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JOHNSON, A.R. Project Directorate I-3

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SUBJECT: LER 93-007-00:on 931122,RT occurred due to high source range flux level during reactor startup.Caused by failure of personnel focusing on RT setpoint.Replaced status lights & corrected PPCS alarm message.W/931222 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR _ [ENCL _ [SIZE: ______ TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649-0001

RÓBERT C. MECREDY Vice President **Ginna Nuclear Production**

TELEPHONE AREA CODE 716 546-2700

December 22, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Allen R. Johnson Project Directorate I-3 Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

LER 93-007, High Source Range Flux Level During Reactor Subject: Startup Causes a Reactor Trip R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 93-007 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours,

Robert C. Mecredy

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission xc: Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

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NRC FORM 366	•	•	U.S.	NUCLEAR F	REGULATOR	Y COHH	ISSION		APPROVED BY	ONB NO. 3	150-010 5	24
(5-92) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)												
FACILITY NAME	(1) R.	E. Gi	nna Nuclea	ar Powe	er Pla	ant	,	DOCKET	NUMBER (2)		PA	GE (3)
		, Denne F	Lux Loval During	Pereton St	tentum Co		Penet		05000244	±1	1	OF 7
IIILE (4) HIG	1 Source	Kange r	tux Level During	Reactor S	cartop co	iuses a	Reacti	n nup			•	,
EVENT_DATE	(5)		LER NUMBER (6))	REPOR	T DATE	(7)		OTHER FACIL	ITIES INVO	LVED (8	3)
HONTH DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILIT	Y NAME		OCKET	NUMBER
11 ² 2	93	93	007	· 00	12,	22	93	FACILIT	Y NAME	[OCKET	NUMBER
OPERATING	N	THIS_RE	PORT IS SUBMITTE	D PURSUANT	TO THE	REQUIR	MENTS	OF 10 CF	R §: (Check	one or more	;) (11)	
MODE (9)		20.4	02(b)		20.405(c)		<u> </u>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.7	(1(b)
POWER	000	20.4	(05(8)(1)(1))		50.30(C	$\frac{1}{1}$			50.73(8)(2)(13.1	(C)
LEVEL (10)	l	20.4	05(a)(1)(iii)	<u> </u>	50.73(a	<u>)(2)(1</u>		— —	50.73(a)(2)(y in
		20.4	05(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a	(2)(i)	1		50.73(a)(2)((iii)(B)	bstrac	t below
		20.4	05(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i	i)	— —	50.73(a)(2)()	0	and in ARC For	Text, m 366A)
				1 ICENSEE	CONTACT F	OR THI	S LFR	12)	1			
NAME John T.	St. Ma	rtin - D	irector, Operati	ng Experie	nce				TELEPHONE NUA (315) 524	4BER (Inclu 4-4446	de Are	a Code)
	<u> </u>	COK	PLETE ONE LINE FO	DR EACH COM	KPONENT F	AILURE	DESCRI	BED IN	THIS REPORT (1	<u>3)</u>		
CAUSE SYST	EM CO	OMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	TO NPRD	S	C	AUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACT	URER	TO NPRDS
 	-											
		SUPPLEKE	NTAL REPORT EXPE	CTED (14)				E	XPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, c	mplete	EXPECTED	SUBMISSION DATE).	X	ю		SU D	BHISSION ATE (15)			
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).ANODATE (15)ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)The plant was at hot shutdown condition, with a reactor startup in progress. At 0644 EST the reactor tripped on High Source Range Flux Level (>/= 1E5 counts per second).The underlying cause was determined to be a Control Room operator not adequately focused on approaching the reactor trip setpoint. With two status lights burned out and a misleading PPCS alarm message, the operator was focused on Permissive P-6 setpoint instead of the reactor trip setpoint. (This event is NUREG-1220 (A) cause code.)Corrective actions were to replace the status lights, correct the PPCS alarm message, and apprise the Control Room operators of the need to												

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focus on reactor trip setpoints. Corrective action to pr repetition is outlined in Section V (B).

