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ACCESSION NBR:9004130177 DOC.DATE: 90/03/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 CAVANAUGH,M.E. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
 MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 90-001-00:on 900225,fire watch did not perform tour at
 least once per h due to personnel error.

W/9 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 8
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244

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	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DET/ECMB 9H	1 1
	NRR/DET/EMEB9H3	1 1	NRR/DET/ESGB 8D	1 1
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	RGN1 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G STUART,V.A	4 4	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
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March 26, 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
Subject: LER 90-001, Technical Specification Fire Watch Patrol
Established, But Did Not Perform Tour At Least Once Per
Hour Due to Personnel Error.
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item
(a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of, "Any Operation Or
Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications", the
attached Licensee Event Report LER 90-001 is hereby submitted.

This LER is being submitted because the hourly Fire Watch Patrol
did not meet the Ginna Technical Specification 3.14 requirements
for patrolling three (3) Technical Specification systems.

This event in no way affected the public health and safety.

Very truly yours,



Robert C. Mecredy
Division Manager
Nuclear Production

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant										0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 1										OF 0 7																																															
TITLE (4) Technical Specification Fire Watch Patrol Established, But Did Not Perform Tour At Least Once Per Hour Due To Personnel Error.																																																																			
EVENT DATE (5)										LER NUMBER (6)										REPORT DATE (7)										OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																					
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAME										DOCKET NUMBER (9)																														
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OPERATING MODE (10)										THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																																									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 1 8										20.402(b)										20.406(i)										80.734(i)(1)(h)										73.71(b)																											
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																																																			
NAME										Mark E. Cavanaugh										TELEPHONE NUMBER																																															
										Fire Protection Engineer										AREA CODE										7 1 1 6 5 1 2 1 4 1 - 1 4 1 4 1 6																																					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																																			
CAUSE			SYSTEM			COMPONENT			MANUFACTURER			REPORTABLE TO NRC						CAUSE			SYSTEM			COMPONENT			MANUFACTURER			REPORTABLE TO NRC																																					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)										MONTH DAY YEAR																																					
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				X NO																																															

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1600 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 25, 1990, at approximately 1345 EST with the Reactor power at approximately 98%, the Operations Shift Supervisor called the Security Shift Supervisor to discuss the areas being toured by Security personnel to fulfill the technical specifications for Fire Watch tours. It was determined that Security tours did not necessarily result in entry to these areas once per hour.

Immediate action was to establish an hourly tour using the auxiliary operators until the Fire Protection Section could acquire the personnel to perform the task.

The cause of the event was determined to be the improper interpretation of Security touring policy which resulted in the failure of Security to tour the required areas once per hour.

Corrective action has been taken by Fire Protection to conduct required Fire Watch tours as required. Follow-up action is to restore the inoperable systems/components to operable status.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 364A's) (17)

I. INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS

The plant was at approximately 98% steady state full power with no major activities in progress.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

- February 25, 1990, 1345 EST: Discovery date and time.
- February 25, 1990, 1400 EST: Auxiliary Operators initiated touring the areas once per hour in compliance with Technical Specifications.
- February 25, 1990, 1720 EST: Fire Watch personnel relieved Auxiliary Operator from hourly tours.

B. EVENT

On February 25, 1990 at approximately 1345 EST with the Reactor at approximately 98% full power, the Operations Shift Supervisor called the Security Shift Supervisor to discuss the areas being toured by Security to fulfill the requirements of Technical Specification 3.14 for Fire Watch hourly tours. During the course of conversation with the Operations Shift Supervisor, it was determined that Security tours do not necessarily result in entry to the areas of concern once per hour. An investigation of Security computer records indicated that greater than one hour had elapsed between some entries to these areas.

On February 25, 1990 at approximately 1400 EST, the Operations Shift Supervisor assigned the auxiliary operators to perform the hourly Fire Watch tour until the Fire Protection Section could come in and relieve them. At approximately 1720 EST, the Fire Watch from Fire Protection was on site and relieved the Fire Watch hourly tour from the auxiliary operators.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

- . Inoperable fire barrier penetration I-79-P
- . Inoperable fire damper I-411-21-P
- . Inoperable fire detection system Z-25

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OF SECONDARY FUNCTION AFFECTED:

None

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

This event was discovered as a result of a conversation between the Operations Shift Supervisor and the Security Shift Supervisor discussing the areas being toured by Security to fulfill the requirements for hourly Fire Watch Patrol.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

The Operations Shift Supervisor discovered the problem and performed the following:

- . Initiated an A-25.1 Ginna Station Event Report
- . Assigned auxiliary operators to perform the hourly tours until Fire Watch could be called in
- . Notified Duty Engineer
- . Notified Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
- . Notified Plant Superintendent
- . Notified Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector

G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES

NONE

III. CAUSE OF EVENT

A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

Technical Specification fire barrier and fire detection systems were not Fire Watch toured hourly as required by Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The inoperable fire detection system could not be repaired and tested before the end of the working day.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The root cause was determined to be improper interpretation of Security touring policy which resulted in Security not going into the areas of inoperable fire barriers and detection system once per hour.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

An hourly Fire Watch tour of three (3) Technical Specification areas with inoperable fire components was not conducted so Technical Specifications 3.14.1 and 3.16.6 was not met. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of, "Any Operation Or Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications".

An assessment was performed considering the safety of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operation or safety consequences or implications attributed to the inoperable fire detection system or inoperable fire barriers because:

Inoperable Fire Detection System Z-25

- Fire detection system for the standby auxiliary feed water pump building was a maximum permissible fire load of 240,000 BTU/Sq.Ft. Existing fire loading is 1,809 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an available heat release of 350 degrees F. This is considered a low fire load (<80,000 BTU/Sq.Ft.). The wall separating the standby auxiliary feed water pump building from the adjacent auxiliary building is a 3 hour rated wall with 3 hour rated fire seals.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 304A's) (17)

Inoperable Fire Damper I-411-21-P

- Fire damper I-411-21P separates Fire Zone ABO-3W (Auxiliary Building Operating Level West) and Fire Zone IBS-2 (Intermediate Building Operating Level South).
- Fire Zone ABO-3W comprises 2500 square feet. The maximum design basis fire loading for this zone is 240,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft. The existing fire loading is 8,721 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an available heat release of 1120 degrees F. The fire resistance for the actual fuel loading condition would be 0.11 hours for complete fire fuel reduction.
- Fire zone IBS-2 comprises 2385 square feet. The maximum design basis fire loading for the zone is 160,000 BTU/Sq.Ft. Existing fire loading for this zone is 20,470 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an available heat release of 1415 degrees F. The fire resistance for the actual fire loading conditions would be 0.26 hours for complete fire fuel reduction.
- These two fire zones/areas (ABO-3W and IBS-2) are monitored by their respective fire detection systems. In addition, fire extinguisher and hose stations are available for each fire zone/area.

Inoperable Fire Seal I-79-P

- Fire Seal Penetration I-79-P separates Fire Zone IBN-1 (Intermediate Building Elevation 253'6" (North)) and Fire Zone SB-1 (Service Building Basement Level Elevation 235'-6").
- Fire Zone IBN-1 comprises 3570 square feet. The maximum design basis fire loading for this zone is 160,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft. Existing fire loading for this zone is 74,198 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an available heat release of 1670 degrees F. The fire resistance for the actual fire loading conditions would be .93 hours for complete fire fuel reduction.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 364A's) (17)

- Fire Zone SB-1 comprises 16,275 Sq.Ft. The maximum design basis fire loading for the zone is 160,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft. existing fire loading for this zone is 7919 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an available heat release of 1080 degrees F. The fire resistance for the actual fire loading condition would be .10 hour for complete fire fuel reduction

- These two fire zone/areas (IBN-1 and SB-1) are monitored by a fire detection system and fire suppression system respectively. In addition, fire extinguishers and hose stations are available for each fire zone/area.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. ACTIONS TAKEN TO RETURN INOPERABLE COMPONENTS TO OPERABLE STATUS:

- Actions taken to return inoperable fire detection system to operable status:
 - The fire detection system was repaired under SC-3.16.2.8 and tested in accordance with PT-13.11.4 and declared operable on February 26, 1990 at 0925 EST.
- Action taken to return inoperable fire barrier I-79-P to operable status:
 - A fire watch was established until the cracked mortar was packed with kaowool using procedure M-56.1, "Placement of Temporary Ceramic Fiber Penetration Fire Seals.
 - A maintenance work request was assigned to permanently seal the penetration.
- Action taken to bring the fire damper I-411-21-P to operable status:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 384A's) (17)

Fire watch is in place until the replacement fire damper arrives and is installed and tested in accordance with procedure PT-13.26, Testing of Fire Dampers.

B. ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

As the root cause was determined to be improper interpretation of Security touring policy resulting in inadequate hourly fire patrols by Security. Ginna Station will provide dedicated fire watch coverage as required.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None

B. PREVIOUS LER'S ON SIMILAR EVENT:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None