ACCELERATED **D**19 RIBUTION DEMONSTR ΠON REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

Ø	ACCESSION NBR:88 FACIL:50-397 WP		DOC.DATE: 88/0 Project, Unit			DOCKET # 05000397
	AUTH.NAME	AUTHOR AFI	FILIATION	-		
	ARBUCKLE, J.D.	Washington	Public Power	Supply Syste	m	
	POWERS, C.M.	Washington	Public Power	Supply Syste	m	2
	RECIP.NAME	RECIPIENT	AFFILIATION			

SUBJECT: LER 88-014-00:on 880512,voluntary rept of RWCU sys resin tank spill due to RWCU valves being open.

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9 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / ENCL / SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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NRC Form 306A	······································	U.S. NUCLEAR REC	SULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPO	RT (LER) TEXT CONTINU	UATION APPROVED O EXPIRES: 8/31	MB NO. 3150-0104 /88
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
•		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION	
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 15 10 10 10 3 9 7	7 8 8 - 0 1 4 - 0 0	0 2 0F 0 8
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)		r	
Plant Conditions			
a) Power Level - 0% b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)			

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Event Description

On May 12, 1988 at approximately 1700 hours, a Plant Radwaste Control Room Operator (RWO) discovered that a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System resin spill had occurred during recirculation of RWCU Phase Separator Tank RWCU-TK-104B. The tank was being recirculated in preparation for transfer of resin slurry to a shipping container.

At 1445 hours, the RWO began the recirculation of RWCU-TK-104B in accordance with Plant Procedure (PPM) 2.11.1, "Solid Waste Processing System." Tank level reading was noted by the RWO to be 50%. The RWO then proceeded to perform his normal duties and at 1615 hours, while taking log readings, he noted that the tank level was 34%. Immediate investigation of the level change was not performed because the RWO thought (erroneously) the change was due to a defective level gauge. (The RWO had remembered a recent level gauge problem on an equipment drain tank and thought this situation was similar.) He also did not investigate any further due to the many activities in progress in the Radwaste Control Room at this time. However, not investigating the level change was contrary to a caution statement in PPM 2.11.1 which directs the operator to monitor tank level and, if it drops, isolate the tank immediately because resin sludge is likely leaking out.

At 1645 hours, the RWO checked tank level again and noted it was still decreasing. The RWO then proceeded to the RWCU-TK-104B location (Radwaste Building - Elevation 437') and discovered resin being discharged down a scupper into a Floor Drain (FDR-SUMP-W2). He also noted that approximately two cubic feet of resin slurry had splashed onto the floor around the drain. The RWO immediately left the area, returned to the Radwaste Control Room and, at 1715 hours, secured the recirculation pump (RWCU-P-28) and closed the RWCU-TK-104B suction and discharge valves. He then informed the Shift Support Supervisor (SSS) of the situation, who in turn notified the Shift Manager and Health Phyics personnel. At 1725 hours, the SSS, RWO and Health Physics personnel arrived at the area of the spill. Health Physics personnel immediately monitored the area and found that their readings indicated 2-3 R/hr at one inch, with no airborne activity present. The area was posted "NO ENTRY" by Health Physics personnel at 1735 hours.

At this time the Shift Manager, SSS and RWO went to the Radwaste Control Room to review System Flow Diagrams in an attempt to identify the drain path. After reviewing the flow diagrams, they suspected that the drain path was through a sample line on the RWCU-P-28 discharge. Although the flow diagrams showed a shut-off switch for Sample Line Isolation Valve RWCU-V-442, the location of the switch was not identified. (However, the location of valve position indication for Sample Line Isolation Valve RWCU-V-443 was identified in PPM 2.11.1). Unable to locate the switches, the SSS contacted an off-duty SSS who informed him that they were in the "A" Concentrator Room (Radwaste Building - Elevation 467').

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A (9-83) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 DOCKET NUMBER (2) FACILITY NAME (1) PAGE (3) LER NUMBER (6) YEAR SEQUENTIAL WEREVISION 0,01 Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 88 0, 1, 4 Q 3 0F 018 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 9 7 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17) At 1750 hours, the SSS found the control switches for RWCU-V-442/443 and noted they

At 1750 nours, the SSS found the control switches for RWCD-V-442/443 and noted they were both in the open position, but the indicating lights were not functional (subsequent investigation revealed that the red [open] lights had been removed and the green [closed] lights were burned out). The SSS then placed the control switches for both valves in the "close" position, and heard the air actuation (both valves are air-operated and are in series).

The SSS dispatched the RWO to the area of the spill and, at 1800 hours, the RWO confirmed that drainage had stopped. It was also noted at that time that RWCU-TK-104B level was 26%.