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NRC FORH 3 (5-92)	66A	U.S. NUCLEAR RE	GULATORY CONNISSION	APPROVED BY ONB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95			
	•••	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LE TEXT CONTINUATION	ER)	ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.			
		FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET MUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)			
R.E.	Gir	na Nuclear Power Plant	05000244	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 7			
TEXT (If n	nore sp	ace is required, use additional copies of	f NRC Form 366A) (17				
I.	PRE	-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS					
U	The plant was stable in the hot shutdown condition, and the reactor was subcritical with a reactor startup in progress, using procedure 0-1.2 (Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown to Full Load).						
II.	DES	CRIPTION OF EVENT	•				
	Α.	DATES AND APPROXIMATE TI	MES OF MAJOR	OCCURRENCES:			
		o November 22, 1993, 0	644 EST: Eve	ent date and time.			
		o November 22, 1993, 0	644 EST: Dis	covery date and time.			
		o November 22, 1993, 0 both reactor trip br shutdown rods insert)644 EST: Co reakers open, red.	ontrol Room operators verify and all control and			
		o November 22, 1993, 0 shutdown condition.)650 EST: Pl	ant stabilized at hot			
	в.	EVENT:					
		At approximately 0643 ES conducting the final app procedure 0-1.2. The op was moving control rods (SUR) prior to declaring the two Nuclear Instruments instruments were indicat counts per second (CPS). anticipating that Permis at this time, prior to end 1E5 CPS.	T, the Contro proach to criperator perfo out to estab the reactor ent System (N ing reactor The Contro sive P-6 sta exceeding the	ol Room operators were ticality, in accordance with rming the reactor startup lish a positive startup rate critical. At this time, IS) Source Range (SR) power at approximately 5E4 l Room operator was tus lights would illuminate reactor trip setpoint of			
	•	Permissive P-6 setpoint (IR) channels, when 1 of is normally equivalent t the SR instruments. Per operator to manually blo reactor trip and de-ener	is generated 2 channels 3 approximat 3 missive P-6 9 ock the High 3 gize the SR	from NIS Intermediate Range is above 1E-10 amps. This ely 1E4 CPS indication on allows the Control Room Source Range Flux Level detectors.			

