



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 45 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-244

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

By application notarized October 10, 1978 (submitted by letter dated October 12, 1978), as supplemented by letters dated April 18, 1979 and August 10, 1979, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. These changes would revise the specifications dealing with availability of battery chargers in the Class 1E direct current (dc) electrical system. Two 75 amp battery chargers were installed at the plant prior to startup in 1969 in accordance with the original plant equipment specifications and construction procedures, and have, thus, been part of the plant configuration, but were not covered by the plant Technical Specifications.

Changes were made to the proposed technical specification changes as mutually agreed upon by the NRC staff and RG&E representatives.

2.0 EVALUATION

Each of the two Class 1E dc systems has a dedicated battery charger in use, whose capacity is 150 amperes. The current Technical Specifications require that only one battery charger per system needs to be operable while the reactor is maintained critical.

In addition to two 150 ampere battery chargers, two additional battery chargers, each with 75 amperes capacity, were installed in the plant prior to its startup in 1969. The licensee has proposed to list the two 75 ampere battery chargers in the Technical Specifications and thereby take credit for their operation. With all battery chargers operational and in their normal configuration, there is a total battery charger capacity of 225 amperes per battery. In the event either of the 150 ampere battery chargers becomes inoperable, manual transfer of a 75 ampere battery charger will result in a battery charger capacity of 150 amperes per Class 1E dc system. In addition; the dc bus tie-switch is

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padlocked open with the key maintained by the shift foremen. Operating procedures require that the feeder fuse to the redundant bus will be removed whenever the bus tie-switch is closed in order to use both 75 ampere chargers for one dc bus.

This configuration and capacity are in accordance with the guidance and recommendations provided in Regulatory Guide 1.6 and 1.32.

The additional battery chargers and their circuits are a part of the Class 1E electrical equipment which is currently under review in the SEP Program. The environmental and seismic qualification of such equipment is under review in the generic Equipment Qualification Program. Also, the adequacy of the physical separation of Class 1E electrical equipment and circuits required by Regulatory Guide 1.75 is currently under review in the Fire Protection Program. These additional reviews will assure long-term capability of the electrical equipment to perform its intended function.

3.0 SUMMARY

Based on our evaluation of the information provided by the licensee, we find that the two additional battery chargers on the dc systems are in conformance with the positions of Regulatory Guide 1.6 and 1.32, and the criteria of the IEEE Std. 308-1974. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the proposed amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types, increase in total amounts of effluents, or an increase in power level, and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

We also conclude, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security of the health and safety of the public.

Date: August 27, 1981