

REGULATOR INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706120233      DOC. DATE: 87/06/05      NOTARIZED: NO      DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe      05000397  
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 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-009-00: on 870506, control room emergency filtration sys automatically initiated due to failure to reset trip logic. Caused by oversight during procedure rev & review process. Procedures will be revised. W/870605 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D      COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1      SIZE: 4  
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

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	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/BMAS/ILRB	1 1
	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1	<del>REG FILE</del> 02	1 1
	RES DEPY GI	1 1	RCN5 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 1 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 3
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TITLE (4)  
Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation Due to Incorrect Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES																
0	5	0	6	8	7	8	7	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	6	0	5	8	7	0	5	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0	20.402(b)			20.408(e)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.408(a)(1)(i)			80.38(a)(1)			80.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(e)		
	20.408(a)(1)(ii)			80.38(a)(2)			80.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)		
	20.408(a)(1)(iii)			80.73(a)(2)(i)			80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
	20.408(a)(1)(iv)			80.73(a)(2)(ii)			80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
	20.408(a)(1)(v)			80.73(a)(2)(iii)			80.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)									
NAME J.D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer							TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 1 1 5		

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)														
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 6, 1987 at 0625 hours, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System automatically initiated. The initiation was the result of a failure to reset the trip logic prior to the performance of a Reactor Vessel Low Level surveillance procedure. During the last outage, Divisions 1 and 2 Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-1 and RC-2) trip circuitry was modified and annunciators installed to alert Operations of a half-trip condition in these panels. With the exception of the Engineered Safety Function (ESF) for Control Room Ventilation, the modification provided indication that all half-trip logic was reset when the half-trip annunciator cleared.

The cause of the event is an oversight during the procedure revision and review process. When procedures were revised to incorporate the modification made to RC-1 and RC-2, the steps in the procedures which verified logic reset status were removed based on the assumption that all trip conditions were reset once the annunciator cleared. However, personnel involved in the process failed to recognize that the ESF for Control Room Ventilation does not reset even though the annunciator clears.

There is no safety significance associated with this event as there was no actual initiating condition and all equipment operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation condition.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0500039787	87	09	00	2	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%
- b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event Description

On May 6, 1987 at 0625 hours, a Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan (WMA-FN-54B) automatically started. The automatic start was the result of a failure to reset the trip logic prior to performing Plant Procedure 7.4.3.2.1.2, "Division 1, Channel C, Isolation Activation Reactor Level 2 - CFT/CC." The procedure provides instructions for performing the channel calibration of Reactor Water Level Switch MS-LS-61C.

During the last outage, Divisions 1 and 2 Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-1 and RC-2) trip circuitry was modified and annunciators were installed in the Control Room to alert Operations of a half-trip condition in these panels. With the exception of the Engineered Safety Function (ESF) for Control Room Ventilation, the modification provided indication that all half-trip logic was reset when the half-trip annunciator cleared.

The cause of the event has been determined to be an oversight during the procedure revision and review process. When procedures were revised to incorporate the modification made to RC-1 and RC-2, the steps in the procedures which verified logic reset status were removed based on the assumption that all trip conditions were reset once the annunciator cleared. However, Plant Instrument and Control (I&C) personnel who revised and reviewed the procedure failed to recognize that the ESF for Control Room Ventilation does not reset even though the annunciator clears. To clear the trip condition for Control Room Ventilation, personnel must reset WMA Reset Pushbuttons 3AX and 3AY.

When the I&C Technicians began the Reactor Vessel Low Level procedure, they verified that the RC-1 and RC-2 half-trip annunciators were clear and proceeded to perform the procedure. However, unknown to either the Operators or I&C Technicians, there was a half-trip condition in the ESF Control Room Ventilation circuit already in existence (investigation did not reveal the exact cause of the half-trip condition). As a result, when the I&C Technicians pressurized Reactor Water Level Switch MS-LS-61C through its trip setpoint, a full trip of the WMA Start Logic occurred and, by design, WMA-FN-54B automatically started.

Immediate Corrective Action

After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System was returned to normal lineup.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Further Corrective Action

- Appropriate Plant Procedures will be revised to include a step to verify logic reset status.
- An engineering evaluation will be performed to consider installing another contact in each RC Cabinet to prevent a reset of the annunciator until the WMA Reset Pushbuttons have been reset.

Safety Significance

There is no safety significance associated with this event as there was no actual initiating condition and all equipment operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation condition.

Similar Events

LERs 85-027 and 85-036

EIIS Information

Text Reference

EIIS Reference

	System	Component
Control Room Emergency Filtration System	VH	----
MS-LS-61C	SB	LS

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

P.O. Box 968 • 3000 George Washington Way • Richland, Washington 99352

Docket No. 50-397

June 5, 1987

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 87-009

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 87-009 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,

*C.M. Powers*  
C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:lc

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 87-009

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V  
Mr. R. T. Dodds, NRC Site (M/D 901A)  
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Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI  
Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

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