At 1820 hours, the Shift Manager returned to the Control Room and was informed that an Area Radiation Monitor (ARM-29: Radwaste Building - Elevation 437') had alarmed and was fluctuating between 80 and 100 MR/hr. Being aware of the spill, the Shift Manager contacted Health Physics personnel for information on radiation levels. He was informed that readings at the scene were 2-3 R/hr at 18 inches; however, actual readings logged on the survey map indicated readings of 2-3 R/hr at one inch.

Proceeding with followup management notifications, the Shift Manager contacted the Assistant Operations Manager and the Plant Manager to brief them on the incident. Upon the recommendation of the Plant Manager, an "Unusual Event" was declared at 1903 hours. The Shift Manager, utilizing the CRASH Network, notified the State, County, Department of Energy, and the Supply System Security Communications Center. In addition, PA announcements were made and the NRC was notified by means of the ENS Line.

At 2025 hours, Health Physics personnel had completed clean up of the immediate area and contained the resin in Floor Drain Sump FDR-SUMP-W2. At this time, the Shift Manager terminated the "Unusual Event" classification.

This LER is submitted as a Voluntary Report.

Immediate Corrective Action

Recirculation pump RWCU-P-28 was secured, Sample Line Isolation Valves RWCU-V-442/443 were closed, the area of the spill was cleaned up, the resin was contained in FDR-SUMP-W2, and the "Unusual Event" classification terminated.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

A. Futher Evaluation

- 1. The immediate cause of this event was valves RWCU-V-442 and RWCU-V-443 being open. The root cause for the valves being open is indeterminate. As shown in Figure 1, this configuration created the following unknown leakage paths:
 - o RWCU-V-442 and RWCU-V-443 Open (Resin Leakage Path)

NRC Form 366A (9-83)		LICENSEE EVENT REP	ORT (LER) TEXT CONTIN	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO NUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88
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Washing	ton	Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9	
		d, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)	- احمد المسلم ماليس المسلم المسلم	
-		pumped through the RWCU-TK-104B level c inadvertently drained	valves to the dr hanges, it is est from the tank. Th ubic feet. The bul	RWCU-P-28, RWCU resin slurry was rain system. As a result of timated that 1,000 gallons was his equates to a resin loss of Ik of the resin was contained in
	0	RWCU-V-442 Open (Conde	ensate Leakage Path)	
			o the drain. It	OND-V-325, down a 1/2" pipe and is estimated that the leakage
2.	RWC ope bec tim act was FDR	U-V-442 and 443 had be ned by means of the co ause an abrupt increa he. At least two attem ual source into the sur identified as an Equ	een opened. It was ntrol switches arour se in FDR-SUMP-W2 n pts were made to id np (a scupper drain ipment Drain (EDR) o -442 and 443 on May	tempt to determine when valves discerned that the valves were nd 1200 hours on April 28, 1988, run time also occurred at that dentify the leakage; however, the port) was not checked because it on Plant drawings instead of an y 12, 1988, FDR-SUMP-W2 run time
3.	con no	ducted to determine the	e circumstances surr	lant Security investigation was rounding the incident. There was ne opening of RWCU-V-442 and 443
4.	was RWC	noted that RWCU-V-442	is not listed on t Intioned in Section	ing System," was performed and it the valve checklist, and neither B," Reactor Water Cleanup Phase
5.		locations and setpoi 11 area were reviewed a		adiation Monitors (ARMS) in the
	0	ARM-28 is located app spill area. The setpo	roximately 90 feet for the formately set of the for	from the geometric center of the 50 mR/hr.
p L	0	spill area. The setp changed from 75 mR/hu alarm conditions due associated with the R approximately 12 fee masking other alarms Radwaste Area Radiatio	ooint for this ARM f r on February 29, 1 to increased backgro WCU recirculate and t from the detecto coming in on Main on Monitors. There the monitor would	from the geometric center of the is 100 mR/hr. The setpoint was 1988 to reduce the frequency of ound radiation levels (75 mR/hr) d transfer line which is located or. The alarm conditions were Control Room annunciators from was not a problem by increasing continue to alert personnel to

