

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	F L S L S 1														2	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0										3	4 1 1 1 1 1										4											5										
7		3		LICENSEE CODE														14		15		LICENSE NUMBER										15		LICENSE TYPE										10		32										16		5	

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0 1 REPORT SOURCE 1 5 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 5 7 0 1 3 1 6 8 10 3 0 1 7 1 2 4 8 10 9

7 3 30 61 DOCKET NUMBER 53 53 EVENT DATE 72 75 REPORT DATE 30

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (15)

02 WHILE SHUTDOWN FOR REFUELING THE PERIODIC INTEGRATED TEST OF ENGINEERED

03 SAFETY FEATURES SHOWED THAT 10 DG LOADING TIMERS WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE;

5 1 THE 2A REACTOR CAVITY COOLING FAN AND THE 1B CONTAINMENT COOLING FAN DID

05 NOT START; AND THE SHIELD BUILDING VENT. SYSTEM OUTSIDE COOLING AIR VALVES .

C S DID NOT OPEN. SYSTEM CAPABILITY WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED SINCE BOTH

5 7 DIESELS OPERATED SATISFACTORILY, BOTH FANS HAD BACKUPS WHICH DID START, AND 1

C13 THE S.B.V.S. VALVES COULD HAVE BEEN OPERATED MANUALLY. SEE LER #77-40.

SYSTEM CODE: [S] [H] (1)
 CAUSE CODE: [X] (12)
 CAUSE SUBCODE: [X] (13)
 COMPONENT CODE: [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] (14)
 COMP. SUBCODE: [Z] (15)
 VALVE SUBCODE: [Z] (16)

(17) SER/NO REPORT NUMBER [8][0] EVENT YEAR [21][23]
[] SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0][1][5]
[] OCCURRENCE CODE [0][3]
[] REPORT TYPE [L]
[] REVISION NO. [1]

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS (22)				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPROG FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
X	15	Z	19	Z	30	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23		24	Z	25	Z	9	9	9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

15 THE PROBLEM WITH NINE DG TIMERS WAS FOUND TO BE NORMAL SETPOINT DRIFT. THE

11 TENTH WAS REPLACED. THE TWO FANS WERE RETESTED SATISFACTORILY WITH NO.

117 PROBLEM FOUND. THE SBVS VALVES WERE RETESTED SATISFACTORILY" AND IT WAS

13 DETERMINED THAT DURING THE PREVIOUS TEST A SHIELD BUILDING DOOR HAD BEEN

12 OPEN FOR REFUELING ACCESS, THIS PREVENTING THE VALVES FROM OPENING.

FACILITY STATUS: 1 5 11 23
 % POWER: 0 0 0 0 29
 OTHER STATUS: NA
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: OPERATOR OBSERVATION

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (26)

1 5 7 2 33 2 22 NA NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1	7	0	0	0	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	3	0	0	0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY					
TYPE		DESCRIPTION			
1	9	7	7	(4)	NA

PRIORITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY									
2	0	N	12	NA											

NAME OF PREPARER P. L. Pace

240NS. (305)^{83 37} 552-3801

8008220 232

ADDITIONAL CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The diesel generator loading sequence timers were out of tolerance by the following amounts: 1A HPSI pump +0.18 sec, 1B HPSI pump +0.22 sec, 1A ICW pump +0.15 sec, 1A CS pump +0.60, 1B CS pump +0.8 sec., HVE-9A +0.86 sec, HVE-13B +0.30 sec., 1B CVCS HT.Trace +1.00 sec, 1A battery charger +0.20 sec., and HVS-4A +5.00 sec. Based on a review of previous engineered safety feature tests it appears that with the exception of HVS-4A (RAB vent.), the timers exhibited normally expected minor setpoint drift. The HVS-4A timer relay was replaced and the other relays were readjusted to specification. All relays retested satisfactorily.

As a result of continued evidence of undesirable timer drift, an engineering evaluation of the feasibility of a different and more repeatable timing circuit design is in progress. If significant design changes are made as a result of this evaluation, a follow-up report will be issued.

The reactor cavity cooling fan was retested for loss of power restart and functioned properly. The containment cooling fan was retested for loss of power restart and SIAS relay actuation and also functioned properly in both cases. No problems were found during fan trouble shooting.

The SBVS valves were retested satisfactorily. It was determined that during the initial test, a shield building door had been open for refueling access, thus preventing the valves from opening on shield building differential pressure.