

ENCLOSURE 1


SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 2)
R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-244

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate the report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of these events are reported in NUREG 1000 "Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

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This report is an evaluation of the response submitted by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, the licensee for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant for Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed, as part of this evaluation, are listed in the references at the end of this report.

Item 2.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee to confirm that an interface has been established with the NSSS vendor or with the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System which includes:

- o periodic communication between the licensee/applicant and the NSSS vendor or the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System, and
- o a system of positive feedback which confirms receipt by the licensee/applicant of transmittals of vendor technical information.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant provided responses to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.1 (part 2) in submittals dated November 4, 1983 and June 4, 1987. The licensee has initiated a Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program, consisting of the recommended NPRDS and SEE-IN programs. These programs as well as interaction with the NSSS vendor (Westinghouse) are considered an aid to the licensee personnel responsible for developing and maintaining plant instructions and procedures. The licensee has implemented administrative procedures for maintaining vendor technical information received by the licensee current, and for incorporating the information into plant operating, maintenance, and test procedures.


The licensee participates in numerous interface activities with Westinghouse (Westinghouse Owners Group Committees and subcommittees, plant modification and safety analysis contracts, Westinghouse technical information bulletins and communications, standards committees and workshops, etc.). Also, the licensee has initiated a vendor manual program that will ensure that vendor manuals are all maintained current and complete. The vendor manual program adequately controls changes to vendor manuals when the licensee's responsible department has specifically indicated a need for controlling.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review of these responses, we find the licensee's statements confirm that an acceptable vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for the successful performance of the reactor trip function. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating Licenses, and Holders of Construction Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
2. Letter, J. E. Maier, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation to D. M. Crutchfield, NRC, November 4, 1983.
3. Letter, R. Kober, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation to C. Stahle, NRC, June 4, 1987.



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