NAC FORM 364 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT-REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: ļ0 (PLEASS PRINT OR TYPE ALL RECUIRED INFORMATION) 01 <u>]</u>0[____]0] $\frac{|S|1}{|3|0|0|-|0|0|0|0|0}$ -1010041111FILISIL CON'T 31315 0 0 15 121 810 3 0 7 1 0 7 1 8 0 0 015 0 1 **S** SOURCE L EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSECUENCES (10) During a planned secondary plant shutdown for turbine maintenance, it was 02 noted that the main steam header would not depressurize following steam 03 stop closure, Investigation revealed that both steam stop bypass valve 0.4 Istems were sheared with the valves stuck in the "open" position. Although 05 ionly three inch warm-up lines were involved, the plant did not meet the 015 intent of T.S. 3.7.1.5 and the FSAR analysis. When the unit was shutdown 077 & cooled the valves were repaired. This is the first report of this type ola SYSTEM CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENTCOOP ĨĬ]@ 0 9 <u>V | E|X |</u> SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE. REVISION LERIRO EVENTYEAR REPORT 1810 5000 NO. 1 1. 10191CN PLANT N 23 VANUFAS YI® <u>A</u> (20) IS 10 <u>A</u> (a) [Z 1(19) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORALCTIVE ACTIONS (27) 110 [The cause of the main steam stop bypass valve stem failures could not be Ldetermined. The valve operators appear to be oversize for valves [1] [Engineering has been requested to evaluate. The valve stems were replaced and the valves were verified to be operable prior to starting up the unit 113 A follow-up report will be issued. METHOD OF OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (52) べ アコットモア **Operator** Observation 1 5 ACTIVITY CONTENT 1000NT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF ASLESS (36) NA 1 | 5 NA TASONNEL EXPOSUAS DISCRIPTICN (3) NA LASONNEL INJURIS SESCRIPTION (4) NA 1 3 TT. 12 OF CR DANAGE TO FACILITY NA 1 9 2112110 <u>N</u> 2450719TICH (S) MAG USE CNLY 20 NÂ 11111 A. Schoppman (305) М. 552 NAME OF PREPARES

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LER. 335-80-25

Event Description and Probable Consequences

The MSIV bypass valves are not specifically mentioned in the Technical Specifications or FSAR analysis. However, their failure in the open position provides a path for continued blowdown of the steam generators on main steam rupture downstream of the MSIV. Rupture upstream of a MSIV would not be affected because of a check valve in series with the bypass valve.

Cause Description and Corrective Action

As a result of the continuing engineering review of the cause of the sheared valve stems, this occurrence has been determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21.

The safety analysis for main steam line breaks, both inside and outside containment, assumes isolation of each main steam line after MSIS. The loss of capability to isolate those lines is an unanalysed event which allows an uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators and could thus constitute a "substantial safety hazard" in relation to 10 CFR 21. In addition, it must also be noted that from a radiological standpoint, this occurrence represents a potential substantial safety hazard. The tube rupture accident assumes isolation of the faulted steam generator. The limiting condition of operation (LCO) for RCS specific activity (T.S.3.4.8) is based on the analysis of the tube rupture accident. Failure to isolate the faulted steam generator could substantially increase offsite exposures.

The valves in question are Schutte and Koerting Co. motor operated bypass valves (3 inch, 600 lb.) with a Limitorque Operator. The FPL Engineering Department is continuing the evaluation of the occurrence. Permanent corrective action will be reported.