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NRC FORM 366A (5-92)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY ONB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95			
-	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION	ESTIMATED BURDEN PER THIS INFORMATION COLLE FORWARD COMMENTS REGA THE INFORMATION AND F (MMBB 7714), U.S. NUCLI WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0 REDUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,	RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH CTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. RDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, 001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK (3150-0104), OFFICE OF WASHINGTON, DC 20503.			
	FACILITY NAME (1) DOC	KET NUMBER - (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
R.E. Gir	nna Nuclear Power Plant 0	5000244	YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 93 007	REVISION NUMBER 00 3 OF 7		
TEXT (If more sp	pace is required, use additional copies of NRC	Form 366A) (17	7)			
c.	<pre>Prior to the P-6 status lig 0644 EST, the reactor tripp (>/= 1E5 CPS). The Control appropriate actions of Emer (Reactor Trip or Safety Inj injection was not actuated to Emergency Operating Proc The plant was subsequently procedure 0-2.1 (Normal Shu INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMP TO THE EVENT: 0 The light bulbs for the indication that reactor</pre>	hts illum ed on Hig Room ope gency Ope ection), or requir edure ES- stabilize tdown to PONENTS, O e status 1 power is	inating, at ap h Source Range rators perform rating Procedu and verified t ed. They then 0.1 (Reactor T d in hot shutd Hot Shutdown). R SYSTEMS THAT ights that pro-	proximately Flux Level ed the re E-0 hat safety transitioned rip Response). own, using CONTRIBUTED ovide sive P-6 were		
•	both burned out. O Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) alarm message to indicate reactor power is above Permissive P-6 was misleading. With reactor power above the P-6 setpoint, the PPCS alarm message indicated that power was still below the setpoint.					
D.	OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY	FUNCTIONS	AFFECTED:			
÷	NOUG:		-			
E.,	E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:					
	This event was immediately Annunciator D-26 (Source Ra CPS) and other alarms and i	apparent Inge Hi Fl Indication	due to Main Co ux Level React s in the Contr	ntrol Board or Trip 1E5 ol Room.		
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NRC FORM 366A (5-92)	U.S. NUCLEAR R	•	APPROVED BY O EXPIRE	MB NO. 315 S 5/31/95	0-0104	
	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LI TEXT CONTINUATION	ESTIMATI THIS IN FORWARD THE INF (MNBB 77 WASHING REDUCTIO MANAGEMI	ED BURDEN PER FORMATION COLLE COMMENTS REGAF ORMATION AND R 714), U.S. NUCLE TON, DC 20555-00 ON PROJECT (ENT AND BUDGET,	RESPONSE CTION REOU CDING BURD ECORDS MAI (AR REGULAT DO1, AND T (3150-0104) WASHINGTON	TO COMPLY WITH JEST: 50.0 HRS. EN ESTIMATE TO NAGEMENT BRANCH ORY COMMISSION, O THE PAPERWORK O THE PAPERWORK OFFICE OF J. DC 20503.	
	FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET MUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)
R.Ę. G	.nna Nuclear Power Plant	05000244	YEAR 93	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 007	REVISION NUMBER OO	4 OF 7
TEXT (If more	space is required, use additional copies o	of NRC Form 366A) (17	··	+		
F.	OPERATOR ACTION:					
	After the reactor trip, appropriate actions of H (Reactor Trip or Safety Response). The plant wa Subsequently, the Contro supervision. The Nuclea 10CFR50.72, Non-Emergeno 1022 EST.	the Control Emergency Ope Injection) a as stabilized ol Room opera ar Regulatory cy, 4 Hour No	Room ratin nd ES at h tors Comm tific	operators g Procedu -0.1 (Read ot shutdonotified) ission was ation at	perfo res E- ctor T wn. higher s noti approx	rmed the O rip fied per imately
G.	SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:	:				,
	None	٠		- '		* <u>-</u>
III. CA	USE OF EVENT	-				
Α.	IMMEDIATE CAUSE:		1			
	The reactor trip was due reactor trip setpoint of	e to NIS SR h f 1E5 CPS.	igh f	lux level	above	the SR
в.	INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:					
The high flux level was caused by failure to block the SR reactor trip, after establishing a SUR of approximately 0.5 to 1 decades per minute (DPM) during the final approach to criticality, with power approaching the SR reactor trip setpoint.						
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NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR RE	366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY ONB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95			
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LE TEXT CONTINUATION	ESTIMAT THIS IN FORWARD THE IN (MNBB 7 WASHING REDUCTI MANAGEM	ED BURDEN PER NFORMATION COLLE COMMENTS REGAL FORMATION AND F 714), U.S. NUCLE ITON, DC 20555-0 ON PROJECT IENT AND BUDGET,	RESPONSE ECTION REQU RDING BURD RECORDS MA EAR REGULAT 001, AND T (3150-0104) WASHINGTON	TO COMPLY JEST: 50.0 EN ESTIMATE NAGENENT BR TORY COMMISS O THE PAPER O THE PAPER O OFFICE I, DC 20503.	WITH HRS. E TO ANCH SION, WORK OF		
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)	
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	05000244	YEAR 93	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER 00	5 OF	7	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the failure to block the SR reactor trip with power increasing at a 0.5 to 1 DPM SUR, was cognitive personnel error by a Control Room operator. The Control Room operator was not adequately focused on approaching the SR reactor trip setpoint.

The Control Room operator was anticipating that the status lights indicating reactor power above Permissive P-6 setpoint would be illuminated, allowing block of the SR reactor trip, prior to reaching the trip setpoint. His attention was focused on these status lights instead of on the approach to the reactor trip setpoint. The status lights did not illuminate due to the light bulbs being burned out. The PPCS alarm message provided incorrect reinforcement that reactor power was still below the P-6 setpoint. The actions of the operator performing the reactor startup were not contrary to procedures established for this evolution. (This event is NUREG-1220 (A) cause code, Personnel Error.)

