

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 55 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-397

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated June 1, 1987, Washington Public Power Supply System (the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specification for Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 for the WNP-2 Plant. The amendment would delete the channel check (once per shift) requirements for the reactor water level 2 instruments to initiate the containment isolation function. This change recognizes that the new instruments installed at the plant for this isolation function do not have indication in the control room to support once per shift channel check capability, but still satisfy the design bases function.


2.0 EVALUATION

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The licensee stated that prior to November 30, 1985 and in order to satisfy the license condition 2.C.(28) (Equipment Qualification), four level indicating trip switches that provide the Reactor Water Level 2 containment isolation function were replaced with Class 1E qualified instruments. The instruments identification numbers are MS-LITS-26A through D. The new qualified level switch (static "0" ring differential pressure switch) does not have indication in the control room. However, the post-accident monitoring instrumentation sensors (Rosemount transmitters), which share the common reference leg with the level switches, have indicators in the control room. The post accident monitoring instruments are required to have a channel check performed once per shift in accordance with the Technical Specification Table 4.3.7.5-1. The level switches and the Rosemount transmitters are required to have a channel function test performed once a month. The licensee has established an acceptable correlation between the level switches and the transmitters.

The post-accident monitoring reactor level instruments have two ranges wide range and fuel range. The wide range water level is sensed by two divisionally separated differential pressure (dp) transmitters. The signals are displayed in the control room on two recorders. The fuel range water level is sensed by two separate dp transmitters which overlap the wide range to provide water level in the actual core region. The fuel range water level is displayed in the control room on a recorder and an indicator. The primary containment isolation valves position indications are displayed by a transient data acquisition system, and are



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also displayed at valve controls in the control room. The primary containment and reactor vessel isolation system variable and trip logic status are annunciated when isolation occurs.

The reactor water level 3, which initiates the reactor scram and also actuates the primary containment isolation, is detected by two separate transmitters. The level 3 instruments are required by the Technical Specification to have a channel check performed once per shift and a channel functional test performed once per month.

Based on the information provided by the licensee and our ensuing review, the staff finds that there is sufficient information available to the operator with respect to the reactor vessel water level to actuate the containment isolation and the reactor water cleanup system isolation. The licensee's request to delete the channel check requirements for the reactor vessel level 2 actuation in the Technical Specification Table 4.3.2.1-1 is, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation and use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offisite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Part 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and has consulted with the State of Washington. No public comments were received, and the State of Washington did not have any comment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Hulbert Li, NRR

Dated: April 13, 1988

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