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NRC Form 366 A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU		DULATORY COMMISSION IMB NO. 3150-0104 /86
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Washing	ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	88-014-00	Q 5 OF 018
TEXT (If more space	ie required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)			
	Area Radiation Monitor recor to determine if ARM-28 ha because, although the scale Green Scale = all others), result, it was impossible ARM-28 alarmed. However, it due to the distance of the m	ad also alarmed. s are color-coded all recorder per to differentiate is unlikely that	The review was ur (Red Scale = ARM-1, is contained black i the recordings and ARM-28 alarmed during	nsuccessful 3 and 3A: nk. As a verify if the event
6.	The area of the spill has Radiation Area by use of a excess of IR/hr). Prior t notified and the proper dos immediately upon discovering required dosimetry, and did light in relation to anticipa	yellow flashing o entry into this imetry obtained. the spill, he had not understand the	light (identifies ex area, Health Physic Although the RWO lef d entered the area w meaning of the yellc	posures in cs must be t the area vithout the
7.	A review of PPMS 11.2.7.1, Egress from High Radiation proper posting requirement Specifications. For areas exists for the purpose of la constructed around the indi- areas be barricaded, posted device. This direction is Specifications.	Areas", was perfor s and consistenc greater than 1,0 ocking, and where ividual areas, PPM ed and flashing	med to determine ade y with the Plant 00 mR/hr, where no no enclosure can be 1 ll.2.7.3 requires light activated as	quacy with Technical enclosure reasonably that such a warning
	For areas greater than 1,00 either be locked or, if no areas shall be barricaded, p device. Although the wordi Technical Specifications, th such areas where possible.	enclosure exists f osted and a flashing is not entirely	or the purpose of lo ng light activated as y consistent with th	cking, the a warning nat of the
	As a result, either the shie have been closed and locked, that location.	ld doors at the en or an enclosure s	trance to the spill a should have been cons	rea should tructed at
B. Fur	ther Corrective Action			
1.	RWCU-V-442 and 443 were tagge	ed shut and de-ener	gized.	
2.	PPM 2.11.1 was deviated to required condition for bot "closed."			
3.	The RWO involved in this even the status of operational believing Plant instrumentat	tasks, includin	g procedural compl	monitoring iance and

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NRC Form 366 A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	T (LER) TEXT CONTINU		GULATORY COMMISSION OMB NO, 3150-0104 11/89
FACILITY NAME (1		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
•		1	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER	
	ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 15 10 10 10 3 9 7	8 8_0 1 4_0 0	0 60F0 8
TEXT (If more space i	is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)	· · ·		<u> </u> •
<i>,</i> 4 .	The Shift Support Supervison needs in the Radwaste Control	or's sensitivity w l Room during heavy	as increased to the work periods.	e manpower
5.	A review of the Radwaste identifying any similar val and 443.			
6.	The Plant drawing (M607, S scupper drain port as an EDR	Sheet 3) which ir source will be rev	ncorrectly identified	d the FDR
7.	The Area Radiation Monitor r design configuration (red a performed to determine if th to better differentiate betwe	and green). In add he current design o	ldition, an evaluatio of the recorder can	on will be
8.	The shield doors at the entra	ance to the spill a	rea were closed and l	locked.
9.	A Plant Quality Assurance so the level of knowledge of Pl results of the survey indica have a clear understanding of Areas and ARMS. Accordingly personnel to enhance underst with respect to proper dosim areas during normal and abnor	lant personnel rega ated that many of of "High" Radiatior y, additional train tanding of "High" an metry and actions re	arding radiation barr the survey population n Areas, "High-High" ning will be provided and "High-High" Radia required prior to ent	riers. The on did not Radiation d to Plant ation Areas
10.	Plant procedure 11.2.7.1 is consistent with the wordir PPM 11.2.7.3.	; in the process ng in the Plant	of being revised t Technical Specifica	o make it ations and
<u>Simliar</u>	Events			
None				
<u>Safety</u> S	Significance			
There is public. follows:		iated with this ev either were, or c	ent in relation to t could have been, in	he general npacted as
that (300	nough the RWO immediately lef t he could have exceeded the S D mrem) by not recognizing th ation to anticipated exposure	Supply System daily he significance of	y administrative expo	sure limit
co11	decontamination crew (consis lective dose equivalent of O. Dived received 70 mrem during	195 man-rem during	recovery operations.	

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NRC FORM 346A (9-83)

NRC Form 344A			NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEÉ EVENT REPORT (LENI IEXT CONTINU	JATION	APPROVED OMB NO, 3150-0104 EXPIRES; 8/31/88
FACILITY NAME (1)	CKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL	
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0	15 0 0 0 3 9 7	88-014	
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)	<u></u>	<u> </u>	
The spilled resin slurry was contained low traffic area and is protected by the shield doors at the entrance to the	the use of radio	logical postin	gs. In addition,
It should also be noted that the spil entire resin tank could not have resul	l area configura ted in a release	tion is such of radioactive	that emptying the e material.
EIIS Information		. •	
Text Reference	EIIS	Reference	
	System	Component	
Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System RWCU-TK-104B FDR-SUMP-W2 RWCU-P-28 RWCU-V-442/443 ARM-28/29 COND-V-325	CE CE CE CE IL SD	TK DRN P ISV 45 V	
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
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

June 28, 1988

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 88-014

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 88-014 for the WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,

C.M./ Powers (M/D 927M) WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:1g

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 88-014

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A) INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399) .

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