early criticality event was viewed to be narrowly focused and the licensee's self-assessment validation team pointed out some shortcomings in the effectiveness of corrective actions. As a result, the licensee initiated two teams to perform a review of reactivity management and a review of the testing procedures to provide additional confidence in further ASD and digital feedwater modification testing. The Panel's concern was the apparent need for Supply System management to require outside assistance to recognize when corrective actions were not effective.
- The Oversight Panel discussed the planned special inspection efforts to review the early criticality and reactivity change event. That inspection effort would be performed by a DRS and DRP inspector. The inspection would begin the week of 7/29. The surveillance testing problems was considered sufficiently distinct from the reactivity issues that it was concluded that the resident

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inspectors could continue the review of the surveillance testing issues.

- A summary of the Engineering and Technical Support team inspection was provided. The findings indicated general improvement in engineering, but some instances of weak corrective actions and a lack of thoroughness in 50.59 evaluations.
- The Oversight Panel discussed the desire to have Supply System management provide a summary of the self-assessment in the next Oversight Panel meeting (in Arlington). The difficulties in establishing an August meeting date with the licensee were discussed.

[H. Wong to coordinate the date and location for the next Oversight Panel meeting.]

cc:

J. Callan

S. Collins

Oversight Panel Members -

J. Dyer

K. Perkins

K. Brockman

W. Bateman

T. Colburn

H. Wong

R. Barr

B. Henderson

M. Hammond

C. Hackney

D. Kunihiro