

- f. Low reactor coolant flow - \geq 90% of normal indicated flow.
- g. Low reactor coolant pump frequency - \geq 57.5 Hz.

2.3.1.3 Other reactor trips

- a. High pressurizer water level - \leq 92% of span
- b. Low-low steam generator water level - \geq 5% of narrow range instrument span

2.3.2 Protective instrumentation settings for reactor trip interlocks shall be as follows:

- 2.3.2.1 Remove bypass of "at power" reactor trips at high power (low pressurizer pressure and low reactor coolant flow) for both loops:

Power range nuclear flux - \leq 8.5% of rated power

- (1) (Note: During cold rod drop tests, the pressurizer, high level trip may be bypassed.)

- 2.3.2.2 Remove bypass of single loss of flow trip at high power:

Power range nuclear flux - \leq 50% rated power

- 2.3.3* Relay operating will be tested to insure that they perform according to their design characteristics which must fall in within the ranges defined below:

- 2.3.3.1* Loss of voltage relay operating time \leq 8.5 seconds for 480 volt safeguards bus voltages \leq 368 volts.

Measured values shall fall at least 5% below the theoretical limit. This 5% margin is shown as the 5% tolerance curve in Figure 2.3-1.

2.3.3.2* Acceptable degraded voltage relay operating times and setpoints, for 480 volt safeguards bus voltages \leq 414 volts and $>$ 368 volts are defined by the safeguard equipment thermal capability curve shown in Figure 2.3-1. Measured values shall fall at least 5% below the theoretical limit. This 5% margin is shown as the 5% tolerance curve in Figure 2.3-1.

Basis:

The high flux reactor trip (low set point) provides redundant protection in the power range for a power excursion beginning from low power. This trip value was used in the safety analysis.⁽¹⁾ In the power range of operation, the overpower nuclear flux reactor trip protects the reactor core against reactivity excursions which are too rapid to be protected by temperature and pressure protective circuitry. The overpower limit criteria is that core power be prevented from reaching a value at which fuel pellet centerline melting would occur. The reactor is prevented from reaching the overpower limit condition by action of the nuclear overpower and overpower ΔT trips. The high and low pressure reactor trips limit the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted. The high pressurizer pressure reactor trip is also a backup to the pressurizer code safety valves for overpressure protection, and is therefore set lower than the set pressure for these valves (2485 psig). The low pressurizer pressure reactor trip also trips the reactor in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident.⁽³⁾

*Effective 30 days after completion of necessary modifications and no later than completion of the Spring 1982 refueling outage

because the maximum enthalpy rise does not increase. For this reason the single pump loss of flow trip can be bypassed below 50% power.

The loss of voltage and degraded voltage trips ensure operability of safeguards equipment during a postulated design basis event concurrent with a degraded bus voltage condition. (9)(10)(11)


The undervoltage set points have been selected so that safeguards motors will start and accelerate the driven loads (pumps) within the required time and will be able to perform for long periods of time at degraded conditions above the trip set points without significant loss of design life. All control circuitry or safety related control centers and load centers, except for motor control center's M and L, are d.c. Therefore, degraded grid voltages do not affect these control centers and load centers. Motor control centers M and L, which supply the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System, are fully protected by the undervoltage set points. Further, the Standby System is normally not in service and is manually operated only in total loss of feedwater and auxiliary feedwater.

The 5% tolerance curve in Figure 2.3-1 and the requirements of specifications 2.3.3.1 and 2.3.3.2 include 5% allowance for measurement error. Thus, providing the measurement error is less than 5%, measured values may be directly compared to the curve. If measurement error exceeds 5%, appropriate allowance shall be made.

*Effective 30 days after completion of necessary modifications and no later than completion of the Spring 1982 refueling outage:

LOSS AND SECOND LEVEL (DEGRADED)*
 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY OPERATING RANGES

FIG. 2.3-1



(120v)
 primary Volts (480)
 Volts (460" Base)

*Effective 30 days after completion of necessary modifications and no later than completion of the Spring 1982 refueling outage
 2.3-10

	1 NO. of CHANNELS	2 NO. of CHANNELS TO TRIP	3 MIN. OPERABLE CHANNELS	4 MIN. DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY	5 PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS	6 OPERATOR ACTION, IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 3 or 5 CANNOT BE MET
17. Circulating Water Flood Protection						
a. Screenhouse	2	1	2+	-*		Power operation may be continued for a period of up to 7 days with 1 channel inoperable or for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels inoperable.
b. Condenser	2	1	2+	-*		Power operation may be continued for a period of up to 7 days with 1 channel inoperable or for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels inoperable.
1/18. Loss of Voltage/ Degraded Voltage 480 Volt Safe- guards. Bus	4/bus	2/bus	2/bus	*		Maintain hot shut-down or place bus on diesel generator.

