



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 38  
License No. NPF-21

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the Supply System, also the licensee), dated July 10, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as follows:


(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 38, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

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3. This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Elinor G. Adensam, Director  
BWR Project Directorate No. 3  
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosure:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 27, 1987

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 38

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

DOCKET NO. 50-397


Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

xiii  
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B 3/4 4-1  
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INSERT

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B 3/4 4-1a



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## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 12 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:\*

- 2 safety/relief valves @ 1150 psig +1%/-3%
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1175 psig +1%/-3%
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1185 psig +1%/-3%
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1195 psig +1%/-3%
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1205 psig +1%/-3%

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 90°F, close the stuck open safety/relief valve(s); if unable to close the open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool average water temperature is 110°F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shut-down position.
- c. With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.2 The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 31 days, and a
- b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.\*\*

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\*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

\*\*The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.

### 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

Operation with one reactor recirculation loop inoperable has been evaluated and been found to be acceptable during the first fuel cycle only, provided the unit is operated in accordance with the single recirculation loop operation Technical Specifications herein.

An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to declare a recirculation loop inoperable, but it does, in case of a design-basis-accident, increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability of reflooding the core; thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facility with a jet pump inoperable. Jet pump failure can be detected by monitoring jet pump performance on a prescribed schedule for significant degradation.

Recirculation loop flow mismatch limits are in compliance with the ECCS LOCA analysis design criteria. The limits will ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA. Where the recirculation loop flow mismatch limits cannot be maintained during two recirculation loop operation, continued operation is permitted in the single recirculation loop operation mode.

In order to prevent undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region, the recirculation loop temperatures shall be within 50°F of each other prior to startup of an idle loop. The loop temperature must also be within 50°F of the reactor pressure vessel coolant temperature to prevent thermal shock to the recirculation pump and recirculation nozzles. Since the coolant in the bottom of the vessel is at a lower temperature than the coolant in the upper regions of the core, undue stress on the vessel would result if the temperature difference was greater than 145°F.

#### 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

The safety valve capacity is designed to limit the primary system pressure, including transients, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1971, Nuclear Power Plant components (up to and including Summer 1971 Addenda). The Code allows a peak pressure of 110% of design pressure (1250 (design) X 1.10 = 1375 psig maximum) under upset conditions. In addition, the Code specifications require that the lowest valve setpoint be at or below design pressure and the highest valve setpoint be set so that total accumulated pressure does not exceed 110% of the design pressure.

The safety valve sizing evaluation assumes credit for operation of the scram protective system which may be tripped by one of two sources; i.e., a direct position switch or neutron flux signal. The direct scram signal is derived from position switches mounted on the main steamline isolation valves (MSIV's) or the turbine stop valve, or from pressure switches mounted on the dump valve of the turbine control valve hydraulic actuation system. The position switches are actuated when the respective valves are closing, and following 10% travel of full stroke. The pressure switches are actuated when a fast closure of the control valves is initiated. Further, no credit is taken for power operation of the pressure relieving devices. Credit is only taken for

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES (Continued)

the dual purpose safety/relief valves in their ASME Code qualified mode (spring lift) of safety operation.

The overpressure protection system must accommodate the most severe pressurization transient. There are two major transients that represent the most severe abnormal operational transient resulting in a nuclear system pressure rise. The evaluation of these events with the final plant configuration has shown that the MSIV closure is slightly more severe when credit is taken only for indirect derived scrams; i.e., a flux scram. Utilizing this worse case transient as the design basis event, a minimum of 12 safety/relief valves are required to assure peak reactor pressure remains within the Code limit of 110% of design pressure.

Demonstration of the safety/relief valve lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.

#### 3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

##### 3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.