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF) including the reactor protection system (RPS)". The reactor trip was an automatic actuation of the RPS.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no safety consequences or implications attributed to the reactor trip because:

- o The two reactor trip breakers opened as required.
- o All control and shutdown rods inserted as designed.
- o The plant was stabilized at hot shutdown.

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NRC FORM 3	566A	•	U.S. NUCLEAR RE	GULATORY COMMISSION	N APPROVED BY ONB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95			
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		FAC	CILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET MUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)			
R.E.	Gi	nna 1	Nuclear Power Plant	05000244	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 93 007 00 6 OF 7			
TEXT (If r	nore s	pace is	required, use additional copies of	NRC Form 366A) (17	7)			
	The reactor trip did not cause any reactor coolant system (RCS) transient, as the reactor was not at the point of adding heat. All reactor protection circuitry actuated as designed to place the reactor in a tripped mode at hot shutdown.							
	Based on the above and a review of post trip data and past plant transients, it can be concluded that the plant operated as designed and that there were no unreviewed safety questions and that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.							
v.	COF	RECI	IVE ACTION					
	Α.	ACT: STA	ION TAKEN TO RETURN A TUS:	FFECTED SYST	EMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL			
		ο	The light bulbs for power is above P-6 w procedure was perfor	the status l ere replaced med to verif	ights that indicate reactor , and a surveillance y their functionality.			
	•	ο	The PPCS alarm messa clear understanding	ge for P-6 w of the statu	vas corrected to ensure a as of Permissive P-6.			
		ο	Operations Managemen appropriate approach SR reactor trip setp expectations to the scheduled to perform	t reevaluate to critical oint, and co personnel on the subsequ	d their expectations for an ity at flux levels near the mmunicated these revised the Operating Shift ent reactor startup.			
	в.	ACT	ION TAKEN OR PLANNED	TO PREVENT R	ECURRENCE:			
		.0	Procedure 0-1.2 was management expectati for (1) a conservati trip setpoint), wher to evaluate the stat illuminated, (2) a c setpoint is not defe conducted by the Shi reactor startup.	revised to i ons. These ve power lev e the power us of P-6, i onservative ated, (3) a ft Superviso	ncorporate the revised included procedural guidance rel (below the SR reactor increase should be stopped f P-6 status lights have not SUR when the SR reactor trip formalized shift briefing or, prior to commencing a			
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NRC FORH 366A	U.S. NUCLEAR RE	GULATORY CONNISSION	APPROVED BY ONB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95					
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R.E. Gi	nna Nuclear Power Plant	05000244	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 93 007 00 7 0F 7					
TEXT (If more s	pace is required, use additional copies of	f NRC Form 366A) (17	/ >					
	o Personnel on the Operating Shift scheduled to perform the subsequent reactor startup were trained on the revisions to procedure 0-1.2 prior to commencing the startup.							
	o A Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) evaluation was performed to determine causal factors for this event. The results of the HPES evaluation were used to identify the root cause and appropriate corrective actions.							
	o The two Control Room operators directly involved in this reactor trip were removed from shift until they had completed additional simulator training on reactor startups, and had been apprised of the revised management expectations contained in the revision to procedure 0-1.2.							
•	o All·licensed reactor will be trained on t	: operators, he revisions:	as part of normal training, to procedure 0-1.2.					
	 Appropriate lesson plans for the Licensed Operator Training programs will be revised to ensure management expectations contained in procedure 0-1.2 are continually reinforced during simulator training. 							
VI. ADI	DITIONAL INFORMATION							
Α.	FAILED COMPONENTS:		•.					
	None	,						
В.	PREVIOUS LERS ON SIMILAR	EVENTS:						
	A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant could be identified.							
с.	SPECIAL COMMENTS:		А					
	None	۰	•					

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