NOTE 1: When block condition exists, maintain normal operation.

F.P. = Full Power

* Not Applicable

** If both rod misalignment monitors (a and b) inoperable for 2 hours or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reset to 93% of rated power in addition to the increased surveillance noted.

*** If a functional unit is operating with the minimum operable channels, the number of channels to trip the reactor will be column 3 less column 4.

+ A channel is considered operable with 1 out of 2 logic or 2 out of 3 logic.

1/Effective 30 days after completion of necessary modifications and no later than completion of the Spring 1982 refueling outage

3.5-4a

Amendment No. 14, 38
(Correction - May 1981)

TABLE 4.1-1 (CONTINUED)

	<u>Channel Description</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Calibrate</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
25.	Containment Pressure	S	R	M	Narrow range containment pressure (-3.0, +3 psig excluded)
26.	Steam Generator Pressure	S	R	M	
27.	Turbine First Stage Pressure	S	R	M	
28.	Emergency Plan Radiation Instruments	M	R	M	
29.	Environmental Monitors	M	N.A.	N.A.	
30.*	Loss of Voltage/Degraded Voltage 480 Volt Safeguards Bus	N.A.	R	M	
S	- Each Shift	M	- Monthly		
D	- Daily	P	- Prior to each startup if not done previous week		
B/W	- Biweekly	R	- Each Refueling Shutdown		
Q	- Quarterly	N.A.	- Not applicable		

*Effective 30 days after completion of necessary modifications and no later than completion of the Spring 1982 refueling outage.

4.1-7

Amendment No. 38
(Correction - May 1981)

Same

Docket No. 50-244
LS05-81-

DISTRIBUTION:
Docket
NRC PDR
LPDR
TERA
NSIC
ORB #5 RF
DEisenhut
HSmith
RPSnaider
OELD
OI&E (5)
ACRS (10)
RDiggs
JHeltemes
Gray File
Xtra Cy (6)

Mr. John E. Maier
Vice President
Electric and Steam Production
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649

Dear Mr. Maier:

By letter dated March 26, 1981, we issued Amendment No. 38 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-18 for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. Amendment No. 38 approved technical specifications related to degraded grid voltage protection for the Class IE power system.

The amendment was inadvertently made effective upon date of issuance without due consideration for the installation of necessary equipment. In order to rectify the situation, we hereby modify the date of effectiveness of this amendment (Item 3 on Page 2 of Amendment No. 38) to read: "Thirty (30) days after completion of required modifications and no later than the completion of the Spring 1982 Outage." This is the date which you have stated that such modifications can reasonably be completed.

A copy of a revised Notice of Issuance is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing

Enclosures
Revised Notice of Issuance,
Amendment No. 38 to
License No. DPR-18

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

① Should be an amendment since the change is substantive in nature. Must be effective on date issued but subparts or requirements be stated to go into effect on a date certain or within 30 days.
E.K. - See note with Amendment #38
②
DL:AD/SA
DL:ORB.#5/LA
DL:ORB.#5/PM
DL:ORB.#5/C
OELD
GLainas
4/12/81
4/20/81
4/20/81
1/81
1/81
4/12/81
Maier

OFFICE	DL:ORB.#5/LA	DL:ORB.#5/PM	DL:ORB.#5/C	DL:AD/SA	OELD		
SURNAME	HSmith:ri	RPSnaider	DCrutchfield	GLainas	KETCHEN		
DATE	4/20/81	4/20/81	1/81	1/81	4/12/81		



10/10/10

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-244ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATIONREVISED NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

On March 26, 1981, (46 F.R. 212295, April 9, 1981), the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Amendment No. 38 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-18, to Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee), which revised the technical specifications for operation of the R. E. Ginna Plant (the facility) located in Wayne County, New York.

The amendment was inadvertently made effective upon date of issuance without due consideration for the installation of necessary equipment. In order to rectify this situation, by letter dated _____ 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has modified the date of effectiveness of Amendment No. 38 to License No. DPR-18 to be thirty (30) days after completion of required modifications and no later than the completion of the Spring 1982 Outage.

The amendment approved limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements regarding degraded grid voltage protection for the Class 1E power system.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of the amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated September 9, 1980 (transmitted by letter dated September 15, 1980), as preceded and supported by submittals dated July 21, 1977, November 21, 1977, December 16, 1977 (transmitted by letter dated December 22, 1977), July 31, 1979 (transmitted August 3, 1979 - two separate submittals), and December 19, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 38 to License No. DPR-18, dated March 26, 1981, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Rochester Public Library, 115 South Avenue, Rochester, New York 14627. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing

MAY 12 1981