



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION

AMENDMENT NO. 17 TO NPF-21

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-397

INTRODUCTION

In its letter dated September 26, 1985, the Washington Public Power Supply System proposed certain changes to Appendix A of License No. NPF-21, the Technical Specifications for WNP-2. These changes relate to the allowable leakage rate through the drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valves.

EVALUATION

LCO Action Statement 3.6.1.8.b requires the plant to initiate shutdown within 24 hours when the drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valves with resilient seals have a measured leakage rate exceeding 0.05 La per valve.

The associated surveillance requirements include testing these valves every six months to detect significant degradation of the resilient material seals and to allow for repair before gross leakage develops. This testing frequency gives confidence that should a LOCA occur, leakage through these valves when combined with the sum of leakages of all Type B and C valve tests would not exceed the cumulative total of 0.6 La.

The licensee proposed to delete the Technical Specification provisions that requires initiation of a shutdown if the leakage from a valve with a resilient material seal exceeds 0.05 La provided that this valve is secured in the closed position and the total leakage of all Type B and C valves, including the affected valve, is less than 0.6 La. The licensee further agreed that should a need exist to use a valve with resilient material seal whose leakage exceeds 0.05 La, a leakage test will be performed within 24 hours after such use to assure that the 0.6 La acceptance criteria is met.

The staff has completed its review of the licensee's submittal and concludes that the total containment system integrity requirement and that compliance with the requirement of Appendix J are met in the proposed Technical Specification. We note further that the frequent testing to determine the condition of the resilient material seal is maintained. Based on the foregoing consideration, the staff finds this Technical Specification change to be acceptable.

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FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

We having evaluated the licensee's request for the proposed Technical Specifications for compliance with the above cited standards and conclude that the change will not:

- 1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the basis for the surveillance requirement is maintained.
- 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated, because no new leakage paths are being created. In fact, a more conservative approach is being proposed in that the valves are to be secured in the closed position when multiple valve tests exceed 0.05 La, or tested following each actuation to ensure compliance with the cumulative limit of .6 La
- 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because no change is being sought in Appendix J requirements pertaining to total containment integrity with respect to Type B and C testing.

Based on the above considerations the staff concludes that the proposed amendment meets the Commission's standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Therefore, the staff has made a final determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

BASIS FOR EMERGENCY SITUATION

Even though the allowable leakage limit of 0.60 La had not been exceeded, WNP-2 would have been required to shut down unless this request for amendment had been authorized on an emergency basis. The Supply System had no previous indication of excessive leakage from any previously performed tests conducted per LCG 3.6.1.8 and, therefore, no reason to believe that an individual valve would exceed the Technical Specification requirement of 0.05 La. The Supply System, therefore, could not reasonably have submitted its request for waiver and this request for amendment earlier. Thus the emergency basis was necessary to avoid shutdown under the Limiting Condition for Operation of Section 3.6.1.8.b.



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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to the requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has determined that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: NOV 1 1985